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Abstract 
A research method for investigating delusional beliefs is outlined by 
adopting the delusional belief that one is dead (the Cotard delusion) as a model 
delusion. Detailed analyses of published case reports of the Cotard delusion 
demonstrate that the term 'syndrome' as it is currently applied to the belief that one 
is dead is not helpful in terms of our understanding of the delusion. Four new case 
studies of the Cotard delusion suggest that preoccupation with belief may play a 
role in the formation and maintenance of delusions. 
Preoccupation with delusional belief was investigated using a variant of the 
'emotional' Stroop paradigm, commonly used in investigating anxiety disorders. 
Three individuals with the Cotard delusion, and diagnosed as suffering from 
depression, showed attentional biases toward words related to the theme of death. 
Two of the individuals had no history of anxiety and showed no bias toward words 
related to generalised anxiety. It was therefore suggested that the locus of 
attentional biases in delusions may be preoccupation with delusional belief, rather 
than anxiety per se. Consistent with this, a patient with fixed grandiose delusional 
beliefs, diagnosed with schizophrenia, and not suffering from anxiety, showed 
attentional bias toward words related to his delusional beliefs. Attentional bias 
failed to be demonstrated in a group of people with delusions arising in the context 
of schizophrenia, and reasons for this are discussed. Finally, three groups of 
individuals, who were free form any form of psychopathology, each showed a 
trend towards longer colour-naming times towards words related to their respective 
interests, but none of these were significant. 
It is concluded that attentional biases in delusions serve to reinforce 
delusional beliefs by constantly focusing the individual's attention onto delusion-
relevant material. Implications for further research are discussed. 
ii 
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Chapter One 
Chapter One 
Research into delusions 
"Since time immemorial delusion has been taken as the basic characteristic 
of madness. To be mad was to be deluded and indeed what constitutes a delusion 
is one of the basic problems of psychopathology." 
Jaspers (1913/1968, p.93) 
Definitions and contexts 
What is a delusion? 
Delusions are generally regarded as false beliefs that are symptomatic of 
mental illness (Berrios, 1991). The above quote from Jaspers, one of the first 
people to attempt to define delusion, remains pertinent today; the issue of what is 
and what is not a delusion is not a simple one. 
Jaspers (1913/1968) characterised delusions as judgments whose contents 
were impossible, which were held with extraordinary conviction and subjective 
certainty, and which were impervious to contradictory argument. He distinguished 
between a delusion-like idea (or over-valued idea, for he often used the two terms 
synonymously) and a primary delusion. A primary delusion, Jaspers argued, 
differed from a delusion-like idea in three ways. First, it was unmediated by 
thought; second it was "ununderstandable" ("unverstandlich") (Walker, p.101); and 
third, it indicated a change in personality (Jaspers, 1913/1968). A primary delusion 
was one that was elementary and psychologically irreducible (i.e., not the result of 
a disturbance of thinking or of perception or sensation). The disturbance, he 
argued, was one of symbolic meaning. A delusion-like idea was mediated by 
thought and was understandable, and was seen to evolve from factors such as guilt 
and false perceptions. Similarly, the evolution of normal beliefs and over-valued 
ideas were understandable and resulted from personality and life events. Schneider 
(1959) also defined a primary delusion as being non-understandable in terms of the 
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individual's personality or past experiences, and a secondary delusion as being 
understandable in terms of these two factors. 
The central tenet of both the Jasperian and Schneiderian account of delusion 
is that a delusion is a false belief. This view remains central today. Hence, the 
third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-in, 
1980), defines delusion as: 
"A false personal belief based on incorrect inference about 
external reality and firmly sustained in spite of what almost everyone 
else believes and in spite of what constitutes incontrovertible and 
obvious proof or evidence to the contrary". 
While most authors accept the general principle behind this definition (e.g., 
Hole, Rush & Beck, 1979; Mullen, 1979; Chapman, 1980; Winters & Neale, 
1983), some disagree with the entire notion that delusions are false beliefs. Berrios 
(1991), for example, writes that delusions are not beliefs at all, but "empty speech 
acts that disguise themselves as beliefs" (p. 8). In a historical analysis of delusions, 
Berrios (1991) notes that until the nineteenth century, delusions, hallucinations and 
illusions were seen as part of the same entity, and that they only became seen as 
separate entities as the result of a philosophical divorce between the concepts of 
belief and knowledge. Knowledge came to refer to scientific certainty and hence 
became subject to "canons", or rules, while belief became "subjectivised and 
redefined in probabilistic knowledge and mental attitudes" (Berrios, 1991, p. 10). 
Such changes in the philosophy of knowledge and belief were reflected in the 
definitions of delusions, hallucinations and illusions. The upshot of such changes 
meant that delusions could no longer be viewed as forms of knowledge, since their 
contents did not meet the new scientific canons and so, by default, argues Berrios, 
delusions became redefined as beliefs. Accordingly, delusions became defined in 
terms of intellectual pathology, hallucinations in terms of perceptual pathology and 
illusions as a combination of perception and intellect (Berrios, 1991). 
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Writing from a philosophical standpoint, Sass (1994) also argues against 
the idea that delusions are false beliefs. Sass provides an intriguing account of 
delusions in which he explores parallels between delusional thinking and solipsism. 
Solipsism is the philosophical doctrine that the self is the only thing that exists, or is 
the only knowable reality. According to this, the only things that are real are the 
things which one perceives and feels. In his account, Sass examines the 
philosophical writings of Wittgenstein and the memoirs of the paranoid 
schizophrenic Daniel Paul Schreber, entitled Memoirs of My Mental Illness. Sass 
suggests that "Madness... is, to be sure, a self-deceiving condition, but one that is 
generated from within rationality itself rather than by the loss of rationality" (p. 12). 
He argues that: 
"Schreber does not experience his delusions as being literally 
true but, rather, as having a certain 'subjectivised' quality - that is, as 
being in some sense the product of his own consciousness rather than as 
enjoying an independent or objective existence (as the poor reality-
testing formula implies)" (p.8). 
Sass goes on to argue that this description of experience is "strikingly 
reminiscent of the philosophical doctrine of solipsism..." (p.8). A potential 
problem with Sass' account is that many individuals with delusions act on those 
delusions; if such people were at some level aware that their beliefs were the 
product of their own minds and as such were distinct from "objective existence", 
surely they would not do this? Even if one accepts that acting on a delusion is 
compatible with solipsism, one of the notable points about delusions is that at least 
some individuals appear to believe them to be true. Even if Sass were to convince 
us that Schreber understood the difference between reality and non-reality, it is 
difficult to conceive, as shall be evident in Chapter Three, that at least some people 
with delusions do not believe them to be true, particularly when one considers the 
severity of some delusion-related behaviour, and this is evident even in cases where 
the individuals themselves understand that others cannot conceive of such beliefs. 
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Another argument against the notion of delusions as beliefs concerns the 
definition of the word belief as it is applied to delusions. Sims (1991) argues that: 
"A delusion is not really a belief in the conceptual or 
philosophical sense of the word. It is more a notion, assumption, idea, 
thought, or underlying mental structure of everyday life. It is 
unnecessarily pompous to state that I have a belief that the chair on 
which I am sitting will prevent me from falling on the floor; it is an 
assumption, a thought which barely reaches consciousness. Delusion is 
an assumption of that order" (p.47). 
How are we to reconcile such conflicting views? It may well transpire that 
for some short-lived, ill-formed delusions the term 'belief is inappropriate, while, 
as shall be demonstrated below, there are some well formed and complex delusions 
for which the term 'belief appears to be entirely appropriate. Indeed, Roberts 
(1991) notes that delusions vary greatly "from fleeting, changeable ideas to 
elaborate and stable systems" (p. 19). In essence, therefore, delusions may run 
along a continuum with fleeting, ill-formed ideas at one end and complex, stable 
beliefs at the other. Indeed, such beliefs and ideas may also run along a continuum 
with normal thinking, such that fully formed complex delusional beliefs fall at one 
end and normal thinking at the other, with fleeting delusional ideas falling 
somewhere in between the two. Such a viewpoint has emerged in line with the 
recognition that there is no clear demarcation of delusional beliefs and so-called 
'normal beliefs'. 
DSM-III (1980) went some way towards clarifying this issue by noting that 
a belief was delusional if it was "not one ordinarily accepted by other members of 
the person's culture or subculture" (p.228). This distinction has been taken up by a 
number of researchers (e.g., Winters & Neale, 1983) and has proved a useful 
means of helping to distinguish normal from delusional beliefs. For example, there 
are many people who claim to have had religious visions; those within their 
religious culture or group will most probably not view them as being deluded. 
4 
Chapter One 
Similarly, people who claim to have seen UFOs or ghosts may be believed by 
others who have either had similar experiences themselves or believe such sightings 
are at least plausible. The relevance of this is that whether such beliefs are viewed 
as delusional depends in part on just who is doing the viewing. 
DSM's (APA, 1980; 1994) distinction between normal and delusional 
beliefs in terms of content and culture certainly aids our definition of a delusion. 
However, the problem of distinguishing clearly between a normal and a delusional 
belief stems not just from the problem of defining a delusion, but from a lack of 
knowledge regarding the range and formation of normal beliefs. This inevitably 
means a precise distinction between a normal and a delusional belief remains 
problematic. 
Most modern conceptions of delusions acknowledge that there are many 
beliefs that may share certain characteristics of delusions, but which are not 
delusional. This notion is accepted in the recent modification to the definition of 
delusions in DSM-IV (1994): 
"Delusions are erroneous beliefs that usually involve a 
misinterpretation of perceptions or experiences... The distinction 
between a delusion and a strongly held idea is sometimes difficult to 
make and depends on the degree of conviction with which the belief is 
held despite clear contradictory evidence" (p.275). 
Such a definition acknowledges that the boundary between a delusion and a 
strongly held idea can be somewhat fuzzy. By way of illustration, Walker (1991) 
notes that we do not typically classify pathological gamblers and people with 
anorexia as suffering from delusions; we prefer to say they have over-valued, or 
perhaps self-deceptive ideas. Both groups, however, display implausibility of 
belief (I'm bound to win next time; I'm horribly fat), hold their respective beliefs 
with strong conviction and are impervious to counter-argument. 
Strauss (1969) drew a distinction between delusional beliefs and self-
deception. He considered a belief to be delusional if it was: i) highly implausible; 
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ii) held with strong conviction; and iii) greatly preoccupied the individual holding it. 
On the other hand, he viewed a belief that was quite plausible and held with less 
conviction and a lower degree of preoccupation, to be rather more self-deceptive 
than delusional. The notions, however, of conviction and preoccupation being 
'less' and 'lower' do not seem to seem adequate to distinguish delusional beliefs 
from self-deceptions - nor, indeed, from 'normal' beliefs. The lack of a clear 
distinction between delusional beliefs and self-deceptions has led authors such as 
Winters and Neale (1983) to suggest they fall along a continuum; at one end of the 
spectrum, there are those beliefs that are fairly commonplace (self-deceptions), and 
at the other are delusional beliefs that fulfil all three of Strauss' criteria. Similarly, 
in terms of delusional and normal beliefs, DSM-IV's criteria are consistent with the 
notion of a continuum, with delusions at one end and so-called normal thinking at 
the other. This may reflect the lack of understanding, noted above, not only of 
delusional beliefs, but also of normal beliefs. 
There are strong echoes of Jaspers' notions of ununderstandability and 
understandability in DSM-IV's differentiation between a bizarre and a non-bizarre 
delusion. According to DSM-IV, a delusion is bizarre if it is clearly implausible 
and does not result from normal life experiences, such as the belief that one is 
capable of controlling the weather. A non-bizarre delusion, on the other hand, may 
be plausible and may result from everyday life experiences, such as believing that 
one is being watched. 
Finally, as Jaspers noted, the definition of delusions is further complicated 
by the fact that even the veracity of a belief is not sufficient to judge whether that 
belief is delusional; the content of a delusion might be true, but the individual 
believes it for the wrong reasons. Jaspers noted that the wife of a man suffering 
from pathological jealousy might indeed be having an affair, but the husband is 
deluded, because the reasons underlying his belief are wrong. For instance, the 
wife became disenchanted with the marriage because of her husband's pathological 
jealousy, and so finally did have an affair. 
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To summarise, the task of defining delusions is a problematic one. There 
is, however, a general consensus that delusions are false beliefs, some of which are 
entirely implausible, others less so. They are usually considered to be held with 
strong conviction and preoccupation, are impervious to counter-argument and 
contradictory evidence, and are not shared by one's fellow cultural or religious 
group or subgroup. 
Who suffers from delusions? 
A common misconception about delusions is that they arise only in the 
context of schizophrenia. This is not the case - indeed, while delusions are often 
associated with schizophrenia, not all people suffering from schizophrenia hold 
delusional beliefs. Delusional beliefs can be found in various psychological 
disorders, including manic depressive disorder and affective anxiety disorder. 
Furthermore, delusions can arise through changes in the central nervous system 
resulting from alcohol misuse, drug abuse and varying types of organic illness 
(Winters & Neale, 1983). 
Delusions can last for a few days, while others may last for years. Some 
people suffer from single delusional beliefs; while others may suffer from more 
than one delusion at once (i.e., hold co-existent beliefs) (e.g., Joseph, 1986); and 
still others may suffer from one delusion followed by another (i.e., hold sequential 
delusional beliefs) (e.g., Wright, Young & Hellawell, 1993). 
Issues in research 
Explanations for delusions 
Until relatively recently, much research on delusions was conducted within 
a psychodynamic framework, according to which delusions are the reflections of 
unconscious inner states, such as unresolved conflicts or fears or unsatisfied needs, 
which are then projected onto an external attribution (e.g., Freud, 1917/1950, 
1921; Mayer-Gross, Slater & Roth, 1954, all cited by Neale, 1988). This type of 
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theory is prey to the same methodological criticism levelled at much of 
psychoanalytic theory; in order to falsify it, one needs to assess processes deemed 
to be unconscious. The methods often used for this (e.g., dream analysis and free 
association) are not generally held to be reliable research procedures (Winters & 
Neale, 1983). 
During the past few years, we have witnessed a growing interest in the 
study of delusions and much research now focuses on the definition and 
measurement of delusions (e.g., Garety, 1985; Brett-Jones, Garety & Hemsley, 
1987) and on cognitive functioning in people suffering from delusions (e.g., Huq, 
Garety & Hemsley, 1987). Generally, there are two main types of explanation for 
delusions. The first views delusions as rational attempts at interpreting abnormal 
experiences (Maher, 1974), while the second argues that delusional beliefs are the 
products of abnormal reasoning (Hemsley & Garety, 1986; Garety & Hemsley, 
1994). 
The notion that delusional beliefs are reflective of an underlying disorder of 
thinking is not a new one. Von Domarus (1944, cited by Maher, 1988) and Arieti 
(1955, cited by Maher, 1988) viewed delusions as being the result of faulty 
syllogistic reasoning (although, like Freud, Arieti believed faulty reasoning was 
itself the result of the disruption of some inner motivational state). Maher and his 
colleagues (1974, 1988; Maher & Ross, 1984) argue, however, that people with 
delusions are merely describing an experience; that delusions are not the result of an 
underlying disorder of thinking, but rational attempts to interpret perceptually 
anomalous experiences. Maher dismisses the notion that people with delusions are 
impervious to contradictory evidence; rather, he argues, the anomalous perceptions 
distort the available evidence such that, to the individual, it appears as confirmatory 
rather than contradictory evidence. Hence, for Maher, the perceptual anomaly is 
central to the delusion and distorts what we might regard as potentially 
contradictory evidence, and thus renders it confirmatory. In a similar vein, La 
Russo (1978, cited by Bentall & Kaney, 1989) suggests that the detection of 
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relevant information is impaired in people with delusions and so inappropriate 
conclusions are more likely to be drawn which in turn increases the likelihood of 
delusional thought. It is important to note, however, that most individuals with 
perceptual impairments do not become deluded. It seems difficult to argue 
convincingly, therefore, that an abnormality in perceptual processing represents a 
sufficient condition for delusional thinking. Moreover, schizophrenics may 
perform normally on syllogistic reasoning tasks but this does not rule out the 
possibility of the existence of an association between errors in reasoning and 
delusions: In the first place, many schizophrenics are not deluded, and in the 
second, formal logic forms only a small fraction of the gamut of human thought 
(Bentall & Kaney, 1989). 
Hemsley and Garety (1986) acknowledge that perceptual abnormalities play 
a role in the formation of delusions but, in contrast to Maher, argue that people with 
delusional beliefs are abnormal in their ability to evaluate evidence and consider 
alternative hypotheses. According to this abnormal reasoning hypothesis, 
delusions may arise from a deficit in the ability to assess evidence according to 
Bayesian principles. Basically, Bayes theorem shows by how much one should 
revise one's belief in a particular hypothesis given that new information is received. 
A number of potential biases can arise in hypothesis evaluation, such as when 
estimating probabilities and searching for information. Hemsley and Garety (1986) 
suggest that research undertaken on the formation of normal beliefs in terms of 
Bayesian theory, the types of judgments made and deviations from optimal 
Bayesian principles (Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983), might prove informative in 
regard to the study of the formation and maintenance of delusions. It is known that 
so-called 'normals' deviate from optimal Bayesian performance when evaluating 
existing and new information (Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983). If people 
suffering from delusions fail to take account of evidence that contradicts those 
beliefs, they should therefore show quantitative and/or qualitative differences from 
the norm. That is to say, they should deviate more, or in a different manner, from 
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normals, as has been shown to be the case in people with obsessional disorders 
(Volans, 1976). Consistent with this, Hemsley and his colleagues have 
demonstrated that people suffering from delusions request less information and 
express more confidence in their judgments in probabilistic reasoning (Huq etal., 
1987). 
It can be seen that the abnormal reasoning hypothesis and the perceptual 
account of delusions are conceptually distinct. As will be discussed below, and in 
Chapters Four and Five, however, both may offer clues as to the formation and 
maintenance of delusions, since it is unlikely to be the case that all delusions can be 
accounted for by a single causal explanation. Hence, Neale (1988), who agrees 
that Maher's theory provides a neat account of delusions involving physiological 
sensations and hallucinations, notes that different mechanisms may underlie 
different types of delusion. Indeed, Maher himself (1974), who was primarily 
concerned with explaining persecutory delusions, originally pointed out that his 
theory may not account for all patients or for all types of delusions. 
The notion that different causal mechanisms underlie different types of 
delusion has considerable implications for psychopathological research. In 
particular, it has implications for the level at which psychopathological research is 
conducted, which lies at the heart of the continuing controversy surrounding 
syndrome- versus symptoms-based approaches in research. It is to this 
controversy that I now turn. 
Symptoms and syndromes 
The idea of psychiatric syndromes is to find an agreed and reliable way of 
classifying the phenomena encountered. Psychiatrists therefore tend to look for 
syndromes that are defined by clusters of co-occurring symptoms. Despite its 
widespread use in diagnosis, the usefulness of the syndrome concept in 
psychopathological research has been the subject of much debate in recent years 
(Bentall, Jackson & Pilgrim, 1988a, b; Wing, 1988; Bentall, 1990, 1992; Costello, 
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1992). At the heart of this debate are the related issues of reliability and validity. 
Reliability refers to the consistency with which people are diagnosed using a given 
system, while validity concerns the usefulness and meaningfulness of diagnostic 
classification. 
In terms of reliability, Bentall (1990) notes that "one psychiatrist's 
schizophrenic must be another psychiatrist's schizophrenic" (p.25). He argues that 
in practice this is not the case, although he and his colleagues (Bentall et al., 1988a) 
acknowledge the advances made to this end in recent years, most notably in the 
development of the Present State Examination (PSE), a structured interview 
technique (Wing, Cooper & Sartorius, 1974) and the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III, 1980). Bentall et al. (1988a) argue that 
"this reliability may not be all that it appears" (p.306) because if different criteria are 
designed to identify the same entity, one would expect a high degree of agreement 
between them in any case. 
Bentall et al. (1988a) argue that reliability is a necessary, but not sufficient 
requirement for establishing validity and so even if reliability was to be obtained, 
further evidence would need to be presented to establish validity. For the concept 
of a syndrome such as schizophrenia to be valid, Wing (1988) argues that a number 
of traits should tend to co-occur. Hence, two patients should have some symptoms 
in common. Bentall (1990) and Costello (1992) argue that this is often not found in 
practice. Bentall et al. (1988a, citing Kendell) add that the reverse should also 
hold. That is to say, few individuals suffering from a syndrome should display 
symptoms of other illnesses. Again, he argues that this is often not the case. While 
acknowledging that the syndrome approach may result in reliable diagnoses, 
Costello (1992) notes that agreement between different diagnostic tools (i.e., 
concurrent validity) is low. Costello (1992) argues that if concurrent validity is 
low, a question arises as to the construct validity of the measurements used. If the 
construct validity is questionable, then the data obtained from such a measure are 
necessarily of questionable validity and hence the data on symptoms derived from 
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the measure will be inadequate. Furthermore, addressing the issue of categorical or 
dimensional differences between psychotic and non-psychotic behaviour (e.g., as 
in the notion of a continuum of beliefs, referred to above) might be an easier task if 
tackled at the level of symptoms rather than syndromes (Bentall et ah, 1988a; 
Costello, 1992). Such views have led authors such as Costello (1992) and Bentall 
(Bentall et ah, 1988a, b; Bentall, 1990) to propose that research into symptoms is 
likely to prove more informative to our understanding of mental illness than is 
research into syndromes. 
The decision to undertake syndrome-based or symptom-based research 
must surely depend largely, however, on what one wants to achieve. Certainly, if 
one is researching into the value of explanations involving psychological factors, it 
would seem sensible to direct that research at deficits defined at the same level of 
generality as the psychological theory employed. However, it is clear that 
syndromes can often have diagnostic usefulness, and that broadly-based groupings 
of cases are needed to support certain types of inference. Parenthetically, it is 
worth noting that psychiatry as a discipline has not ignored the 
syndrome/symptoms debate within psychopathological research, nor has it denied 
the clinical heterogeneity of, for example, schizophrenia. Indeed, the increasing 
number of papers on these issues appearing in psychiatric journals in recent years 
bears witness to this (e.g., Liddle, 1987; Liddle & Barnes, 1990; Snaith, 1991; 
Costello, 1992). 
Clearly, in conducting research there are many different possible 
classification systems one might adopt, and, as hinted above, these exist at different 
levels of generality. For the sake of simplicity, let us imagine there are three levels 
at which one might investigate delusional beliefs. First, if one's primary overall 
research interest is in schizophrenia, one may wish to adopt a relatively broad-based 
strategy and examine the presence or absence of symptom clusters which may 
include delusions, as well as, say, thought disorder and hallucinations. Here, the 
disorder under investigation is schizophrenia and the aim is to ascertain whether a 
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pattern of symptoms emerges for various sub-classifications of schizophrenia. 
Second, if one is interested in explaining delusional beliefs per se one approach 
might be to examine different types of delusion with a view to establishing whether 
certain individual features co-occur. Here, it can be seen that the disorder under 
investigation has switched from being schizophrenia to that of delusions in general, 
and the aim is to ascertain whether a pattern of features emerges in different types of 
delusional belief. Third, one might be interested in understanding mechanisms 
underlying a specific delusional belief, in which case one might examine only those 
individuals who suffer from that particular delusional belief with tasks sensitive to 
the hypothesised mechanism (and, of course, one might then attempt to discover 
whether any such mechanisms are implicated in other delusional beliefs). Here, the 
specific delusional belief becomes the object of study and the aim is to understand 
how that particular belief is formed and maintained. In the latter case, the decision 
is made to attempt to understand in detail a particular, relatively tightly-defined 
phenomenon. One can then decide to investigate whether one's explanation can be 
broadened to account for other types of delusion. It is to this approach that I now 
turn. 
Adopting a model delusional belief 
In order to investigate how delusions are formed and maintained, an 
appropriate starting point would seem to be to identify a sort of 'model' delusional 
belief. Then, one may attempt to establish a common pattern of symptoms, and 
then try to construct a theory that is able to account for the resulting 
symptomatology. Such a theory would need to establish causal mechanisms in the 
formation and maintenance of that delusion. Having done this, one may, as 
suggested above, attempt to ascertain whether similar mechanisms may be involved 
in other types of delusion. 
The starting point in the present research, therefore, was to identify a model 
delusion. I chose the Cotard delusion, which is the delusional belief that one is 
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dead, because it fulfils the generally-agreed definition of delusions, referred to 
above (p.6). That is to say, it is is a false belief, held with strong conviction and 
preoccupation, is impervious to counter-argument and contradictory evidence, and 
it is not shared by people's cultural or religious groups. Furthermore, in terms of 
bizarreness, it is certainly one of the most implausible of delusional beliefs. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to outlining current theory 
regarding the formation of the Cotard delusion, and to relating this to the structuring 
of the present thesis. 
The Cotard delusion 
Introduction 
In 1882, Jules Cotard, a French psychiatrist, published a number of case 
reports in which the central feature was what he termed nihilistic delusions (le delire 
de negation). In their milder form, these delusions were characterised by self-
deprecation and feelings of despair and in their most extreme form, by a total denial 
of the self and external world. Over the years, the term 'Cotard syndrome' has 
become almost synonymous with the most striking feature found in the nihilistic 
delusions described by Cotard; the belief that one is dead, although, as shall be 
discussed in Chapter Two, Cotard believed that this symptom occurred in severe 
forms of le delire de negation, and that it did not represent the defining feature. The 
delusion was first referred to eponymously by S6glas (1897), following a 
suggestion by his contemporary, Regis. 
An approach to research and an explanation 
Until very recently, the Cotard delusion was viewed mainly in 
psychodynamic terms, by which the delusion arises out of a "death-wish inherent in 
the collective conscious" (Enoch & Trethowan, 1979, p. 130). Self-negation, self-
punishment and feelings of guilt are all seen as reflections of this death-wish. 
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Over the past few years, however, an alternative theory of the Cotard 
delusion has been proposed (e.g., Young, Robertson, Hellawell, de Pauw & 
Pentland, 1992). Young and his colleagues point to a number of perceptually 
anomalous experiences in the Cotard delusion. These anomalies involve things 
appearing unfamiliar and unreal to the individuals, as well as a loss of emotional 
responsiveness. They suggest that the Cotard delusion is the result of a 
misinterpretation of those anomalous perceptual experiences (Young etai, 1992; 
Wright et al., 1993; Young, 1994). 
Such experiences might potentially be interpreted in many possible ways 
and, as Kaney and Bentall (1989) note, this will depend on social and personal 
factors. In regard to this, it is relevant that the Cotard delusion typically arises in 
the context of depression. Beck (1967; 1989) argued that depressed individuals 
commonly have a negative cognitive set. This cognitive set consists of negative 
views of themselves, the external world, and the future. Central to this is the 
concept of schemas, which consist of previous negative events. These schemas 
become automatically activated whenever similar negative events are encountered 
and influence the way in which these new events are interpreted. Hence, the self, 
the situation and the future are all perceived as being hopeless. Schema activation is 
held to be automatic, leading the depressed individual to make arbitrary inferences 
about causation. For example, if the person to whom you are attracted does not feel 
the same attraction, it is because you are a fat, ugly, uninteresting failure. 
Consistent with Beck's formulation of depression, it has been shown that 
depressed individuals tend to attribute negative events to internal causes (It's my 
fault) rather than to external causes (It's someone else's fault) (Kaney & Bentall, 
1989; Candido & Romney, 1990). Wright et al (1993), drawing from this theory, 
suggest that the individuals' depressed mood contributes to their seeking an internal 
cause for their perceptual problems, and erroneously concluding that they must be 
dead. That is to say, they (correctly) attribute their altered perceptual experience as 
being a change in themselves, but (incorrectly) go on to infer that they are dead. 
15 
Chapter One 
A problem with this theory does not address the issue of why patients form 
the specific belief they are dead, rather than say they feel as //they are dead, or do 
not feel human. There would seem to be a quantum leap from seeking an internal 
cause for their perceptually anomalous experience to concluding they are dead. 
Why, for example, do patients not claim that they have changed into a non-human 
form, as happens in patients suffering from metamorphosis - and, indeed, in some 
of Cotard's original (1882) cases? Alternatively, given the reported perceptual 
anomalies, why do patients not believe they have, for example, a brain tumour or a 
visual defect? 
These problems notwithstanding, the general theoretical approach of Young 
and his colleagues has two main advantages. First, it generates readily testable 
predictions. For example, the delusion of being dead should resolve in parallel 
with changes in the individual's mood. This indeed appears to be the case (Young 
et al, 1992) and will be demonstrated further in Chapter Three. Second, the 
approach can be extended to other delusional beliefs, such as the Capgras delusion, 
in which people claim that some of their relatives have been replaced by duplicates 
or impostors (Capgras & Reboul-Lachaux, 1923). 
The Capgras delusion shows intriguing parallels to the Cotard delusion; in 
particular, similar perceptual anomalies are reported by both types of patient. 
Indeed, the fact that people experiencing the Cotard delusion often report that they 
must be dead because they 'feel nothing inside' provides a parallel with a widely 
hypothesised lack of affective reactions in Capgras cases (Anderson, 1988; Ellis & 
Young, 1990; Lewis, 1987). That is to say, not only do people have a lack of 
feeling of familiarity for the person or persons they believe are the impostors, but 
they are usually curiously ambivalent about what has happened to the original. 
Similar impairments are seen in both the Cotard and Capgras delusions on 
neuropsychological tests of the processing of faces (e.g., on the selection of 
previously-seen from previously-unseen distracter faces in tests of recognition 
memory) and places (e.g., on recognition memory for unfamiliar buildings and on 
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the naming of famous landmarks, such as the Eiffel Tower) (Young et al., 1992; 
Young, Reid, Wright & Hellawell, 1993). Also common to both types of delusion 
are feelings of derealisation (Christodoulou, 1977; Todd, Dewhurst & Wallis, 
1981; Young et al., 1993). The issue of derealisation, and also that of 
depersonalisation, warrants special mention and shall be addressed below. 
Finally, both delusions can be produced by similar types of brain injury. In patient 
WI (Young et al., 1992), for example, the Cotard delusion followed damage to the 
temporo-parietal areas of the right cerebral hemisphere as well as some bilateral 
frontal lobe damage. A similar pattern has been associated with the Capgras 
delusion (Alexander, Stuss & Benson, 1979; Lewis, 1987), and right hemisphere 
dysfunction (as assessed by neuropsychological tests of face-processing) has been 
shown even in cases of Capgras delusion without readily demonstrable brain injury 
(Ellis, de Pauw, Christodoulou, Papageorgiou, Milne & Joseph, 1993). The face 
processing impairments are held to re-inforce the feeling the patients have of 
appearing to be strange and unfamiliar. Taking the above evidence into account, 
Young et al. (1992) have therefore suggested that the underlying pathophysiology 
and neuropsychology of the Cotard and Capgras delusions may be related. 
Against this background of similarities between the Cotard and Capgras 
delusions, there appears to be a key difference. While the Cotard delusion is 
associated with a depressed mood, the Capgras delusion is associated with a 
suspicious mood, and is often accompanied by persecutory delusions. Studies 
have shown that people with persecutory delusions tend to attribute negative events 
to external rather than internal causes (Kaney & Bentall, 1989; Candido & Romney, 
1990). Hence, Young et al. (1993) hypothesise that in the Capgras delusion, a 
suspicious mood and the presence of persecutory delusions cause people to 
misattribute changes in their own perception to changes in other people, which in 
turn leads them to infer that these people must be impostors. 
Again, the issue of why patients form the specific belief that others are 
impostors is not addressed by Young and his colleagues. However, the leap from 
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seeking an external cause for one's perceptual problems to claiming that others are 
impostors does not appear to be as great as that required when attempting to account 
for the Cotard delusion in terms of internal attributions of perceptual anomalies. 
In both the Capgras and Cotard delusions, therefore. Young and his 
colleages claim that there are at least two interacting contributory factors; anomalous 
perceptual experience and disturbed mood. The latter determines a particular 
interpretation of the former, which results in the specific form of delusion. A 
prediction which follows from this is that i f people who had initially voiced the 
Cotard delusion change from being depressed to being suspicious, they may shift to 
the Capgras delusion as an account of their experiences, and vice-versa. Consistent 
with this, there are indeed a number of reports of sequential Capgras and Cotard 
delusions (Bleeker & Sno, 1983; Enoch & Trethowan, 1991; Forstl, Almeida & 
Iacoponi, 1991; Joseph, 1986; Kim, 1991; Wrightsai, 1993). 
The theory that the Capgras and Cotard delusions result from an interaction 
of contributory factors may help to explain why the two appear to be related. There 
are, however, a number of problems with Young's theory. First, as noted above, it 
fails to explain why patients formulate the specific beliefs about being dead and 
others being replaced by impostors. If patients are seeking an explanation for their 
perceptually anomalous experiences, what makes these particular explanations seem 
more acceptable to them than other alternatives? 
A further problem concerns the causal role of the factors which Young and 
his colleagues identify. First, might not the perceptually anomalous experiences be 
secondary to the formation of the delusional belief? That is to say, the delusion 
itself may give rise to the perceptual anomalies and loss of emotional 
responsiveness, as opposed to arising from the need to explain such anomalous 
experiences. If this were the case, then a question would arise as to whether the 
'misinterpretation' relates to an erroneous attribution of causality, rather than to 
(secondary) perceptual anomalies. Second, and related to this, might not the 
depressed and suspicious moods be, in turn, secondary to the perceptually 
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anomalous experiences? In this case, the attribution would not mood-driven and 
neither would it arise out of the need to explain strange experiences. Rather, it 
would be the precursor to such moods and experiences. 
Even if these problems can be overcome, a final problem remains. Young's 
theory does not explain why, having formulated their specific explanatory beliefs, 
people remain convinced by explanations that seem so patently absurd to everyone 
around them. Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven therefore examine a mechanism 
which may be involved in the maintenance of delusional beliefs, namely attentional 
bias. 
The Cotard delusion, and derealisation and depersonalisation 
Depersonalisation appears as a disorder in its own right in DSM-IV (1994), 
according to which it is characterised by "a feeling of detachment or estrangement 
from one's self (p.488), and derealisation is listed as one of several features 
associated with it. While depersonalisation refers to the perception of one's body 
or the self as feeling strange and unreal, derealisation relates to the perception of the 
external world as being strange and unreal (Mayer-Gross, 1935; Nemiah, 1989). 
Mayer-Gross argued that while there may be good theoretical reasons for viewing 
the two phenomena as belonging together, in cases where the two appeared 
together, "either the subjective [i.e., depersonalisation] or the objective [i.e., 
derealisation] disturbance is usually more emphasised in the patient's description" 
(p. 104). Some authors feel such a distinction is neither valid nor helpful (e.g., 
Hollander, Fairbanks, Decaria & Liebowitz, 1989), but the report of a case of 
derealisation without depersonalisation lends suport to the existence, of two 
phenomena (Krizek, 1989). The principal issue here concerns the status of 
depersonalisation and derealisation; the question whether they represent distinct 
categories or fall along a continuum remains the subject of debate. The case of 
derealisation in the absence of depersonalisation (Krizek, 1989) does not provide 
direct evidence either for a categorical distinction or against the concept of a 
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continuum. Furthermore, whether one views Krizek's case as contradicting the 
notion that derealisation constitutes a feature of depersonalisation (DSM-IV, 1994), 
would seem to depend on how broad a definition one applies to the term 
'depersonalisation'. 
In the absence of tighter definitions of depersonalisation and derealisaton, 
this thesis remains neutral in regard to their respective status. The term 
'depersonalisation' is used hereafter to refer to the experience of unreal feelings 
regarding the self, and 'derealisation' to describe the experience of unreal feelings 
regarding the environment. That is to say, depersonalisation is used to describe 
feelings of unreality of the internal world, while derealisation is used to describe 
those of the external world (cf. Mayer-Gross, 1935; Nemiah, 1989). 
Derealisation and depersonalisation are common clinical features of the 
Cotard delusion (e.g., Joseph & O'Leary, 1986; Young etai, 1992; Wright et al., 
1993), although surprisingly little significance has been afforded to them in this 
context. Indeed, Nuller (1982) has noted that depersonalisation is often 
underestimated in clinical practice, despite the fact that it is associated with many 
mental illnesses. In regard to this, it is interesting to note that Mayer-Gross, 
writing in 1935, noted that "... the diagnostic value of the depersonalisation 
syndrome seems small. No one can say how far this will continue to be true. 
Diagnosis in psychiatry is still in a state of flux and our syndrome may one day 
come to have practical value" (p. 103). 
What is the relationship between depersonalisation and the Cotard delusion? 
Speaking in general terms, Mayer-Gross (1935) suggested that "delusional 
misinterpretation does not, as a rule, creep into the depersonalisation" (p. 105). 
More specifically, Enoch and Trethowan (1979) argue that the Cotard delusion and 
depersonalisation need to be distinguished from one another. They claim that 
people suffering from depersonalisation say " I feel as if I am dead", while those 
suffering from the Cotard delusion say " I am dead" (p. 130). However, evidence is 
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presented in Chapter Three which questions this clear demarcation and suggests that 
there is a marked overlap between depersonalisation and the Cotard delusion. 
Finally, an interesting link has been made between depersonalisation and 
feelings of deja vu. First, it has been shown that the deja vu phenomenon is 
experienced more often by psychiatric patients than by non-psychiatric patients 
(Richardson & Winokur, 1968, cited by Sno & Linszen, 1990). Second, and of 
particular interest in relation to the Cotard delusion, is the suggestion that deja vu 
may be viewed as the positive equivalent of depersonalisation (Nemiah, 1989). 
Hence, in deja vu one has an inappropriate feeling of familiarity (and one is aware 
that the feeling is inappropriate) and in depersonalisation one has an inappropriate 
lack of familiarity (and one need not necessarily be aware that the feeling is 
inappropriate). It has been proposed (Myers & Grant, 1972) that jamais vu (i.e., 
never seen) represents an extreme degree of depersonalisation, affecting places and 
situations, whereas depersonalisation itself affects experience of the self (Nemiah, 
1989). According to this jamais vu may be related more to derealisation than to 
depersonalisation. Again, the category versus continuum issue is raised here. 
Nemiah (1989) appears to be arguing that deja vu and depersonalisation form 
separate, but related, categories (the former positive, the latter negative), whereas 
Myers and Grant (1972) appear to be suggesing that jamais vu falls within a 
depersonalisation continuum which also includes derealisation and deja vu. 
As with the status issue of depersonalisation and derealisation, this thesis 
remains neutral as to the relationships of deja vu and jamais vu to depersonalisation 
and derealisation. Chapter Three includes a case description of an individual who 
claimed to have had many experiences of deja vu prior to the onset of the Cotard 
delusion, and displayed feelings of jamais vu during the delusion. 
The Cotard delusion and the philosophy of existence 
I f you tell people you are conducting research into the delusional belief that 
one is dead, you are typically greeted with incredulity: "How on earth could 
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anyone think they're dead?". If , on the other hand, you tell people that you are 
investigating people who believe they are, for example, Jesus Christ, or have 
recently seen Elvis Presley in the local Co-op, the response tends to be: "Oh, I bet 
that's interesting", or some such statement. The difference is that people can 
conceive of someone believing themselves to be Jesus Christ, or believing that they 
have seen Elvis Presley, but they cannot conceive of someone claiming to be dead. 
Their incredulity highlights the fact that the Cotard delusion appears to fly in the 
face of the fundamental philosophy of existence. 
The philosophical implications of the Cotard delusion have not gone 
unnoticed. Enoch and Trethowan (1979) state that "Cotard's syndrome has a 
complex psychopathology of its own and one which brings us face to face with the 
very meaning of existence itself (p. 117). As such, it appears to represent a direct 
contradiction of a very basic argument in philosophy, namely Descartes' cogito 
ergo sum: 
"... while I thus decided to think that everything was false, it 
followed necessarily that I who thought thus must be something; and 
observing that this truth: / think, therefore I am, was so certain and so 
evident that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were 
not capable of shaking it, I judged that I could accept it without scruple 
as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking. 
"Then, examining attentively what I was, and seeing that I could 
pretend that I had no body and that there was no world or place that I 
was in, but that I could not, for all that, pretend that I did not exist, and 
that, on the contrary, from the very fact that I thought of doubting the 
truth of other things, it followed very evidently and very certainly that I 
existed; while, on the other hand, if I had only ceased to think, although 
all the rest of what I had ever imagined had been true, I would have had 
no reason to believe that I existed". 
(Descartes, 1637/1968, p.54) 
22 
Chapter One 
At first sight, people suffering from the Cotard delusion appear to be saying 
' I think, but nevertheless I am not' and hence may appear to contradict Descartes' 
theory of existence. However, a principal complaint in Cotard sufferers is that they 
do not have proper feelings and claim that their absence of, or alteration in, feelings 
is evidence that they are dead, or no longer exist. But, Russell (1961) argues that 
Descartes intended 'cogito' to be interpreted as ' I think and feel', and not just as ' I 
think': 
"'Thinking' is used by Descartes in a very wide sense. A thing 
that thinks, he says, is one that doubts, understands, conceives, 
affirms, denies, wills, imagines, and feels". 
(Russell, 1961, p.548). 
Denying one's own existence thus does not represent a contradiction to the 
cogito ergo sum principle, for if we cease to have normal feelings, we may have no 
reason to believe we exist. Chapters Two and Three examine this and other 
symptoms of the Cotard delusion in detail in order to examine the utility of the 
concept of a Cotard syndrome as applied to Cotard's own original case reports and 
to more case recent reports of the delusion. 
Following from the examination of the utility of a Cotard syndrome, a 
possible mechanism in the maintenance of the Cotard delusion is identified and this 
is explored in Chapter Four. In Chapters Five and Six, this mechanism is 
examined in other types of delusion, and in Chapter Seven the mechanism is 
explored in subjects who are not suffering from any form of psychopathology. 
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Chapter Two 
The Cotard delusion 
"Stating that she was no longer anything, the patient begged for her veins to 
be opened, her arms and legs to be cut o f f , and her body to be opened up, so that it 
could be seen that she had no more blood and that her organs no longer existed " 
Case 6, Cotard (1882). 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the notion of a Cotard 'syndrome' is questioned, and it is 
suggested that Cotard's, now largely forgotten, original conception of nihilistic 
delusions best fits the symptoms displayed not just by his original cases, but by 
other cases reported in the literature. First, the debate surrounding the existence of 
a Cotard syndrome is outlined. Second, evidence from Cotard's own cases wil l be 
presented which demonstrates that the Cotard delusion is not a syndrome in which 
some symptoms inevitably co-occur, but rather a delusional belief in which severity 
varies between individuals as well as within individuals during the course of their 
illness. Finally, an analysis of 17 other published case reports of the Cotard 
delusion lends further support for this position. 
The Cotard syndrome debate 
As noted in Chapter One, Cotard (1882) reported a number of cases in 
which people suffered from negativistic delusions ranging in severity from self-
deprecatory ideas to complete denial of the world. Cotard noted, therefore, that the 
delusions could be partial or total, allowing for a continuum of severity, with 
individuals falling anywhere in between these two extremes at any time during the 
course of their illness. For example, people may begin by expressing self-
deprecatory notions about being responsible for the suffering of others and express 
guilt and shame. Later on in the course of their illness, they might voice the belief 
24 
Chapter Two 
that parts of their bodies are rotting away or are no longer there. Some may go on 
to deny their families, claiming they were never married in the first place and so 
have no family. Later still, they may claim to be dead and that the world no longer 
exists or, in a seeming paradox, claim to be immortal and/or even attempt suicide. 
These seemingly paradoxical features will be commented on in Chapter Three. 
The important thing to note here is that the common theme is one of 
negation. While Cotard allowed, indeed insisted upon, the variability of nihilistic 
delusions, he viewed as essential the presence of negativism and self-accusatory 
depressive delusions (self-blame, guilt, shame and/or eternal death or damnation). 
In terms of possible causal factors, Cotard believed "the twin sources of 
nihilistic delusions... [to be]... melancholia with depression or stupor, and 
melancholia with agitation or anxiety" (Hirsch & Shepherd, 1974, p.355). Anxiety 
and depression were therefore viewed by Cotard as causal factors rather than 
symptoms per se. Hence he says "... in advanced chronic conditions of this type it 
is not uncommon for these delusions to outlast the general symptomatology seen at 
the beginning of the illness and for patients... to show no signs of visible 
depression or anxious agitation" (Hirsch & Shepherd, 1974, p.355). 
In Chapter One, it was noted that over the years, the term 'Cotard 
syndrome' has become virtually synonymous with the most striking feature found 
in the nihilistic delusions described by Cotard: The belief that one is dead. Cotard 
did indeed note that in some cases, everything could seem so unreal that individuals 
thought they had died (Cotard, 1880, 1882, 1884), but he viewed this belief as an 
accompanying feature in severe cases, and certainly not as the defining one. Enoch 
and Trethowan (1979), however, describe Cotard's syndrome as "a rare condition 
of which the central symptom is a nihilistic delusion which, in its complete form, 
leads the patient to deny his own existence and that of the external world" (p. 117). 
In Enoch and Trethowan's view, therefore, the more severe the symptoms, the 
more complete the delusion. 
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As mentioned in Chapter One, S6glas (1897) was the first to refer to the 
Cotard syndrome eponymously although, interestingly, he did not consider it to be 
a syndrome as such, but rather a symptom that could be found in a variety of 
disorders. Cotard had himself, however, believed that le delire de negation was an 
illness in its own right. This view was opposed as early as 1892, at the Congress 
of Neurologists at Blois, France, by delegates who regarded the illness as a 
symptom arising in a number of disorders such as confusional states, 
schizophrenia, epilepsy and senile and pre-senile conditions (Enoch & Trethowan, 
1979). 
The delusion of being dead is certainly associated with a variety of 
psychopathological disorders, including depression (e.g., Enoch & Trethowan, 
1979; Campbell, Volow & Cavenar, 1981; Young et al., 1992; Wright et al, 
1993), affective disorders (e.g., Joseph, 1986), acute schizophrenia (Campbell et 
al., 1981; Joseph, 1986) and organic disorders (e.g., Mayer-Gross, 1935; Ey, 
1950; Anderson, 1964; Campbell et al., 1981; Joseph, 1986). In particular, the 
delusion has been associated with fronto-temporal lesions and epilepsy (Drake, 
1988), typhoid fever (Campbell et al., 1981) and parietal lobe abnormality (Enoch 
& Trethowan, 1979). The role of the parietal lobes has been called into question, 
however, by Joseph and O'Leary (1986), who found the delusion to be associated 
with cortical atrophy involving the medial frontal lobes, but not the parietal lobes. 
It is generally accepted, then, that the Cotard delusion may arise in the 
context of organic disorder as well as various forms of psychopathology. The 
debate regarding the status of the delusion, however, remains unresolved; there is 
disagreement as to whether the Cotard delusion is best regarded as a syndrome, as 
symptom arising in a number of mental disorders, or a subtype of depression. 
As noted above, the term 'Cotard syndrome' has come to be used largely to 
describe the single delusional belief that one is dead. However, different authors 
appear to have different conceptions of precisely what is meant by a 'Cotard 
syndrome'. Joseph and O'Leary (1986), drawing from Cotard (1891), note, and 
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Enoch and Trethowan (1979) write: "The hallmark of the disorder is the delusion of 
being dead. Associated features include le delire d'enormite (the delusion of 
enormous body size), delusion of immortality, and intense nihilistic delusions that 
can expand to negate all of a patient's internal and external world" (p.518). Drake 
(1988), drawing from Cotard's (1891) description, refers to the syndrome as "an 
unusual disorder characterised chiefly by the delusion of death, and less frequently 
involving perceptions of immortality, enormous body size, or non-existence of 
body parts" (p.36). In both of these descriptions, the belief that one is dead is the 
principal symptom, which may be associated with other features. Campbell et al. 
(1981) summarise the modern view of the syndrome as being "an extreme form of 
nihilistic delusion, and most often the delusion is that one has died or does not 
exist" (p. 1377); while Forstl and Beats (1992) write that the term Cotard syndrome 
"is commonly applied to patients who suffer the nihilistic delusional belief that they 
are mortally i l l or dead" (p.417). In both these descriptions, the 'syndrome' is 
viewed in terms of a 'nihilistic delusion'. 
Friedman and Caplan (1967, cited by Enoch & Trethowan, 1979), do not 
agree that this type of description is suggestive of a syndrome. Hence, they argue 
that it "has never been possible to see in which way patients with this syndrome 
differ from those who manifest what psychiatrists usually call nihilistic delusions -
such delusions being by no means uncommon in patients suffering from 
endogenous depression, as well as occurring in patients with organic brain disease" 
(p. 117). However, Enoch and Trethowan argue that it is justifiable to refer to 
Cotard's syndrome as a distinct clinical entity "in view of the fact that it may exist in 
a pure and complete form, and that even when symptomatic of another mental 
illness, such as endogenous depression, nihilistic delusions usually dominate the 
clinical picture" (p. 117). Such a statement is suggestive of a syndrome varying 
along a continuum, with a 'pure' form at one end, and a less complete form at 
another. The notion that the Cotard syndrome varies along a continuum is 
addressed by Malone and Malone (1993), who describe Cotard's syndrome as "a 
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rare and uncommonly reported psychosyndrome characterised by a denial by the 
afflicted person of his own existence. This can vary in severity along a continuum 
from a belief by the patient that he is losing his powers of intellect and feelings, to 
the most severe form when he believes that he no longer exists, leading him to deny 
his own existence and that of the cosmos" (p.53). This view certainly has echoes 
of Cotard's view that le delire de negation varies along a continuum. But, little 
seems to be achieved by the insistence of a Cotard syndrome as opposed to an 
extreme manifestation of a nihilistic delusion, and it is noteworthy that Friedman 
and Caplan's conception of the delusion seems more akin to the delusion that 
Cotard himself described. 
In order to assess the usefulness of the concept of a Cotard syndrome, a 
detailed analysis of case reports of the delusion is warranted. A simple way of 
doing this is to ask which features commonly or necessarily co-occur. This is the 
question that is addressed in the following section. 
Cotard's case reports 
Introduction 
It has already been noted that Cotard allowed for a degree of variability in 
his cases in terms of symptoms and severity, while noting their common features of 
the presence of self-deprecatory depressive delusions and negativism. To what 
extent were these and other features universally present in Cotard's (1882) case 
reports? 
Cotard's first description of nihilistic delusions was presented in a paper 
read to the Soctete" M6dico-Psychologique on 28 June 1880 (Cotard, 1880). In this 
paper, Cotard described a single case with key features of what would come to be 
known as Cotard's syndrome. His patient, Mile. X, denied the existence of God, 
the devil, and many parts of her body, and said that she no longer needed to eat. 
Later, she believed that she was eternally damned because of her failings, and that 
this was justified punishment, but felt that she could no longer die a natural death, 
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and made repeated suicide attempts. In this report, Cotard (1880) used the phrase 
le delire de negation, but more as a descriptive remark than as a name for the 
problem. 
Analysis of Cotard's case reports 
In 1882, Cotard presented an extensive case series, in which he divided his 
cases into three categories. The first category (cases 1-8) involved the purest form 
in that the individuals were not suffering from any other kind of delusion. The 
second category, represented by a single case only (case 9), showed nihilistic 
delusions as part of a more general debilitating illness. In Cotard's third category 
(cases 10-11) there were concurrent nihilistic and persecutory delusions. Cotard 
viewed these as mixed cases, and claimed that individuals with these additional 
delusions of persecution showed several features that differed from those people 
with purely nihilistic delusions; for example, they thought of themselves as being 
possessed rather than damned. 
In terms of the putative Cotard syndrome, cases 1-8 from this series are the 
most important, since these were thought to be relatively pure, and are the ones 
with which this analysis is concerned. To make the analysis as neutral as possible, 
all the features and symptoms from Cotard's 1882 case reports were simply listed. 
This list included any symptoms Cotard mentioned in discussion, as well as those 
from the case reports themselves. In all, this yielded some 31 symptoms, which 
are listed in Table 2.1. They are listed under general headings, according to 
symptom type, which are used in a further, more broad-based analysis (see below). 
Finally, a word of explanation is warranted in terms of the belief that one's body 
has changed in some way. Cotard noted a number of symptoms concerning 
changes in the body, including the belief that one's body is enormous (le delire 
d'enormite), the converse belief that one's body is unusually small, and the belief 
that parts of the body have been misplaced (i.e., moved to another part of the 
body). These beliefs are all included as changes in the body. 
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Table 2.1: List of symptoms noted by Cotard (1882) and their occurrence in his 
pure cases. 
Symptoms 
Case N umber 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
General nihilistic delusions 
Negation of others V V V V 
Negation of environment V 
Self-nihilistic delusions 
Negation of self, including 
denial of whole body V V V V V 
Belief that one is dead V 
Immortality/inability to die V V 
Self-deprecatory delusions 
Self-accusatory delusions V V V V V 
Feelings of guilt V V V V 
Imaginary terrors or fears V 
Belief that one is damned V 
Bodily delusions 
Hypochondriacal delusions V V V V 
Denial of parts of body V V V V 
Putrefaction of body parts 
Belief that body smells foul 
Changes in body parts V 
Metamorphosis V 
Perceptual abnormalities 
Auditory hallucinations V V 
Visual hallucinations V V V 
Olfactory hallucinations 
Gustatory hallucinations 
Visual illusions 
Hyperaesthesia 
Anaesthesia 
Behavioural manifestations 
Suicide attempts/thoughts V V 
Violence V V 
Refusal to eat V V V V 
Retention of urine & faeces V 
Muscular rigidity V 
Immobility V V V 
Mutism V V 
Repetition of words/phrases V 
Resistant insanity V V 
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Cotard's (1882) reports for his 8 relatively pure cases were examined 
simply by noting which of these symptoms were mentioned. Each of the individual 
symptoms noted for Cotard's 8 pure cases is marked in Table 2.1. Note that some 
of these symptoms did not arise in any of these pure cases; this is usually because 
the symptoms were noted only in the other cases in Cotard's (1882) report. 
As Table 2.1 shows, there is no single symptom that was noted for all 8 of 
Cotard's (1882) pure cases. The most common symptom, though, was self-
accusatory depressive delusions (7/8) cases). Also common was repetition of 
words or phrases (6/8 cases), which may relate to individuals consistently returning 
to the theme of their delusions. Resistant insanity was also noted in 6 cases (Cotard 
used this term to describe a general resistance in his patients to any form of personal 
care, such as getting out of bed in the mornings, washing and so on, and a 
resistance to any form of help), but this is perhaps unsurprising as it is largely 
indexed by the individuals acting on their delusions. Suicidal thoughts or attempts 
were fairly common (5/8), but violence directed at others was relatively unusual 
(2/8 cases, both of whom were also suicidal). Feelings of guilt, negation of self, 
and denial of bodily parts were each also present in more than half the cases. 
Strikingly, although variants of the theme that one was damned, lacking a 
body or non-existent were noted fairly commonly, only 1 of these 8 pure cases 
voiced the belief that she was herself dead (case 1). Even if all the case histories in 
Cotard's (1882) report are included, in only one other case did an individual claim 
to be dead (case 9). Whilst saying that one does not exist is in many ways similar 
to saying that one is dead, for reasons that wil l be discussed below, the specific 
claim " I am dead" would appear to be the explanation most acceptable to individuals 
about what has happened to them. There wil l naturally be many different versions 
of these explanations ("I am dead", " I am damned", "My body has disintegrated", 
and so on). There is as yet, however, no satisfactory account of why the specific 
belief of being dead appears to be more acceptable than these latter explanations. 
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For further analysis, the 31 symptoms listed in Table 2.1 were collapsed 
into broad symptom categories involving six types of delusional belief, and the 
other two involve perceptual abnormalities and behavioural manifestations 
respectively. The first category included general nihilistic delusions, such as denial 
of other people's existence or the existence of the external world. The second 
category involves self-nihilistic delusions, including the seemingly paradoxical 
stance of maintaining that one is immortal or unable to die while also voicing the 
belief that one does not exist. The third grouping, self-deprecatory delusions, 
includes people who accuse themselves of having been responsible for crimes they 
did not commit, world-wide accidents or famine; guilt, both generalised and 
specifically emanating from these supposed wrong-doings; imaginary fears related 
to the supposed wrong-doings and resulting guilt; and, finally, another self-
accusatory, guilt-based delusion - the belief that one is damned. The fourth 
category is bodily delusions, including hypochondriacal delusions, denial of bodily 
parts, changes in body parts (such as believing one's head has become hollow), 
and metamorphosis (believing that one has been transformed into, for example, an 
animal). A f i f th group, perceptual abnormalities, includes gross sensory changes, 
such as hallucinations and illusions. Finally, in a sixth grouping, all behavioural 
manifestations noted by Cotard are included. These often seem to derive from 
individuals acting on their delusions (e.g., refusing to eat, move or defecate on the 
grounds that they are dead). 
Table 2.2 presents a broad analysis, which examines whether people 
showed at least one symptom within each of these six groupings (i.e., i f we 
consider only whether each individual showed any one of the symptoms belonging 
to a particular group). As can be seen in Table 2.2, there were 2 symptom groups 
for which all 8 individuals experienced at least one symptom; these involve self-
deprecatory delusions and delusion-related behaviour. Bodily delusions were 
shown by 6/8 individuals, self-nihilistic delusions by 5/8, and general 
nihilistic delusions and perceptual abnormalities were each noted in 4/8 cases. 
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Table 2.2: Symptoms noted for Cotard's (1882) pure cases according to symptom 
group. 
Symptom Group 
Case N umber 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
General nihilistic delusions 
Self-nihilistic delusions V V V V 
Self-deprecatory delusions V < V V V V V 
Bodily delusions V V V V V 
Perceptual abnormalities < V V 
Behavioural manifestations V V 
Discussion of Cotard's case reports 
The most striking point to note about Cotard's cases is that no single 
symptom was displayed by all individuals. As noted above, Cotard believed le 
delire de negation to be an illness in its own right, the essential features being 
negativistic self-deprecatory delusions. Whilst only 1 individual (case 1) did not 
expressly accuse herself of having been responsible for some wrong-doing, she 
nevertheless had feelings of guilt and believed that she was damned. Hence, she 
still expressed self-deprecatory delusions. The only other feature that was common 
to all cases was some form of behavioural manifestation This is perhaps not 
surprising, however, since it simply reflects individuals acting on their own 
delusional beliefs. 
The remaining symptoms - bodily delusions, perceptual abnormalities, 
general nihilistic delusions and self-nihilistic delusions - were common, but by no 
means universal in Cotard's case reports. This is in keeping with Cotard's view 
that these features sometimes accompanied, but were not essential features of, the 
illness. Two of these symptoms are particularly interesting. First, in view of the 
syndrome concept, it is noteworthy that self-nihilistic delusions were only noted in 
5 of the 8 cases and, of these, only 1 (case 1) believed she was dead (interestingly, 
this was the only person not to have accused herself expressly of committing some 
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crime). This is also consistent with Cotard's view that the belief that one is dead 
arises only in extreme cases of the illness. Second, in terms of general nihilistic 
delusions, it is interesting that only half of Cotard's cases displayed either negation 
of others or negation of the environment. This is important when considering the 
syndrome concept and shall be discussed below. 
To summarise, there was no specific symptom shown by every one of 
Cotard's pure cases, and no universally present symptom complex. It is clear, 
however, that all of his patients suffered from self-deprecatory delusions, and all 
showed some form of delusion-related behaviour. This pattern confirms Cotard's 
original conception of negativistic delusions; le delire de negation. It might be 
argued, however, that Cotard's own case reports are almost bound to concur with 
his own view of the delusion, since it was largely from these cases that his 
conception of the delusion was formed. 
A question therefore remains as to whether Cotard's original conception of 
le delire de negation fits the symptoms displayed by other people reported in the 
literature as suffering from the Cotard delusion, or whether such cases are more in 
keeping with the notion of a syndrome. 
Case reports published in English 
Introduction 
In this section, cases of the Cotard delusion that are available in English are 
examined in the same manner adopted for the analysis of Cotard's published cases. 
In order to make as close a comparison to Cotard's case reports as possible, only 
'purer' cases of the Cotard delusion are analysed. Cases of sequential Cotard and 
Capgras delusions (i.e., both held, but held one after the other) are included 
(Wright et a/., 1993; Enoch & Trethowan, 1979, Chapter 8: case 4), but not those 
in which the Cotard and Capgras delusions co-exist (Joseph, 1986; Terao, Fujino, 
Egashira & Abe, 1992: case 2) or those in which there are several delusional beliefs 
(Enoch & Trethowan, 1979, Chapter 9: case 5). Other cases that are omitted are 
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those for which partial translations have been published by Enoch and Trethowan 
(1979), but for which it is impossible to ascertain the completeness or 
incompleteness of the translations (and, in some cases, whether they were 
published as cases of the Cotard delusion or types of depression) (de Martis, 1956; 
Ahleid, 1968; Vitello, 1970, all cited in Enoch & Trethowan, 1979). Rather than 
analyse possibly incomplete case reports, it was deemed preferable to omit them 
from the analysis. In all, 17 cases were included in the analysis. The identification 
of each report is shown in Appendix 1. 
It is important to remember that the symptoms used in the analysis of 
Cotard's cases were those noted by Cotard himself. In order to make a fair 
assessment of any co-occurrence of symptoms in the more modern conception of 
the delusion, we need to include not only symptoms noted by Cotard, but any 
additional ones noted by the authors of the respective case reports. Accordingly, 
the perceptual abnormalities category now includes visual recognition deficits, 
which involve the inability to recognise once-familiar people and places. In 
addition, an 'other' category has been included under perceptual abnormalities. Of 
course, 'other' is not a symptom, but some people may, for example, claim that 
they cannot see themselves in the mirror, or that they see something other than 
themselves, such as a death-mask. Similarly, behavioural manifestations now 
includes an 'other' category; people act on their delusions in many different ways, 
and even i f they do not show the same delusion-related behaviours as noted by 
Cotard, they may nevertheless show some form of behavioural manifestation. 
Since such behaviour varies greatly from individual to individual, it was deemed 
preferable to include those behaviours under the general heading of 'other', rather 
than to list each type of behaviour separately. Examples of such behaviour include 
people phoning the police and claiming to have been murdered, insisting that 
someone should ki l l them, or, as in the case of Bonnet's patient (Forstl & Beats, 
1992), insisting that someone puts her in a coffin. One act of self-harm (case 16) 
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was classified as 'other', since it was not an attempt at suicide, but an attempt by 
the gentleman to prove he had no blood in him. 
As noted in Chapter One, it has been suggested that the Cotard delusion 
arises out of a depressive disorder (e.g., Young et al., 1992; Wright et al., 1993). 
Cotard (1882) believed that depression was one of the joint causes of the delusion 
and that it need not necessarily present itself as a symptom. Depression has 
nevertheless been included as a symptom, since it is noted in some case reports as 
being such. This wi l l enable us to ascertain the extent to which depression is 
displayed as a symptom. Finally, feelings of depersonalisation, and derealisation 
and feelings of unreality have been added, since they are often discussed or noted 
as symptoms in case reports. 
Analysis of case reports published in English 
Table 2.3 shows that, as with Cotard's case reports, no single symptom 
was noted for all 17 of these later cases. However, there are two findings that are 
particularly striking. First, a far larger proportion of people believed they were 
dead (13/17) compared to Cotard's cases (1/8), while 2 individuals voiced negation 
of the self, without actually claiming to be dead. Second, a far smaller proportion 
of people voiced self-accusatory delusions (4/17) or feelings of guilt (2/17) than did 
Cotard's cases (8/8). Possible reasons for these two findings are examined below. 
Turning to the other categories, we can see that nobody voiced nihilistic 
delusions about the environment or about other people, whereas half of Cotard's 
patients had voiced one or both of these beliefs. Hypochondriacal delusions were 
reported in 4/17 cases and denial of body parts in 5/17; while putrefaction of body 
parts, belief that one's body smells foul, changes in body parts and metamorphosis 
were noted in only one or two cases. These incidences are all lower to a greater or 
lesser degree than those reported in Cotard's cases. 
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Table 2.3; Occurrence of Cotard symptoms in case reports published in English. 
Symptoms 
Case Number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
General nihilistic delusions 
Negation of others 
Negation of environment 
V 
Self-nihilistic delusions 
Negation of self, including denial of 
whole body V V V V V 
Belief that one is dead V V V V V 
Immortality/inability to die 
Self-deprecatory delusions 
Self-accusatory delusions V V 
Feelings of guilt V 
Imaginary terrors or fears 
Belief that one is damned 
Bodily delusions 
Hypochondriacal delusions V V 
Denial of parts of body V 
Putrefaction of body parts V 
Belief that body smells foul 
Changes in body parts V 
Metamorphosis 
Perceptual abnormalities 
Auditory hallucinations 
Visual hallucinations 
Olfactory hallucinations 
Gustatory hallucinations 
Visual illusions 
Hyperesthesia 
Anaesthesia 
Visual recognition deficits 
Other V V V 
Behavioural manifestations 
Suicide attempts/thoughts V 
Violence 
Refusal to eat 
Retention of urine & faeces 
Muscular rigidity 
Immobility 
Mutism V 
Repetition of words/phrases 
Resistant insanity V 
Other V V V V V 
Depression V V 
Depersonalisation 
Derealisation/unreality feelings V 
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Table 2.3 Occurrence of Cotard symptoms in case reports published in English 
(Contd.). 
Symptoms 
Case Number 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
General nihilistic delusions 
Negation of others 
Negation of environment 
Self-nihilistic delusions 
Negation of self, including denial of 
whole body V V V V V V 
Belief that one is dead V V V V 
Immortality/inability to die V 
Self-deprecatory delusions 
Self-accusatory delusions V 
Feelings of guilt V 
Imaginary terrors or fears 
Belief that one is damned 
Bodily delusions 
Hypochondriacal delusions V 
Denial of parts of body V V 
Putrefaction of body parts 
Belief that body smells foul 
Changes in body parts 
Metamorphosis 
Perceptual abnormalities 
Auditory hallucinations 
Visual hallucinations 
Olfactory hallucinations 
Gustatory hallucinations 
Visual illusions 
Hyperaesthesia 
Anaesthesia 
Visual recognition deficits 
Other 
Behavioural manifestations 
Suicide attempts/thoughts V V V 
Violence V 
Refusal to eat V 
Retention of urine & faeces 
Muscular rigidity 
Immobility V 
Mutism V V 
Repetition of words/phrases 
Resistant insanity V 
Other V V 
Depression V V V V 
Depersonalisation 
Derealisation/unreality feelings V 
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In terms of perceptual abnormalities, one individual suffered from auditory 
hallucinations and one from olfactory hallucinations, while two showed visual 
recognition deficits, one of whom also had olfactory hallucinations. Three others 
showed some 'other' perceptual abnormality, and these will be discussed below. 
Suicide attempts or thoughts were noted in 5/17 reports; violence in 2; 
refusal to eat in 2; mutism in 3; some form of resistant behaviour in 2; and some 
other form of behavioural manifestation in 10 of the reports. Depression was noted 
in 12 cases; depersonalisation in only 1; and derealisation or feelings of unreality in 
5 cases. 
Table 2.4: Symptoms noted for case reports published in English, according to 
symptom group. 
Symptom Group 
Case Number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
General nihilistic delusions 
Self-nihilistic delusions V V 
Self-deprecatory delusions V V V 
Bodily delusions V V V V 
Perceptual abnormalities V V 
Behavioural manifestations V V V 
Depression V V V 
Depersonalisation 
Derealisation/unreality feelings V V 
Table 2.4: Symptoms noted for case reports published in English, according to 
symptom group (Contd.). 
Case Number 
Symptom Group 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
General nihilistic delusions 
Self-nihilistic delusions V V V V 
Self-deprecatory delusions V 
Bodily delusions V V 
Perceptual abnormalities V V 
Behavioural manifestations V V V V V V 
Depression V 
Depersonalisation 
Derealisation/unreality feelings 
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Again, in order to broaden the analysis, the symptoms were grouped 
together according to symptom categories. This analysis is shown in Table 2.4. It 
has already been noted that none of the individuals voiced general nihilistic 
delusions, and this wi l l be commented on below. Self-nihilistic delusions of one 
form or another were reported in 15, and self-deprecatory delusions in 5 of the 17 
cases. Some form of bodily delusion was noted in 9/17 cases; perceptual 
abnormalities in 7/17; and behavioural manifestations in 12/17. Finally, as already 
noted, depression was noted in 12 cases, depersonalisation in only 1, and 
derealisation or feelings of unreality in 5/17. 
Discussion of case reports 
As with the analysis of Cotard's case reports, there was no single symptom 
that was reported in all 17 of the later cases, and no clear symptom pattern. It is 
clear, however, that the majority of people (15/17) suffered from self-nihilistic 
delusions of some form, and that the majority of those (13) believed they were 
dead. This is clearly far more than the one patient of Cotard's who believed she 
was dead. One possible explanation for this is that i f the delusion is defined by 
modern authors in terms of the belief that one is dead, cases in which individuals do 
not show this symptom may be less likely to be reported. Similarly, if , as was 
noted above, authors view the delusion as a manifestation of what are termed 
nihilistic delusions by psychiatrists (Friedman & Caplan 1967, cited by Enoch & 
Trethowan, 1979), and/or the belief that one is dead is not present, then it may be 
more likely to be written up as an example of depersonalisation or nihilistic delusion 
than as a case of the Cotard delusion, if, indeed, it is reported at all. 
That some form of self-deprecatory delusion was noted in only five cases is 
perhaps a rather surprising finding, given that Cotard viewed it as an essential 
feature of the delusion. As suggested for the large number of case reports noting 
the belief that one is dead, however, it may be the case that, unless they accompany 
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the belief that one is dead, such beliefs, if they are written up at all, are classified as 
nihilistic delusions or cases of depersonalisation. 
Enoch and Trethowan (1979) argue that denial of the external world (as well 
as denial of oneself) constitutes the most complete form of the delusion. It is 
interesting in this respect that in none of the reports was nihilistic delusions about 
others or the environment mentioned. It was noted earlier, however, that Enoch 
and Trethowan published partial translations of a number of case reports. In one of 
these (de Martis, 1956), the woman said that everything around her did not exist. 
In three of the others, (Ahleid, 1968), delusions arose in the context of an organic 
impairment. Two of Ahleid's cases (1 & 2) believed they were dead, but did not 
deny the existence of the external world. In the third case, the person said that his 
body was dead and his "spirit was waiting to die" (Enoch & Trethowan, 1979, 
p.l 19) but, again, he did not have more general nihilistic delusions. 
In keeping with their view that the complete syndrome includes a negation 
of others and the environment, Enoch and Trethowan describe the delusions in 
Ahleid's cases as representing an "incomplete Cotard syndrome" (p. 119). It is 
important to remember here that Enoch and Trethowan view the Cotard syndrome 
as falling along a continuum. At one end of this continuum are milder features such 
as depression, the belief that one is losing one's intellect, and feeling oneself and 
the external world to be different in some way, and at the other are the extreme 
features, involving total subjective and objective negation. Joseph (1986), 
however, also writing in terms of a syndrome, views denial of the external world 
and/or of others to be common, but not universal, features. This issue wil l be taken 
up below. 
Turning now to the other symptoms, one or more forms of bodily delusion 
were noted in around half of the cases. Cotard himself viewed bodily delusions as 
accompanying features of the delusion and, indeed, most authors regard them as 
common, but not essential features (e.g., Enoch & Trethowan, 1979; Joseph, 
1986; Joseph & O'Leary, 1986; Drake, 1988). 
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In terms of perceptual abnormalities, seven cases reported the presence of 
some disturbance. Of the three cases classified as 'other', case 2 alternately denied 
seeing herself or said she saw a death mask resembling the features she had had 
when she was alive, case 4 would say "that used to be me" (Drake, 1988, p.37), 
when shown his reflection in the mirror, and case 3 believed his brain was 
liquefying and oozing from his left ear, and when shown a mirror, indicated the 
course that this was taking. 
In terms of behavioural manifestations, 12 of the 17 case reports (71%) 
noted some form of delusion-related behaviour. As was noted in regard to Cotard's 
cases, however, behavioural manifestations are not surprising since they are largely 
indicative of individuals simply acting according to their delusional beliefs. 
In terms of depersonalisation, it is quite striking that it was noted in only 
one case (case 11). However, in case 16, the gentleman complained of "feeling 
nothing inside" (Wright et al, 1993, p.346), which is a common feature in 
depersonalisation. Similarly, in case 6, the lady complained that she "had strange 
feelings and did not feel like other people" (Enoch & Trethowan, 1979, p. 121). 
This statement contains hints both of depersonalisation (not feeling like other 
people) and of derealisation (things feeling strange). Again, the reason for not 
classifying these symptoms as depersonalisation was to ensure an interpretation-
free analysis. Derealisation and/or complaints about things feelings strange and 
unreal were noted in five cases. 
Despite the hints at both depersonalisation and derealisation in the case 
reports noted above, it is clear that the classifications of depersonalisation and 
derealisation were relatively rare phenomena in the 17 case reports. This appears to 
be keeping with Enoch and Trethowan's view that the Cotard delusion should be 
distinguished from depersonalisation (Enoch and Trethowan do not distinguish 
between depersonalisation and derealisation). However, as noted already, i f the 
belief that one is dead is not present, any case report may be more likely to be 
classified as a case of depersonalisation or derealisation than that of the Cotard 
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delusion. The roles of depersonalisation and derealisation in the Cotard delusion 
wil l be addressed below. 
Finally, depression was noted in 12 of the 17 cases (nearly 71%) as a 
symptom. There was one case report (case 4), not classified as depression, but 
which referred to the person replying "sorrowfully to reassurances that he was still 
alive" (Drake, 1988, p.37). As noted, Cotard viewed depression and anxiety as the 
joint causal factors of the delusion, and so argued that they need not necessarily 
emerge as actual symptoms, and, as noted in Chapter One, it was noted that the 
delusion typically arises out of depressive illness. 
Discussion 
The principal issue in both sets of analyses is whether a pattern of 
symptoms arises from which one could argue that the Cotard delusion represents a 
syndrome. A further, and related, point of interest is whether the two sets of 
reports differ in terms of symptomatology and, i f so, whether this difference is 
sufficient to argue that while Cotard's conception of le delire de negation best fits 
the symptoms described by him, the more modern picture of the delusion is best 
accounted for in terms of a syndrome. 
I f we compare the two sets of findings, we can see that there are, indeed, 
some differences in symptomatology. Cotard noted that half of his cases suffered 
from general nihilistic delusions; while neither negation of other people nor that of 
the environment were noted in any of the 17 case reports. Self-nihilistic delusions 
were noted in 5 of Cotard's 8 cases, and a similar proportion (15) was noted in the 
17 later case reports. Most striking is the fact that the delusional belief that one is 
dead was noted in 13 of the 17 cases, as opposed to only one of Cotard's cases. 
Also noteworthy is the fact that while all of Cotard's patients suffered from self-
deprecatory depressive delusions of one form or another, these were only noted in 
5 of the subsequent case reports. In terms of bodily delusions, a smaller proportion 
of the 17 later cases noted the presence of these than did Cotard's reports, and the 
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same applies to the presence of perceptual abnormalities and behavioural 
manifestations. 
To sum up, all 8 of the 'pure' cases described by Cotard displayed self-
deprecatory delusions, only one believed she was dead, and around half showed 
some of the symptoms (e.g., self-nihilistic and bodily delusions) which Cotard 
viewed as accompanying features. This pattern seems to fit perfectly with Cotard's 
own conception of the delusion. I f we look at the symptoms displayed by the 17 
later case reports, we can see that the picture becomes rather different. No cases 
voiced general nihilistic delusions, most voiced self-nihilistic delusions, around 
three-quarters of whom believed they were dead, and only around a quarter voiced 
self-deprecatory delusions. Finally, accompanying symptoms were noted in fewer 
cases overall than were noted in Cotard's case reports. 
The first thing we need to establish is whether there are any reasons as to 
why there were differences in symptomatology between the two sets of reports. In 
this regard, it is important to remember that Cotard was the first to detail nihilistic 
delusions, and to accord them a distinct status within the field of psychopathology. 
Since then, a syndrome has been named after him, but it does not quite tally with 
the disorder he actually described; most authors now define the Cotard syndrome as 
being the belief that one is dead. Given this, it becomes easier to understand why 
there are differences in symptomatology between Cotard's cases and the 17 later 
case reports. The greater preponderance among these latter cases of the belief that 
one is dead may be explained in terms of a commonly-held view that this is the 
defining feature of the Cotard syndrome. Hence, as noted earlier, those cases in 
which this single belief is not held may be classified as nihilistic delusions rather 
than the Cotard syndrome, and so those who hold with Friedman and Caplan's 
view that the delusion is a form of nihilistic delusion, may view it as not uncommon 
and so not report it. Alternatively, they may, as noted above, report it as a case of 
depersonalisation or derealisation. 
44 
Chapter Two 
The debate surrounding the status of the Cotard delusion was outlined 
earlier. How do the findings from the two sets of case reports accord with the 
notion that the delusion represents a syndrome, a sub-type of depression, or simply 
part of the disorder commonly labelled by psychiatrists as a nihilistic delusion? 
It has already been noted that the notion of a syndrome does not accord with 
Cotard's own cases, as only one type of symptom (self-deprecatory depressive 
delusions) was universal; other features did not inevitably co-occur. However, 
these symptoms are considered to be accompanying features of the syndrome, and 
so their presence is not required in order to define that syndrome. What is required 
in order to define the full-blown syndrome, according to Enoch and Trethowan, is 
total negation, not merely of the self, but also of other people and of the 
environment. Viewed from this standpoint, not even Cotard's case 1 represents the 
fu l l syndrome. We are thus left to conclude either that none of Cotard's case 
reports represented complete versions of a syndrome named after him, or that the 
syndrome does not accord with his own cases. Since the former position departs 
from the stance adopted by Cotard himself, who viewed nihilistic delusions as 
forming an illness in their own right, we are left with the conclusion that the term 
syndrome in relation to Cotard's own cases is, at best, unhelpful. It is interesting 
in this respect, as noted above, that Friedman and Caplan (1967) do not consider 
the Cotard syndrome to be distinct from nihilistic delusions. Indeed, as Enoch and 
Trethowan note, this is "the view of many, i f not the majority of psychiatrists" 
(p. 117). This is an important point, since it affects not only the notion of a 
syndrome in regard to Cotard's own case reports, but in relation to the seventeen 
case reports, fifteen of which referred to the delusion as a syndrome. 
As with Cotard's case reports, no symptom pattern emerged. There were, 
however, 13 people who believed they were dead. If , as suggested by Sommer 
and Petrides (1992), the syndrome is defined in terms of this single belief, then all 
seventeen individuals should have voiced this belief. 
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Alternatively, i f one is to accept the notion of a Cotard syndrome varying 
along a continuum along the lines suggested by Enoch and Trethowan, one may 
adopt the view that all the seventeen cases represent incomplete versions of the 
syndrome, since no general nihilistic delusions were noted in any of the case 
reports. Seen in this light, however, one again needs to question the utility of 
adopting the notion of a syndrome in preference to Cotard's view of le delire de 
negation, or Friedman and Caplan's (1967) view that the delusion forms part of the 
general disorder of nihilistic delusion. 
Having established that the notion of a syndrome is not a helpful one as 
applied to the Cotard delusion, I turn to the view that the delusion is a sub-type of 
depression. Although the Cotard delusion is commonly associated with depression 
(e.g., Cotard, 1882; Enoch & Trethowan, 1979; Young et al., 1992), the precise 
role of depression has not been clearly delineated. Cotard viewed depression as 
having a causal role in the formation of the delusion, along with anxiety. (Anxiety 
is seldom mentioned in reports of the Cotard delusion, except occasionally as a 
symptom in specific cases. Its role will be addressed in Chapters Three and Four.) 
Cotard argued that since depression was one of the joint causes of the delusion it 
need not necessarily emerge as a symptom. While it is often noted that the Cotard 
delusion is associated with depression, its role as a causal factor has only recently 
been investigated. As noted in Chapter One, Wright et al. (1993) have suggested a 
role for depression in the formation of the Cotard delusion in the type of 
explanation the person seeks for perceptually anomalous experiences. To re-cap 
briefly, Wright et al draw from attribution theory, which shows that depressed 
individuals make internal attributions of negative events. They suggest that the 
individuals' depressed mood contributes to their seeking an internal cause for their 
perceptual problems. Feelings of loss of familiarity, depersonalisation and 
derealisation all serve to reinforce the perceptual anomalies experienced by people 
suffering from the Cotard delusion. 
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The first thing that strikes one about this formulation is that perceptual 
disturbances of the type noted by Young et al. (1992) and by Wright et al. (1993) 
were, in fact, only noted in their own case reports (cases 17 and 16 respectively), 
although some form of visual perception disturbance was noted in cases 2, 3 and 
4), and Cotard (1884) also contains a possible case. This raises an important issue; 
namely that different authors report, or investigate, the sorts of things in which they 
are interested. This may seem a somewhat needless comment to make, but it is 
worth stressing for the very obvious reason that i f different authors pursue different 
things, they are bound to reveal different things. Hence, Young and his colleagues 
investigated face-recognition deficits in people with the Cotard delusion, and found 
that they did, indeed, display such deficits. It is hardly surprising that authors who 
have not investigated visual recognition in individuals suffering from the Cotard 
delusion have not reported face-recognition impairments. Of course, this argument 
extends to all the symptoms noted both in Cotard's case reports and in the 
seventeen collected reports. Hence, while Cotard investigated le delire de negation, 
and found that, in line with his predictions, people displayed common features of 
self-deprecatory delusions, other authors have investigated self-nihilistic delusions, 
and the belief that one is dead in particular, and found a high preponderance of both 
types of belief in the cases they report - although it must be stressed that these were 
by no means universally present. An additional factor may be that authors take as 
read that certain symptoms are present. For example, in cases 16 (Wright et al., 
1993) and 17 (Young et al., 1992), there are strong hints at the presence of 
depersonalisation, but this was not noted as a symptom. Young certainly views 
both individuals as suffering from depersonalisation (personal communication) but 
neither could be noted as such here since depersonalisation was not stated explicitly 
in the case reports. 
One possible reason that Young and his colleagues (Young et al., 1992; 
Wright et al., 1993) have emerged with a slightly different picture of the delusion 
from that of other authors is that they have remained somewhat neutral in terms of 
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the syndrome debate in general and have preferred to use the term 'Cotard delusion' 
as a convenient shorthand for describing the belief that one is dead They therefore 
view delusional beliefs such as the Cotard and Capgras delusions as symptoms 
requiring an explanation. To this end, Young and his colleagues have established a 
possible causal role for depression in the Cotard delusion. 
In terms of the status of the Cotard delusion, it must be noted that there is a 
problem with discussing it as a sub-type of depression; detailed examination of the 
literature reveals neither who actually suggested it, nor what it was they suggested! 
A number of authors refer to the view of the delusion as a sub-type of depression; 
for example, Joseph (1986) and Joseph and O'Leary (1986). Both of these, 
however, draw from Enoch and Trethowan (1979), who do not state the exponents 
of this view, making it difficult to accept or to argue against. This notwithstanding, 
we can at least argue that the existence of depression cannot be seen as a sufficient 
cause for the delusion to emerge, since the vast majority of people who suffer from 
depression do not voice the belief that they are dead. The work of Young and his 
colleagues suggests that depression may be a necessary condition for the formation 
of the Cotard delusion, together with a perceptually anomalous experience (Young 
et al., 1992; Wright et al, 1993). Chapter Three presents four case studies of the 
delusion that were examined in the light of this theory. 
Finally, we are left with viewing the Cotard delusion as a form of nihilistic 
delusion (Friedman & Caplan, 1967). This certainly seems more in keeping with 
the position adopted by Cotard himself (1881; 1882). A possible problem with 
viewing the delusion strictly in terms of le delire de negation is that while Cotard 
viewed the presence of self-deprecatory depressive delusions as essential, they 
were noted in only 4 of the 17 more recent case reports. However, as noted above, 
this may reflect the fact they are not typically reported, rather than not being 
present. That the presence of self-nihilistic delusions was noted in 15 of the 17 
cases, however, appears consistent with the notion that the delusion is a form of 
nihilistic delusion. Also consistent is the fact that other associated features were 
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present but did not inevitably co-occur. The advantage of viewing the delusion as a 
type of nihilistic delusion is that one can then examine the delusion on two levels. 
First, one may examine nihilistic delusions in general and, second, one may 
examine the specific belief that one is dead in terms of a symptom requiring an 
explanation, as suggested by Young and his colleagues (Young et al., 1992; 
Wright etai, 1993). 
To conclude, the case reports that were analysed above did not accord with 
the notion of there being a 'Cotard syndrome'. Furthermore, authors vary in terms 
of what they regard as constituting the syndrome in the first place. The variations 
seen in symptomatology between Cotard's 8 pure cases and the collection of 17 
later case reports (and also within the 17 later reports) may be due to differences in 
the types of symptoms examined, or looked for, by different authors. The Cotard 
delusion would appear to be best regarded, as suggested by Friedman and Caplan 
(1967), as a type of nihilistic delusion that varies along a continuum in terms of 
presence and severity of symptoms, rather than as a separate clinical entity; the 
specific delusional belief that one is dead represents one of these symptoms. This 
and related symptoms are examined in this thesis and the term 'the Cotard delusion' 
will be used to describe the delusional belief of being dead. In Chapter Three, four 
case studies serve to highlight the variability seen between and within individuals 
suffering from the Cotard delusion and in Chapter Four, a mechanism is suggested 
which may help to explain why people remained convinced by explanations that 
seem patently absurd to everyone around them. 
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Chapter Three 
Single cases of the Cotard delusion 
"Terrified and restless, the patients begin to experience their feelings as the 
reality itself and are then inaccessible to reason. Now the world has escaped them. 
Nothing remains. They are alone in terrible isolation, suspended between infinities. 
They have to live for ever because time no longer exists. They themselves no 
longer exist; their body is dead Only this fake-existence remains as their horrible 
fate." 
Jaspers (1913/1963, p.63) 
Introduction 
The above quote is Jaspers' description of people suffering from 
derealisation. It also captures the despair and denial of existence experienced by 
individuals suffering from the Cotard delusion, and highlights the suggestion 
(Chapter One) that there is no clear demarcation between derealisation (or 
depersonalisation) and the Cotard delusion. Indeed, as also noted in Chapter One, 
derealisation has been viewed as an accompanying feature of the delusion 
(Christodoulou, 1977; Todd, Dewhurst & Wallis, 1981), and Young et al. (1993) 
have suggested that it is reinforced by feelings of loss of familiarity of once-familiar 
faces and places (see Chapter Two). 
It was suggested at the end of Chapter Two that a possible reason for case 
reports showing such a variation in symptomatology from those reported originally 
by Cotard is that different authors look for different things, depending on what it is 
they aim to achieve. It was further noted that impaired recognition of faces and 
buildings, viewed by Young and his colleagues as central to understanding the 
Cotard delusion, were not noted in other case reports. However, this was a fairly 
recent serendipitous finding, following a complaint by an individual with the Cotard 
delusion of not being able to recognise familiar people and places. I f such 
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impairments are implicated in the delusion, together with derealisation, and perhaps 
depersonalisation, then investigation of these particular symptoms in other cases 
should reveal their existence. In order to establish this, four single cases of the 
Cotard delusion were investigated; these are described in the present chapter. 
In Chapter Two it was demonstrated that the denial of one's own existence 
is a common, but by no means universal, feature of the Cotard delusion. Indeed, 
we now have a fairly good picture of the symptoms displayed by people suffering 
from the Cotard delusion and an indication of the variability among individuals. It 
has also been noted that individuals show variations in the degree and severity of 
their delusional beliefs during the course of their illness. However, we have yet to 
gain any real sense of how such symptoms are felt by the sufferer. That is to say, 
we have no impression of the subjective experience of someone suffering from 
Cotard delusion. In this chapter, three brief case descriptions and one detailed 
report of the Cotard delusion are presented, which illustrate not just the variability 
between different individuals, but the variability within individuals over the course 
of their delusions. The fourth case (JK) is reported in far greater detail than the 
other three reports because she was investigated extensively over a two and a half 
year period. The report includes a detailed description of JK's experiences, which 
illustrates the subjectively very real fears and dilemmas faced by people suffering 
from the Cotard delusion. The case descriptions are followed by the results of a 
test of recognition memory, a self-report test of depression and anxiety, and a test 
of magical ideation. Following from the case descriptions and formal test results, 
the symptoms noted in each case are presented in the same table formats as those in 
Chapter Two. 
Overall, the present chapter serves three main functions. First, the case 
reports, and subsequent analyses of them, further highlight the variability seen in 
the Cotard delusion and lend further support to the claim made in Chapter Two that 
the delusion does not constitute a syndrome. Second, the presence of depression, 
face processing deficits and feelings of derealisation were specifically noted in order 
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to assess the claims by Young et al. (1992) and Wright et al. (1993) that this triad 
of symptoms plays a contributory role in the formation of the Cotard delusion. To 
recap briefly, the face processing deficit are held to reinforce the feelings of 
derealisation experienced by the patients, and the depressed mood determines an 
internal attribution of these feelings. Third, the cases (particularly that of JK) 
provide a deeper insight into the Cotard delusion, illustrating just how the 
symptoms noted in the previous chapters manifest themselves, and underscoring 
the terrors and traumas experienced by individuals suffering from the delusion. 
Additionally, the cases themselves highlight the problems inherent in undertaking 
single case investigations of this type; in particular, that of the individuals' own 
distresses and distractibility that can sometimes make testing undesirable, despite 
their willingness to take part. 
Four case studies of the Cotard delusion 
RB: A case of anxious agitation 
Case description 
RB is a 61 year old man who initially became depressed and then took an 
overdose following a bowel resection. He was transferred to a psychiatric ward of a 
general hospital, where he was initially prescribed fluoxetine, but it was soon 
realised that his depression was rather worse than first thought and his mood 
subsequently worsened. He began to say that he had been dead since the previous 
week. RB had no previous known psychiatric history, but his wife suffers from 
chronic schizophrenia and has done so for many years. RB had little formal 
education; he left school at the age of fourteen with no qualifications, and he is only 
semi-literate. 
Delusional beliefs 
RB believed that he was dead. He constantly looked at the ward clock and, 
when asked why, said that he could not understand why the clock was still 
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working; it should have stopped at the time he died. He became extremely anxious 
and frustrated at his inability to understand why the clock continued to move on in 
time. RB reported feeling as though he were not there, and at one time claimed to 
be "somewhere in between Heaven and Hell". 
RB's behaviour was highly reminiscent of Cotard's (1882) description of 
people suffering from le delire de negation who displayed 'anxious agitation'. He 
was extremely agitated and deeply distressed; he was unable to lie down or sit for 
very long and paced continually up and down at the side of his bed. Also 
reminiscent of Cotard's case descriptions was the fact that RB showed muscular 
rigidity, which appeared to have been a side-effect of his medication. 
I visited RB on four occasions. On the first occasion, when he was 
convinced he was dead, RB was distressed, anxious and extremely restless. I 
attempted to carry out some formal testing, but he became even more distressed and 
I decided to end the session after only a few minutes. I attempted to have a general 
conversation with him, but he had severe difficulty in concentrating. He returned to 
his bed space in an extremely anxious state, and paced up and down by the side of 
his bed for well over an hour. 
A fortnight later, I visited him again. In the intervening time, he had been 
placed on a tricyclic anti-depressant and neuroleptic medication, and had improved 
slightly. He was noticeably better than on the previous occasion, and no longer 
fully convinced that he was dead, although he still made occasional comments about 
the clock, and often looked up at it. Because he failed to respond to medication 
after a lengthy trial and remained distressed, ECT was resorted to, and his 
depression and delusional beliefs remitted rapidly. 
The next time I saw him, about a fortnight after he had been placed on the 
new treatment regime, RB was about to be discharged. During this session, RB 
spoke of having had several premonitions of events over the years, including of the 
deaths of his mother and his two brothers, and of his recent bowel operation. He 
reported being at work one day when, just after lunch time, he had heard someone, 
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whom he believed to be his mother, calling out his name. It later transpired that this 
was the time at which his mother had died. He further reported having sensed his 
mother the night before her funeral, when she was lying in an open coffin in his 
house. He said he was asleep and at first thought he was dreaming, but had 
"realised it was really her", when she touched him. He also said that she was 
present at his recent operation and had told him that "everything would be fine" and 
that he "would be alright". 
A year after his delusions remitted, RB underwent a closure of colostomy. 
He has not become deluded since, although he has been seen intermittently for 
episodes of depression. His wife remains very symptomatic. At the time of 
writing, however, RB shows no recurrence of any delusional beliefs. 
JA: A bodily delusion as an explanation of a painful life event 
Case description 
JA is a 56 year old woman, of average intelligence, who was admitted to a 
psychiatric ward via a surgical ward, following a minor operation on her bowel. 
JA had become depressed following the operation and had attempted suicide by 
swallowing some bleach. JA had a history of bowel problems and had had a 
couple of routine operations in the past. She had no prior history of mental illness. 
She is married and has a son and a daughter, both of whom are now married. Her 
married life had not been good for some time prior to her admission, and her 
husband had recently begun an affair with her sister-in-law (her late brother's 
wife). 
Delusional beliefs 
When JA was first admitted to the psychiatric ward, she began voicing 
nihilistic beliefs. These beliefs varied, however, from claiming that she felt as if 
she were dead, to claiming that her body had changed or felt numb. The belief that 
she felt as though she were dead lasted for a couple of days only. JA was highly 
54 
Chapter Three 
suspicious of the hospital and its staff. In particular, she was convinced that the 
surgeon who operated on her bowel had partially sewn up her vagina. She was 
extremely upset by this and insisted that it prevented her from having sexual 
intercourse with her husband. She claimed that this inability to have intercourse 
was the reason why he was having an affair with her sister-in-law. She also 
insisted that the surgeon had inserted a tube linking her vagina to her anal passage. 
In order to check that there was no physical reason for her inability to have 
intercourse, and that there were no other problems with her vaginal or anal 
passages, an exploratory operation was performed. This confirmed that there were 
no physical reasons why she could not have sexual intercourse. However, the 
surgeon did note that part of her anal passage bent slightly to the front and it might 
be possible that it was this that she could feel and which led her to believe that she 
had an extra tube linking her vaginal and anal passages. 
JA had a number of other bodily delusions. For example, she claimed that 
her wisdom teeth had gone and that her extremities were dead. She was afraid to 
eat due to an imagined lump in her throat. She also complained of being dehydrated 
and "all dried up"; this included her skin, which she believed had no moisture in it. 
Medical examination, however, revealed no dehydration. At one point, JA said " I 
have no oxygen". When questioned further about this, she simply said " I have no 
oxygen. That's all. I just have no oxygen". 
JA also believed that she could "smell the stuff that's rotting down below". 
Like Cotard's patients, she repeated the same phrase over and over again, saying 
about the surgeon and medical staff: "They've done this to me". This 
suspiciousness arose while JA was still very depressed and extended to her 
repeatedly asking why the medical staff and I had "singled me out". After a couple 
of visits, however, she began to trust me and agreed to take part in some tests. The 
results of these are presented below. 
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MB: A chronic case of the Cotard delusion 
Case description 
MB is a 59 year-old woman with no family history of serious psychiatric 
illness. She is divorced, with one daughter from the marriage. MB has been a 
clerical worker in the civil service for most of her adult life. 
MB has a thirty year history of mental illness. At the age of 28, she 
received a diagnosis of phobic anxiety. She made a good recovery after being 
placed on benzodiazepine, which she continued to take intermittendy for the next 25 
years. When she was 53 she had another episode of anxiety and was diagnosed as 
having agoraphobia with panic. She also suffered from hypochondriacal worrying, 
low mood and depersonalisation. Again, she recovered well. 
The current episode began 6 years later, when she experienced feelings of 
derealisation, and seemingly also of depersonalisation. She was suffering from 
increased awareness of body functions, about which she was highly anxious. She 
reported that she could "smell death", which medical and psychology staff felt 
suggested a differential diagnosis of temporal lobe epilepsy. An EEG revealed no 
abnormalities. 
Eight weeks later, after MB had complained she was unable to feel any 
emotion, a diagnosis of atypical depression was made. Four months after this, she 
was described as suffering from a depressive defective state with gross anhedonia, 
intermittent depersonalisation and derealisation, nihilistic delusions and ideas of 
reference. 
During the present investigation, MB was oriented in person, time and 
place, and there was no evidence of formal thought disorder and no gross 
abnormality of speech or language. Her posture was anxious, tense and rigid - she 
would sit forward in her chair, with her arms around her shoulders, as i f giving 
herself a hug. Her facial expression was also anxious, but unvarying, and her 
affect was flat 
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Following treatment, again with benzodiazepine, MB recovered sufficiently 
well to move to a psychiatric hostel staffed by nurses, in which she continues to 
live. 
Delusional beliefs 
MB reported feelings of depersonalisation and claimed to be dead. She said 
that she could feel herself when, for example, she touched herself on the arm. 
However, she also stated " I am not aware that I 'm here", and said she was cut off 
from everything around her. When asked i f this was an uncomfortable experience, 
MB said that she was unable to say because she could not feel anything at all. She 
said that she felt her own body was "not there at all". She knew where she was, 
but did not know whether her body was there. MB knew that others could see her 
body but thought that it "may be someone else". When asked what she thought 
might have happened to her body, she replied that she had wondered whether her 
spirit was "something like a disembodied spirit of a ghost". 
MB's loss of feeling extended to her emotions. She complained of a total 
loss of emotional responsiveness, which included everything from the weather to 
the presence of others. In particular, she said that when she cuddled her 
granddaughter she did not derive any feelings from her (she informed me of this 
several times in several visits). She stated continually that she had no thoughts 
whatsoever, and so could neither think nor feel; hence she had neither sad nor 
happy thoughts, but instead felt only numbness. MB alluded to a difference 
between feeling and knowing, but did not know any reason as to why, or on what 
basis, such a difference might exist. 
When asked whether this sort of thing happens to others, she replied "No, 
just me... I am the only person in the world with this". She added that she did not 
know what the "this" was, "unless it is supernatural, but I don't know what". 
Throughout the conversation, MB either sat bolt up right in her seat with her hands 
held together, continually 'wringing', as though she were washing her hands, or 
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she sat stooped forward with each hand clasped over the opposite arm, as though 
she were hugging herself. Physically, she never looked comfortable or relaxed. 
There was a seeming paradox in her physical behaviour - she alternated between 
what Cotard would have described as muscular rigidity on the one hand, and the 
'wringing' of hands behaviour on the other. Indeed, her bodily behaviour seemed 
paradoxical when considering her flat vocal and facial expressions. 
MB spoke of her experiences before her admission to hospital. She 
reported having had some bizarre experiences in the hostel; she said that when she 
looked in a mirror, the image would shift from one end of the mirror to the other. 
She claimed to have seen strange lights and coffins in her house. She also reported 
having had feelings of being pulled across the room and seeing a white cloud across 
her feet that slowly enveloped her up to her chest. MB said she thought then that 
she was dying, and even claimed to have seen her own death in the paper. 
I visited MB just over a year later at a staffed hostel for people with 
psychiatric illnesses, to which she had moved some months before. Her condition 
was exactly the same as in the previous year and she voiced exactly the same 
experiences. She appeared anxious when discussing her experiences and still 
showed the same muscular rigidity, interspersed with the characteristic wringing of 
her hands. She remained highly distractible, being unable to concentrate on any 
given task for more than a few minutes before returning to speak of her 
experiences, the accounts of which were exactly the same as in the previous year. 
JK: A severe case of the Cotard delusion 
Case description 
JK (Young, Leafhead & Szulecka, 1994) is a 29-year old woman of 
average intelligence, who was admitted to hospital five times over a four-year 
period for episodes of psychotic depression. She responded well to ECT, but 
developed spells of elated mood following treatment on three occasions. Earlier 
during the year of the latest episode, a close friend of the family, whom she used to 
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call "uncle", and referred to as being like a "second father", died and this seemed to 
have been associated with the beginning of the illness. JK's first episode of 
depression, experienced a few years before, followed the death of her father from 
cancer. She was then admitted to hospital where she believed she "died partially" 
and "never really recovered". She believed that the latest episode was related to an 
operation she had had on a lymph gland in her neck two or three weeks prior to 
admission. She insisted that she had been conscious during the operation and had 
felt everything. 
JK reported being a normal, happy child who spent a great deal of time with 
her father. She was good at reading and spelling at school, but very poor at Maths, 
for which she was placed in a special class. She reports having been teased a lot by 
the other children at primary school and not having any real friends. She got on 
better at her secondary school, where she made friends and was only taunted 
occasionally. She left school at sixteen with three CSEs. 
After leaving school, JK embarked on a couple of Youth Training Schemes 
and other similar schemes, until settling to work in nursing homes, one of which 
she remained at for three years on a part-time basis. She enjoyed her work and she 
felt that she got on well both with her colleagues and with the elderly people. She 
stopped working when she became i l l , some three months prior to her admission. 
JK does not have any good friends of her own age, and has never had a 
long-term boyfriend. She said she was sexually abused by a boyfriend at school, 
but gave no details. About a year after being discharged from full-time hospital 
care, she met a young man at the hospital Day Centre who had suffered from 
depression. She became very fond of him quite quickly, but after a short while he 
told her he just wanted them to be good friends. JK took this rather 
philosophically. This may seem surprising given her rather fragile state, but JK 
was severely lacking in friendships and knew no-one else of her own age, so she 
was just pleased to have made a friend. They shared their experiences of being i l l , 
and he stood by her when she had a relapse. Apart from the young man, the only 
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people she reported seeing outside the family were the "uncle", now deceased, and 
his wife, whom she still sees. JK is very close to her mother and to her brother, 
aged 41, who, like JK, still lives at home. 
Delusional beliefs 
When she was most floridly i l l , JK claimed that she was dead. At other 
times, she believed that her brain was dead and that her body was going to explode. 
At the beginning of her illness, she had very strong feelings of derealisation and 
depersonalisation. She also had ideas of reference and believed that she was in 
control of objects and people around her. When the delusion was at its worst, JK 
tried to cut her wrists with a pair of bathroom scissors, but her mother stopped her. 
Like Cotard's patients, JK experienced self-accusatory delusions. She 
thought that she perpetrated some act for which people were suffering, although she 
could not specify the nature of the act. She also believed she was responsible for 
bad weather and accidents world-wide because she could predict their occurrence. 
JK felt particularly guilty about having claimed social security benefits (to which 
she was legally fully entitled) on the grounds that she was dead while she was 
claiming and so had not been entitled to any benefits. She was extremely worried 
about getting into trouble about this and no amount of re-assurance would convince 
her that she had done nothing wrong. Other delusions were rather vague. For 
example, she was particularly worried that she had done things for which her 
mother would get into trouble, but she could not say what the 'things' were. 
JK's mother was also the focus of some general nihilistic delusions. 
During the time in which she believed she was dead and complained about feelings 
of derealisation, JK denied the existence of her mother. This belief was, as with 
some of her self-accusatory delusions, vague and not clearly formed. Later, when 
she no longer believed she was dead, but thought she may have been dead, she 
voiced beliefs that her mother and brother had changed and were no longer the 
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people they were before. This is interesting in terms of the postulated relationship 
between the Cotard and Capgras delusions referred to in Chapters One and Two. 
When asked about her visual experience and feelings of derealisation in 
general, JK stated that although she could see everything - people, objects and her 
surroundings - "nothing feels real". When the delusion was at its most severe, JK 
reported feeling very frightened and having strange perceptual experiences. She 
saw people and objects as outlines or shadows only, while remaining able 
somehow to perceive their features. At times, JK felt as though she was from 
another planet, as i f she were "someone else who couldn't see me, and as i f other 
people weren't real. I could only see outlines". 
JK also had some hallucinatory experiences during the time in which the 
Cotard delusion was florid. She had visions of her aunt and uncle in Australia and 
would continually visualise everyone in her family. She said that she "saw" her 
living uncle cycling around the skies. Like MB, JK also reported standing one day 
and watching a white cloud appear at her feet and then gradually rise until it 
enveloped her up to her waist. 
JK's unusual experiences were not confined to vision. She believed that 
she had experienced something highly unusual. She reported feeling frightened, 
confused and guilty. At times she said that she was not human and even asked her 
mother i f she had really given birth to her; she could not convince herself that she 
had been born at all. At other times she repeated her belief that she was dead: " I 
feel as though I have died... I believe I have died... I can't breathe... I have died". 
On one occasion, JK described herself as consisting of mere fresh air and on 
another she said that she was "just a voice and i f that goes I won't be anything... i f 
my voice goes I wil l be lost and I won't know where I have gone". She said that i f 
no-one could help her, she wanted to be put out of her misery. It was at this time 
that she tried to cut her wrists. She said "the television was telling me I was 
insane" and she felt as though she could control her mother, the garbage van and 
the men collecting the rubbish, as well as the switches and electrical equipment in 
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the house. She complained that when she went to bed at night she did not feel 
comfortable, owing to the fact that her body felt strange. Her subjective experience 
of eating was similarly unreal; she felt as though she were "just placing food in the 
atmosphere", rather than into her body. 
JK displayed the type of 'resistant insanity' noted by Cotard. She would 
not eat, get up in the morning, bath, dress, and so on, without being coerced. 
When asked why she would not do these things, JK explained that she was 
"scared" to do them. She was similarly scared of urinating and defecating, and 
would retain urine and faeces until persuaded by her mother to go to the lavatory. 
Somewhat paradoxically, JK informed me that she had been very constipated and 
added " I don't know if my bowels work". 
Such fears persisted late into the course of her illness, even after she no 
longer believed she was dead. She reported being frightened to go to sleep at 
nights for fear she may die during her sleep. She felt that her father and uncle (both 
deceased) were "willing" her "to join them' and she was continually fighting against 
doing so. She was "frightened of experiencing death again" and kept saying that 
she wanted to become "like everybody else". As mentioned above, at the beginning 
of her illness, JK had denied the existence of her mother. After the Cotard delusion 
had remitted, JK voiced beliefs that her mother and brother had changed and were 
no longer the people they were before. 
As JK recovered, she was able to talk about what she had felt at the time 
when she believed she was dead. She claimed her auditory, olfactory and gustatory 
modalities had all been relatively normal. She said, however, that her vision and 
her sense of touch had been unusual - "things just didn't feel right". She felt that 
her body was going to explode and had visualised this happening. These unusual 
feelings in her visual and tactile modalities remained long after the delusion had 
remitted. 
I was particularly interested to know whether the fact that JK felt and 
thought at all had struck her as being inconsistent with her belief that she was dead. 
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I asked her, therefore, whether she could feel her heart beat, whether she could feel 
hot and cold, and whether she could feel when her bladder was ful l . She said she 
could. I suggested that such feelings surely represented evidence that she was not 
dead, but alive. She said she could feel them and she was dead and so it clearly did 
not represent evidence that she was alive. She said she recognised that this was a 
difficult concept for me to grasp and one which was equally difficult for her to 
explain, partly because the experience was unique to her and partly because she did 
not fully understand it herself. I then asked whether she thought I would be able to 
feel my heart beat, to feel hunger and so on i f I were dead. She repeated that her 
experience was unique to her; no-one else had ever experienced what she was going 
through. When pressed to give an answer, however, she finally, but very 
reluctantly, agreed that "it might be possible" (for me to feel such things). JK 
appeared to recognise the inconsistency of someone being dead and yet remaining 
able to feel and think, and yet could not entertain the possibility of this 
inconsistency in regard to her. JK became extremely upset after this conversation, 
possibly because it had presented a challenge to her delusional belief system. 
Indeed, JK suffered a minor relapse after this conversation; a poignant reminder of 
the sensitivity and fragility of people undergoing challenge to their delusional 
beliefs. 
When JK's mental state settled again, she related having had some strange 
experiences long before the onset of her illness. She told me about having gone 
"into a trance" and walking in front of a car when she was at primary school. She 
also told me that the television had always irritated her and that she never watched 
anything all the way through. She said she had often felt that she had seen a 
programme before, even though it had never been previously shown on the 
television (or at the cinema) and she knew that she could not possibly have seen it. 
This was such a regular occurrence that when she was younger her father used to 
say that she "must have been here before" and that she "must have lived before". It 
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cannot now be known whether her father actually believed this or whether he was 
joking with her, but it is certain that JK took him seriously. 
When JK began to recover from her other delusional beliefs, and stopped 
having "strange experiences", she seemed to be aware of a distinction between 
reality and delusion. This distinction became rather blurred, however, when she 
discussed how she perceived and interpreted her experiences while under the 
Cotard delusion and how she viewed them once she had stopped believing she was 
dead. JK showed only superficial appreciation of the fact that when she was 
floridly i l l she had been, in fact, deluded. 
In a conversation about death and what it means to be dead, JK appeared to 
hold contradictory views. She said that "when you're dead, you're dead - that's 
it", but when questioned again about possible bodily sensations after death, she 
now said, without reluctance, that because it had happened to her it must be 
possible to feel one's heart beat. Such views reinforced the impression that her 
understanding of having been deluded was not complete. When pressed further, it 
transpired that she was in a dilemma: " I want to understand what's happened, but 
I 'm scared of what the truth is. Either none of this has happened and I am mad or 
all of it has happened and I did die. Either way I can't win. I don't want to know 
which one it is. I 'm scared of finding out". 
JK's condition stabilised from this point and she started to attend the Day 
Centre at the hospital. She was now receiving greatly reduced medication, with a 
view to complete cessation, and was markedly more alert than at any other time I 
had seen her in the past. She was very keen to say how much better she felt. She 
was beginning to take a pride in her appearance, and had embarked on a diet 
(having gained several stones in weight owing to the medication). For the first time 
in the two years in which I had been seeing her, JK was eager to talk about pleasant 
events that had been happening in her life. It was then she met the young man who 
subsequently became her friend. When she told me about him, her face lit up, she 
reddened, went all coy and then gave a huge grin. 
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This period of stability lasted for around six months, after which she began 
to believe that she was invisible. She later said about this that she knew that people 
could see her despite her invisibility and that she could not understand why they 
were able to do so. She became very frustrated by this and began head-banging 
first thing in the mornings. It finally became too much for her and she took an 
overdose. Her mother found her the next morning in bed and she was rushed to 
hospital where she remained in the intensive care unit for four days. After this she 
settled down again and continued to attend the Day Centre, which she very much 
enjoyed, and to see her 'boyfriend' who had stood by her during her delusion about 
being invisible. 
I asked JK to tell me what she remembered about having been i l l . She 
referred to her belief that she had seen cars being squashed and related this belief to 
a car crash that she had been in along with her mother and brother. Nobody was 
hurt, apart from a few bruises, but she thinks this was why she believed she could 
see cars being squashed. When questioned about her prior beliefs she said she 
realised it had been "the illness", and said "It was just me that changed". 
She talked about the surgery on the gland in her neck and said that she had 
been worried about having the operation. At that time, she felt as though she was 
turning inside out, that her body was exploding and she was "being torn apart, limb 
from limb". She said the operation had had nothing to do with her illness, which 
contradicted her view while she was i l l when she insisted that the operation was a 
significant factor in her illness. She now felt her failure to obtain an 'O' Level in 
Human Biology was a major factor in the onset of her illness since she had been 
particularly upset by it. During her illness, JK had informed me that she had been 
conscious during the operation and had felt everything. She had become very 
distressed when talking about it at the time. During this later discussion, however, 
when asked whether she could remember anything about the operation or whether 
she had felt anything during it, she replied that the last thing she had remembered 
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was being put to sleep and the next she knew was waking up in a hospital bed after 
the operation. 
I asked JK about her views on death, God and a possible afterlife. She said 
she believes in God and prays every night. I asked her i f she prayed on the night 
she took the overdose and she said she did. When asked i f she believed she would 
die from the overdose she replied that she did not think she would and added " I 
must have known I 'd come round". Paradoxically, she added that she has a great 
fear of dying; " I am terrified of it", she said. 
I then asked her about her views on what happens when you die. These 
views had altered radically from when we discussed them some eighteen months 
previously. She now held the sorts of views which many people hold. She said 
she believes in Heaven, where she believes she will "meet Dad again", although she 
was not sure about the existence of Hell. She also believed reincarnation was 
possible but was not sure what form it would take. I asked her about what people 
might look like once they were in Heaven and she replied that she was not sure, but 
suspected they would look just as they did before they died. 
I questioned her about her father's death and she said that she believed her 
problems all stemmed from her inability to accept that he had died. She said that 
she now accepted he was dead and that she would not see him again, except when 
she gets to Heaven herself. She said she continued to dream about him all the time. 
When asked about whether she could make predictions about events, she 
said she could. These predictions, however, turned out to be the sorts of 
predictions made by people every day. For example, she referred to her prediction 
that the collieries would close. Many people in Britain predicted the same. She 
also referred to her ability to predict the ending of a television programme or f i lm 
even i f she had not seen it before. Many people can do this also. The only 
difference seems to be that what JK believes is a fairly unusual thing to be able to 
do, most of us accept as predictions that are part of everyday life. When asked 
about more fantastic predictions, however, she laughed. Without reminding her 
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that when she was i l l she had informed me that she could predict (and control) the 
weather, I asked her if she felt this was something she could do. She laughed and 
said "Oh blimey no, I couldn't do something like thai1!". 
At no point during the discussion, did JK refer to having believed that she 
was dead or that her mother and brother had changed in some way and were not the 
people they used to be. Whether she had genuinely forgotten these beliefs or 
whether this was simply part of the sort of 'conspiracy of silence' that often takes 
place in the families of those who are mentally i l l is open to question. Also, it is not 
uncommon for people with the Cotard delusion to deny that they ever held the belief 
that they were dead (e.g., Maack & Mullen, 1983; Malone & Malone, 1992). 
Even at the height of her illness, when JK's delusional beliefs were most 
florid, she was able to discuss matters not related to her delusions quite normally 
and relatively cheerfully. When discussing her delusional beliefs, however, she 
became visibly anxious and highly distressed, sometimes being unable to stop 
herself from crying. However, even during the times in which she was feeling the 
utmost despair, JK was always willing to talk to me, and to take part in testing. 
Formal testing 
Introduction 
Three tests were administered: The Warrington Recognition Memory Test 
(RMT) (Warrington, 1984); the Hospital Anxiety and Depression (HAD) scale 
(Zigmond & Snaith, 1983); and the Magical Ideation Scale (MIS) (Eckblad & 
Chapman, 1983). 
In the RMT, f if ty faces are presented serially, each for three seconds. The 
subject is asked to make a judgment as to whether or not each face is pleasant (in 
order to facilitate encoding). Immediately following presentation, each face is 
presented again alongside a previously unseen distracter face. The task is to 
identify which of the two faces was the one originally seen. The procedure for the 
words subtest is the same. Fifty words are presented to which the testee has to 
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respond "pleasant" or "unpleasant". Immediately following presentation, each of 
the words is re-presented, alongside a previously unseen distracter word. The 
testee's task is again to identify which word was seen previously. 
The HAD scale is a self-report scale of anxiety and depression, consisting 
of a series of statements about how you have felt over the past week and a choice of 
four responses. Subjects are asked to select which of the four choices most closely 
corresponds with how they have felt over the past week. 
In the MIS, thirty statements are presented, to which the testee has to 
respond "true" or "false". Statements include: " I have had the momentary feeling 
that I might not be human" and " I think I could learn to read others' minds i f I 
wanted to". 
Table 3.1 shows the status of each patient's delusional belief at the time 
each test was administered. In addition, some general points need to be made 
concerning the testing of RB, MB and JK. Due to RB's distressed state on the first 
visit (when he was fully convinced that he was dead), it was impossible to complete 
any tests. On the second visit, a week later, he was still unable to concentrate on 
anything and was extremely distressed and anxious. After a further week, when 
RB was no longer fully convinced that he was dead, he was able to take part in 
testing. However, as noted above, RB is only semi-literate, so in the recognition 
memory test for words (reported below), the words were read out aloud to him. As 
such, it is difficult to gauge how much weight can be given to his score. Owing to 
his distress on previous visits, and the fact that he became tired and distractible after 
the recognition memory test, the Hospital Anxiety and Depression (HAD) scale 
(Zigmond & Snaith, 1993) and Magical Ideation Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983) 
were not presented to RB until the day of his discharge from hospital, by which 
time, of course, his condition had improved. MB felt unable to complete the HAD 
scale because, as noted earlier, she said she felt neither happiness nor sadness, 
displeasure nor pleasure. Hence, no scores are presented for her on this test. 
Finally, JK was tested three times over a period of two years. At the time of Test 
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1, JK believed she was dead and also voiced some rather vague doubts about the 
existence of her mother. By Test 2, JK was no longer convinced that she was 
dead, but thought she may have been dead. It was at this time she believed her 
mother and brother were no longer the people they had been. By the third testing 
session (18 months later), JK was no longer deluded, and stated that it was all "just 
in my mind". It must be stressed that the second time on which JK was given the 
MIS, she responded "yes" to all questions, so little weight can be given to her 
score. 
Table 3.1: Status of delusional beliefs at the time of testing. 
E E 
RMT: No longer fully convinced he was dead 
HAD: No longer deluded 
MIS: No longer deluded 
JA 
All tests: Felt 'as i f she were dead 
MB 
RMT: Believed she was dead 
HAD: Not completed 
MIS: Believed she was dead 
IK 
Test I 
All tests: Believed she was dead and questioned her mother's existence 
Test 2 
All tests: No longer fully convinced she was dead, but believed her mother 
and brother had changed in some way 
Test 3 
All tests: No longer deluded 
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Warrington Recognition Memory Test (Warrington, 1984) 
The results for the RMT for all 4 cases are presented in Table 3.2. The 
Table shows their raw scores for the numbers of faces and words they identified 
correctly, together with the published percentile scores for Warrington's (1984) 
age-matched controls. Also for the purposes of comparison, mean scores for a 
group of patients (n=134) with right hemisphere lesions and a group (n=145) with 
left hemisphere lesions (reported by Warrington, 1984) are also shown in the 
Table. 
Table 3.2: Scores for RB, JA, MB and JK on the Warrington Recognition Memory 
Test for words and faces. 
FACES WQRPS 
Accuracy Percentile Accuracy Percentile 
(/50) (/50) 
RB 36 5th 39 25th 
JA 39 25th 42 50th 
MB 37 10th 39 25th 
JK: Test 1 35 5th 45 25th 
JK: Test 2 30 5th 41 10th 
JK: Test 3 38 5th 44 25th 
Right hemisphere lesions: 
39.7 44.6 
Left hemisphere lesions: 
41.8 39.9 
As Table 3.2 shows, impairments in recognition memory for faces were 
found in all four cases. For RB and JK, the impairment was severe; it was were 
less so for MB; while for JA it was moderate. However, all four scored lower than 
the mean score for patients with right hemisphere lesions. Turning to the 
recognition memory for words scores, the Table shows that all four individuals 
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identified correctly more words than they did faces; indeed, JA's scores were 
normal. The other three participants, however, showed a moderate degree of 
impairment. MB and RB both scored at the 25th percentile; indeed, their scores 
were as poor as those for patients with left hemisphere lesions. JK also scored at 
the 25th percentile on Test sessions 1 and 3, and her score dropped to the 10th 
percentile in Test session 2. The important point to note here, however, is that in 
all cases, the face memory impairment was disproportionate to that shown for 
words. This is particularly notable in RB's case, who, given his literacy problems, 
might have been expected to recognise fewer words than faces. 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
Again, before examining the results, some points need to be made 
concerning testing. First, owing to his distress and distractibility on previous 
visits, RB was not able to complete the HAD scale until the day he was discharged 
from hospital, by which time, of course, his condition had improved. No results 
are reported for MB since, as noted above, she could not do the test. Finally, JK 
was tested on the same occasions as the RMT was given. 
Table 3.3: Scores for RB, J A, MB and JK on the Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
(HAD) Scale. 
Anxiety Depression 
RB 3 2 
JA 13 11 
MB 
JKTes t l 15 17 
JK Test 2 14 14 
JK Test 3 6 6 
Published cut-off score 10 10 
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Table 3.3 shows the results for the 3 cases, together with the published cut-
off scores for both anxiety and depression (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). As can be 
seen in the Table, RB showed no signs of depression or anxiety; but it must be 
borne in mind that he did not complete the test until the day upon which he was 
discharged, by which time he was better. JA, on the other hand, showed a 
moderate-severe level of anxiety and a moderate level of depression. JK's scores 
varied from the first 2 sessions, to the third. On Test 1 (when JK believed she was 
dead), she scored 15 for anxiety and 17 for depression. Similarly, on the second 
test session (when she no longer believed she was dead, but though she may have 
been dead), her scores were 14 for both anxiety and depression. By the third 
session (18 months later), JK was no longer deluded and her scores for both 
anxiety and depression had dropped markedly to 6 for both subscales. 
Magical Ideation Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983) 
The results of the MIS are presented in Table 3.4. As with the HAD scale, 
the MIS was not given to RB until the day of his discharge from hospital, after his 
delusions had remitted. Despite this, he scored 10, which is well above the control 
score of less than 3 (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). It was during this test that he 
spoke of his premonitions (noted above). Even though RB was no longer 
Table 3.4: Scores for RB, JA, MB and JK on the Magical Ideation Scale. 
MIS score 
RB 10 
JA 3 
MB 4 
JK Test 1 17 
JK Test 2 23 
JK Test 3 
Published control mean 
_6 
<3 
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delusional, therefore, he still held some bizarre beliefs. In particular, he agreed 
with the statements: " I f reincarnation were true, it would explain some unusual 
experiences I have had" and " I have wondered whether the spirits of the dead can 
influence the living". 
Unlike RB, JA appeared to have few bizarre beliefs other than those which 
she specifically complained about, scoring only 3. Similarly, MB scored only 4, 
indicating that she had no bizarre beliefs, save that she was dead. JK, on the other 
hand, scored very highly on the first and second testing sessions. On Test 1, she 
scored 17/30 agreeing with statements such as " I have had the momentary feeling 
that I might not be human" and " I think I could learn to read others' minds i f I 
wanted to". This is far higher than the average score of under 3. It is important to 
note, however, that JK did not score 30/30. That is to say, she was not simply 
going along with any idea put to her, but was considering the relevance of each 
statement to her. Of particular interest is that she agreed with the statement " I have 
had the momentary feeling that someone's place has been taken by a look-alike", 
which is noteworthy when considering the strange feelings she was expressing at 
the time concerning the existence of her mother. On the second test session, JK 
simply responded "agree" to all the questions. This resulted in a score of 23, 
because there are only 7 statements in the scale to which a response of "disagree" 
indicates magical ideation. Unlike her performance on Test 1, when she clearly 
considered each statement carefully, JK was highly distracted and simply 
responded "agree" to each statement that was put to her. As noted above, it was 
around the time of the second testing session that JK was worrying over whether 
she had been dead and also over the feeling she had that her mother and brother 
were no longer the people they once were. Finally, as with her anxiety and 
depression, JK's Magical Ideation score was much reduced by the third session. It 
is interesting, however, that she still scored 6, which is double that of Eckblad and 
Chapman's (1983) controls. In particular, JK agreed with having had the 
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momentary feeling that she might not be human and that reincarnation might explain 
some unusual experiences she had had. 
Discussion of formal testing 
These findings are in keeping with other findings of face recognition 
impairments in cases of the Cotard delusion (Young, et al., 1992; Wright, et al, 
1993; Young et al., 1993). In particular, it was noted in Chapter One that in W I 
(Young et al., 1992), the Cotard delusion followed damage to right temporo-
parietal areas, as well as some bilateral frontal lobe damage. It is regrettable that 
WI's recognition memory for words could not be reported (this was because, as 
often happens in such cases, the RMT subtests had to be administered at very 
different times), since a lowered score for W I on words may have helped with the 
interpretation of RB and MB's scores here. This notwithstanding, it may be said, 
albeit tentatively, that RB and MB's scores on the RMT are consistent with studies 
showing face processing impairments in the Cotard delusion (e.g., Young et al., 
1992). 
The results of the RMT reported here lend support to Young et aL's (1992) 
suggestion that face recognition impairments are implicated in the Cotard delusion. 
Additionally, JK's belief that her mother and brother had changed and were no 
longer the people they once were is consistent with Young et aVs (1992) claim that 
the underlying pathophysiology and neuropsychology of the Cotard and Capgras 
delusions may be related. Further evidence of face-processing deficits in the Cotard 
and Capgras delusion, and for the relationship between the two delusions, have 
been reported by Young et al. (1994). 
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Analysis of case studies 
The symptoms displayed by the four individuals suffering from the Cotard 
delusion were analysed in the same way as were the case reports studied in Chapter 
Two. As can be seen from Table 3.5, only JK negated the existence of others. She 
also negated herself, believed she was dead and yet believed she was immortal, as 
did MB. RB simply stated that he was dead, while J A negated her own existence, 
and felt as though she was dead for a couple of days. Only JK voiced self 
accusatory delusions and feelings of guilt, and suffered from imagined fears. JK 
also claimed that parts of her body did not exist, and suffered from hypochondriacal 
delusions. JA also voiced hypochondriacal delusions, and believed that parts of 
had changed in some way or were rotting away and emanating offensive odours. 
Neither RB nor MB voiced any such beliefs, although MB had suffered from 
hypochondriacal worrying. JA voiced visual, olfactory and gustatory 
hallucinations, and JK and RB voiced both auditory and visual hallucinations, 
while MB voiced only visual ones. 
In terms of behavioural symptoms, JK, RB and JA had all attempted suicide 
at some point during their illness, JK refused to eat, and both she and JA retained 
urine and faeces. RB, J A and MB displayed the muscular rigidity which Cotard 
(1882) spoke of, while JK showed resistant insanity, and RB, JA and MB the 
repetition of words and phrases characteristic of Cotard's cases. 
What is particularly noticeable about Table 3.5 is that all 4 individuals 
showed impaired face processing, and all voiced feelings of depersonalisation, 
while 3 (JK, RB and MB) voiced feelings of derealisation and/or feelings of 
unreality. Finally, all 4 individuals showed depression as a symptom. 
As in Chapter Four, the symptoms were again placed into broad symptom 
groupings in order to establish whether an overall pattern emerged. These 
groupings are shown in Table 3.6. As can be seen, all voiced self-nihilistic 
delusions of one form or another; all showed perceptual abnormalities, behavioural 
manifestations, feelings of depersonalisation, and depression. Three also voiced 
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Table 3.5 Symptoms noted in the four single cases of the Cotard delusion. 
Symptoms RB JA MB JK 
General nihilistic delusions 
Negation of others V 
Negation of environment 
Self-nihilistic delusions 
Negation of self, including denial of 
whole body V V V 
Belief that one is dead V V V 
Immortality/inability to die V V 
Self-deprecatory delusions 
Self-accusatory delusions V 
Feelings of guilt V 
Imaginary terrors or fears V 
Belief that one is damned 
Bodily delusions 
Hypochondriacal delusions 
Denial of parts of body V 
Putrefaction of body parts 
Belief that body smells foul 
Changes in body parts V 
Metamorphosis 
Perceptual abnormalities 
Auditory hallucinations V V 
Visual hallucinations V 
Olfactory hallucinations V 
Gustatory hallucinations V 
Visual illusions V 
Hyperaesthesia 
Anaesthesia 
Visual processing deficits V V V 
Behavioural manifestations 
Suicide attempts/thoughts V 
Violence 
Refusal to eat V 
Retention of urine & faeces V 
Muscular rigidity V V 
Immobility 
Mutism 
Repetition of words/phrases V V 
Resistant insanity 
Other 
Depersonalisation V 
Derealisationi'unreality V 
Depression V V 
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feelings of derealisation. Finally, general nihilistic delusions and self-deprecatory 
delusions were only voiced by JK, while bodily delusions were voiced by both her 
and JA. 
Table 3.6: Symptoms noted for the four cases according to symptom group. 
Case Number 
Symptom Group RB JA MB JK 
General nihilistic delusions 
\Self-nihilistic delusions V V 
Self'deprecatory delusions 
Bodily delusions 
Perceptual abnormalities < V V 
Behavioural manifestations V V < 
Depersonalisation 
Derealisation/'unreality V 
Depression 
Discussion 
The four individuals shared a number of symptoms; they all suffered from 
depression, and from depersonalisation. In addition, all four displayed impaired 
recognition memory for faces, as measured by the RMT. In this sense, then, the 
individuals showed great similarity. However, by examining the symptoms and 
subjective experiences of the four individuals in greater depth, it is clear that there 
are as many differences as there are similarities. 
First of all, in terms of the putative Cotard syndrome, only JK comes close 
to representing a textbook case; she not only had self-nihilistic delusions, including 
the belief that she was dead, but she denied the existence of others. Furthermore, 
unlike the other three individuals, she had self-accusatory delusions, feelings of 
guilt and imaginary terrors. This cannot be overlooked when examining the 
concept of a Cotard syndrome. Of particular interest is the fact that JK's symptoms 
varied during the course of her illness, such that she did not display all the 
symptoms listed at the same time The symptoms displayed by RB, JA and MB, on 
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the other hand, were far less variable: RB simply improved with treatment; while 
JA and MB's symptoms, although showing slight improvement over time, were 
relatively constant 
Only JK voiced self-accusatory delusions, and these differed from those 
voiced by Cotard's patients (who in turn differed from one another). One of her 
guilt-based delusions was fixed firmly in the twentieth century in a Department of 
Social Security benefit office. The theme of JK's delusion, however, was in 
keeping with the theme of all Cotard's patients, that is, negation. That the contents 
of delusions change with time is reflected in today's schizophrenic who believes 
that there are secret messages for him on the radio or television, or that he is Elvis 
Presley, rather than Napoleon. 
Bodily delusions were voiced by nine of Cotard's patients. Both JK and JA 
voiced bodily delusions, but there were differences in the form that these symptoms 
took and the severity with which they were displayed. While both believed that 
their bodies had changed in some way, there were clear differences in the specificity 
of these changes. JK simply stated that her brain was dead and that eating was like 
"placing food into the atmosphere". JA, on the other hand, was very specific about 
her beliefs (e.g., her body was rotting, and dehydrated, that her wisdom teeth were 
gone, her extremities were dead and she had no oxygen). One of Cotard's patients 
believed that her heart had been displaced and her throat contracted; another 
believed that she had a contagious disease; another that she had no body. Basically, 
neither individual held the same belief in terms of specific content, but both shared a 
common negativistic and hypochondriacal theme. This was also true of Cotard's 
cases reported in Chapter Two. MB did not have bodily delusions as such during 
the present investigation (although she had a history of hypochondriacal worrying), 
but she did report a heightened awareness of bodily functions and thought her body 
might be someone else's, or that she was the disembodied spirit of a ghost. It is 
interesting in this regard that MB alluded to a difference between feeling and 
knowing, albeit without knowing what that difference might be. As noted in 
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Chapter Two, Descartes' cogito ergo sum incorporates both thinking and feeling 
- MB's thoughts encapsulate nicely the divorce of the two leading to denial of 
one's existence. 
In terms of perceptual abnormalities, these were evident in all four cases 
(and had been displayed by seven of Cotard's patients). A l l four individuals 
reported here suffered from visual hallucinations; with both JK and JA believing 
that they had seen white clouds enveloping them, RB believing that he saw his 
mother after her death, and MB believing she had seen lights and had read a report 
of her own death in a newspaper. MB also had a visual illusion in which her image 
shifted in the mirror. Finally, all four displayed face processing deficits that are 
commented on in depth below. 
In terms of behavioural manifestations, RB, JA and MB corresponded 
closely to Cotard's description of what he termed muscular rigidity; with all three 
individuals showing stiff and rigid postures. Indeed, even though JK did not 
display quite such a rigid posture, she would sit somewhat motionless during 
interview and, when she did move, she lacked the fluidity of normal movement. 
Only JK displayed the resistant insanity referred to by Cotard, while both she and 
JA would often retain urine and faeces. 
In regard to other behavioural manifestations whereby individuals act on 
their delusions, JK, RB and JA attempted suicide, while MB did not. None of the 
four displayed aggression towards others, although JK and JA voiced 
suspiciousness about others. As referred to in Chapter Two, six of Cotard's 
patients displayed suspiciousness; three believed their food had been poisoned and 
the other three that they were being persecuted in some way. Furthermore, JK 
voiced the specific belief that her mother and brother were no longer the people they 
had been. This type of belief was noted by Cotard (1882); for example, case 4 
argued that her daughter was a devil in disguise, while also denying the existence of 
her family, case 8 denied the existence of her family, and case 5 believed that the 
people around her were only shadows. The latter is interesting in regard to the 
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perceptual disturbances reported by JK - specifically, her complaint of seeing 
people and objects as outlines or shadows. 
In terms of precipitating factors in the Cotard delusion, it was noted above 
that, prior to JK's illness, a family friend had died and, some time beforehand her 
father had died. JA had not suffered from a bereavement as such, but had, in her 
eyes, effectively lost her husband - to another woman (her late brother's wife). 
Neither RB nor MB had suffered any such recent losses (although the death of his 
mother clearly still bothered RB; while MB was divorced some years before, 
although she never mentioned this). It is interesting, however, that while there 
seemed to be no obvious precipitating factor for MB, RB had had an operation on 
his bowel - as, indeed, had JA. Similarly, JK had had an operation on her lymph 
gland, which she believed was related to her (second) illness, and during which she 
maintains she was fully conscious and had felt everything. Whether such factors 
are in some way causal to the onset of the Cotard delusion is, of course, not 
something that is easily demonstrable. It is interesting, however, to note that in 
Cotard's (1892) paper, le delire de negation followed the deaths of someone close 
in cases 6 and 7. It also followed bereavement in at least 6 recent cases. For 
example, Enoch and Trethowan's (1979) patient described as case 1 became 
deluded after her husband and a close friend died within 6 weeks of each other, and 
de Martis' patient (translation in Enoch & Trethowan, 1979) became deluded 
following the death of her father. Similarly, Maack and Mullen's (1983) patient, 
Mr B, became deluded shortly after the death of his mother and said he felt he was 
"exploding with grief that wouldn't come out" (p.652). It would be interesting to 
ascertain whether the Cotard delusion typically follows loss (either through 
bereavement or marital disharmony) and/or some form of surgical procedure. 
Of particular interest are the feelings of depersonalisation voiced by all four 
individuals. As noted in Chapter One, it has been suggested that depersonalisation 
affects experience of the self (Nemiah, 1989), whereas jamais vu represents a 
severe degree of depersonalisation, which affects places and situations (Myers & 
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Grant, 1972). It was further suggested that deja vu is the positive equivalent of 
depersonalisation (Nemiah, 1989). As noted, in Chapter One, deja vu experiences 
are more common in psychiatric patients than non-psychiatric patients (Richardson 
& Winokur, 1967, cited by Sno & Linszen, 1990). This is particularly relevant to 
JK, who had experienced feelings of deja vu for many years, especially with regard 
to her having "seen" television programmes before, which resulted in her avoidance 
of the television. During her illness, she experienced feelings of jamais vu, as well 
as of depersonalisation. RB, on the other hand, did not claim to have had deja vu 
experiences, but believed that he had had several premonitions in his life (of the 
deaths of his mother and brother, and of his operation). In contrast, neither JA nor 
MB reported feelings of deja vu, and nor did they claim to have had premonitions. 
Furthermore, and in contrast to RB and JK, they held few bizarre beliefs, as 
assessed by the Magical Ideation Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983), on which 
high scores have also been found for people with other types of delusion (Kaney & 
Bentall, 1989). However, MB had marked feelings of unreality and, like RB, JA 
and JK, displayed impaired face-processing on the Warrington RMT. Hence, 
while only two of the four individuals reported having had feelings of deja vu or of 
experiencing premonitions, all four had impaired recognition memory for faces, and 
three (JK, RB and MB) complained of feelings of unreality. Again, this fits more 
closely with the notion of le delire de negation; while there was a common pattern in 
the symptomatology of the four cases (in terms of depersonalisation and face 
recognition memory), there were differences in the degree and severity of those 
symptoms, particularly in the manifestations of feelings of unreality (i.e., deja vu, 
etc.). Finally, the presence of premonitions in the Cotard delusion has not been 
reported hitherto. It is entirely possible that they are of minimal relevance; 
however, the relationship between premonitions and the triad of depersonalisation, 
deja vu and jamais vu warrants further exploration. Unfortunately, this is beyond 
the remit of this thesis. 
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The cases described above, and especially JK, show obvious similarities to 
Cotard's patients. In terms of a Cotard syndrome, JK would represent a textbook 
case, and MB and came close to this. So, too, did JA, save, of course, for the fact 
that she did not actually say that she was dead; only that she felt as if she was dead. 
RB, on the other hand, while believing he was dead, showed few related 
symptoms, so therefore showed only part of the syndrome. Hence, believing 
oneself to be dead cannot be seen simply as a symptom found in the most severe 
cases; while RB was convinced that he was dead, his associated symptoms were far 
less severe than those of JK and, in contrast, JA's associated symptoms were far 
more severe than those of RB, and yet she did not actually claim to be dead. Such 
variations are far more in keeping with Cotard's own conception of the delusion 
than with the concept of a Cotard syndrome. 
It was noted both in Chapter One and in Chapter Two that Young and his 
colleagues (Young etal, 1992; Wright etal, 1993, Young, 1994) have suggested 
a clear role for depersonalisation and/or derealisation, feelings of unreality, face 
processing deficits (which serve to reinforce the feelings of derealisation and 
unreality), and, finally for depression. Also noted was the fact that in only 2 of the 
17 reports were face processing deficits noted; both of these were Young's case 
reports (Young et al, 1992; Wright et al., 1993). It was suggested that the fact 
such deficits were not noted in other case reports, may be simply because they had 
not been investigated. The results from the four cases analysed here are consistent 
with this view. The presence of impaired recognition memory for faces in the four 
individuals, taken with the feelings of depersonalisation and unreality, lends 
support to Young's theory. 
It is important to note that Young et al. (1992) and Wright et al. (1993) do 
not suggest that abnormal feelings, depersonalisation and derealisation are in 
themselves sufficient cause for the Cotard delusion to emerge. Face processing 
impairments and feelings of depersonalisation and/or derealisation are experienced 
by many people who do not conclude that they are dead. The key is the interaction 
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with depression that, as noted in Chapters One and Two, Wright et al. (1993) 
suggest leads people to seek an internal cause for their altered perceptual 
experience. Although the attribution of these changes is correctly internalised, the 
consequences of them are exaggerated. (That both RB and JK scored highly on the 
MIS is consistent with this, since it demonstrates that patients may be more willing 
to entertain bizarre hypotheses that other people would dismiss.) This, in turn, 
leads people to conclude erroneously they must be dead. A l l four individuals 
showed problems in face recognition memory and voiced feelings of 
depersonalisation. JA suffered from depression and from feelings of 
depersonalisation, but did not complain of feelings of derealisation or unreality, and 
neither did she voice the specific belief that she was dead; rather that she felt as 
though she were dead. The other three cases all suffered from depression, from 
feelings of depersonalisation and from feelings of derealisation, and they all voiced 
the belief that they were dead. The key difference seems to be that while these 3 
suffered from feelings of derealisation, JA did not. This seems to fit neatly with 
Wright et al.'s (1993) hypothesis. 
This pattern of symptoms raises an interesting question in terms of the 
notion of a Cotard syndrome. In particular, it raises the possibility that other 
individuals with the Cotard delusion might show the same symptomatology were 
they to be investigated using the same (or similar) method adopted here, and by 
Young and his colleagues. I f it emerged that all (or the majority, at least) people 
with the Cotard delusion demonstrated the specific combination of depression, 
depersonalisation, feelings of derealisation, and face-recognition impairments, this 
would create a syndrome. This issue will be addressed further in Chapter Eight 
To summarise, the disturbances in familiarity common to all four 
individuals appear consistent with the view that the face processing impairments 
seen in people suffering from the Cotard delusion may heighten feelings of 
unreality and so contribute to the maintenance of that delusion. 
83 
Chapter Three 
Taken together, such findings suggest that the most appropriate agenda for 
research into the Cotard delusion should involve specifying the roles of 
contributory factors in the Cotard delusion, rather than an attempt to find a single 
cause of the delusion. In this regard, the hypothesis that the Cotard delusion (and, 
as noted in Chapter One, the Capgras delusion) results from an interaction of 
impairments has much to commend it in terms of explaining why the delusion may 
arise, and yet, as noted in Chapter One, it seems to fall short of a complete account. 
In particular, it does not account for why people remain convinced by explanations 
that seem so patently absurd to everyone around them. Even the MIS findings, 
while suggestive that the individuals are willing to entertain bizarre hypotheses, do 
not seem sufficient in this respect. To this end, Chapter Four examines a possible 
mechanism in the maintenance of the Cotard delusion. 
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Chapter Four 
Attentional bias in the Cotard delusion 
Introduction 
In Chapter One it was noted that a useful strategy to adopt when conducting 
research in psychopathology is to look in detail at how particular individuals 
develop specific delusions. One then can attempt to ascertain whether similar 
mechanisms are involved in other types of delusion. An example of this type of 
strategy is the work undertaken by Young and his colleagues in formulating their 
theory that the Cotard delusion results from an interaction of impairments and 
extending this theory to account for the Capgras delusion (Young et al., 1992; 
Young et al., 1993) (see Chapters One and Two). Evidence supporting this 
position was presented in Chapter Three. 
While this theory has much to commend it, however, it still seems to fall 
short of a complete account. In particular, it does not explain why people remain 
convinced by explanations that seem so patently absurd to everyone around them. 
In this respect, there appeared to be a potential parallel between delusions and an 
aspect of anxiety disorders. Specifically, as noted in Chapters Two and Three, 
some individuals experiencing the Cotard delusion are preoccupied by their 
thoughts of their own demise. A question arises here as to whether this delusion-
related preoccupation might be a contributory factor in maintaining delusional 
beliefs. A useful way to examine this seemed to be to investigate attentional bias. 
A common means of investigating attentional bias in anxiety disorders is the so-
called 'emotional' Stroop paradigm. It was decided, therefore to investigate 
attentional biases in three individuals suffering from the Cotard deluson, using a 
variation of the Stroop paradigm. Before detailing the study, however, research 
into attentional biases in psychopathological disorders is outlined. 
85 
Chapter Four 
Attentional bias in psychopathological disorders 
Introduction 
It is now well-established that people suffering from a wide range of anxiety 
disorders show attentional biases towards stimuli related to their concerns. So, for 
example, anxious subjects display an attentional bias towards threat-related stimuli 
(e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 1986) and depressed individuals recall more 
affectively negative words than they do neutral words (Williams, Watts, MacLeod 
& Mathews, 1988). In an attempt to avoid possibly confounding results stemming 
from the effect that the presentation of threat-related stimuli may have on anxious 
subjects, MacLeod, Mathews and Tata (1986) used a visual probe technique, 
whereby subjects made neutral responses to neutral stimuli. They still found that 
anxious individuals direct their attention to, but non-anxious controls avert attention 
from, threat-related stimuli. 
The Stroop colour-naming paradigm 
A common means of investigating attentional biases is a modified Stroop 
paradigm (Stroop, 1935), in which subjects are asked to colour-name lists of 
words. It is almost 60 years since Stroop (1935) published what is now regarded 
as a "landmark article on attention and interference" (MacLeod, 1991, p. 163). It is 
doubtful whether he then realised the impact that his compound-stimuli task, which 
yields one of the most robust findings in psychology, was to have, not just on 
cognitive psychology, but also within the clinical field. 
In the standard Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 1935), subjects are required to 
name the colour in which a word with an incompatible colour-name is printed. 
Hence, they are presented with, for example, the word blue printed in the colour 
green and instructed to name the colour in which the word is printed, while 
ignoring the word itself (hence, the correct response to the example would be 
green). When compared to a control task, in which, for example, a row of XXXs is 
printed in a coloured ink, participants take longer to name the colour in which the 
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incompatible colour word is printed. This, then, is the basic Stoop interference 
effect. Interference constitutes the difference in times taken to colour-name the 
control stimuli (e.g., rows of XXXs or colour patches) and the incongruent-colour 
words. The latter take longer to name; hence there is interference from the to-be-
ignored, incongruent stimulus features. 
If, however, participants are required to read the word blue when it is 
printed in green there is little decrease in performance relative to naming the colour 
green when it is printed in black (Stroop, 1935). That is to say, there is little 
interference from the irrelevant colour when the task is simply to read the word. 
This property is known as asymmetry: the word interferes with the task of naming 
the colour, but the colour does not interfere nearly as much with the task of reading 
the word. 
There are two main theories of the interference effect found in the Stroop 
paradigm. The first, which has been cited since the days of pre-Stroop-type effects 
(see MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988), is the automaticity hypothesis, and the second is 
the relative speed of processing account (e.g., Dyer, 1973; Morton & Chambers, 
1973; see also MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988; MacLeod, 1991). 
The automaticity hypothesis (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 1975) holds that a 
given process is automatic if it is processed rapidly and independent of attention or 
strategy. Furthermore, a process is either automatic, or it is not, that is to say, 
there is no in-between (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 1975). It wil l therefore be referred 
to here as the strong automaticity account According to this view, interference may 
be caused by automatic processes, but not by those requiring attentional control. 
This view is consistent with Stroop asymmetry whereby reading the wording is 
regarded as automatic while naming the colour is not considered so. 
There have, however, been criticisms of this view, based on the 'dilution' 
effect (Kahneman & Chajczyk, 1983). I f participants are presented with a colour 
word placed underneath a colour patch, this serves to reduce the impact of the 
original word. Hence, attention may be split with the addition of another word on 
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the screen. The result of this is reduced interference to naming the colour patch; 
that is to say, the interference effect is diluted. This dilution effect does not accord 
with the notion that reading is an automatic process, since, if a process is automatic, 
the degree of interference should be unaffected by divided attention. 
This finding led Kahneman & Chajczyk (1983) to argue, not for the all-or-
none automaticity account, but rather for a modified version, whereby processes are 
not necessarily either automatic or not. Following from this, and as a response to 
the apparent dichotomous reasoning involved in Kahneman and Chajczyk's 
argument, MacLeod and Dunbar (1988) argue for a 'continuum of automaticity' 
(CofA). According to this view, processes are not either automatic or controlled, 
but rather fall along a continuum of automaticity, with highly automatic processes at 
one end, and processes having low-degree automaticity at the other. 
Rather than viewing automaticity as the crucial factor, the relative speed of 
processing account proposes that speed is the critical factor in Stroop. The relative 
speed view holds that colour naming and word reading are carried out in parallel, 
and interference occurs because reading is the faster process and can interfere with 
colour-naming (the slower process). A slower process, however, cannot interfere 
with a faster one. This account is consistent with Stroop asymmetry. 
MacLeod and Dunbar (1988), however, criticise the relative speed account 
on the following grounds: It has been found that the slower process can affect the 
faster one. Dunbar and MacLeod (1984) found that when they rotated colour 
words, responses were much slower than for normally-oriented words. Despite 
this, however, incongruent words continued to interfere with colour naming, and to 
the same magnitude as with normal words. Clearly, such a finding does not accord 
with the relative speed account 
Another problem with the relative speed account concerns the predictions 
made by it. The relative speed view predicts that i f the traditionally slower task 
(colour-naming) is practised until it becomes equally as fast as the initially faster 
task (word reading), then one would expect each dimension to begin to interfere 
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with each other to approximately the same degree. Eventually, with increased 
practice of the initially slower process, one would expect to see the original 
interference effect reversed, so that the colour in which a word is printed interferes 
with the reading of the colour-word, but not vice-versa. It is known, however, that 
when both colour naming and word reading are practised separately, the ratio of 
response times for the two tasks remains constant (Brown, 1915, cited by 
MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988). Hence, Brown argued that a theory based on 
differential practice (which is encompassed in the relative speed theory) was not 
sufficient. It is worth noting, however, that while this may well transpire to be the 
case, which is most likely, the evidence presented by Brown is itself insufficient It 
is surely not surprising that the ratio of response times for the two tasks remained 
constant: Individuals practice reading for years, but they do not commonly spend 
large amounts of time colour-naming. It could be argued that Brown's results 
simply inform us that a few sessions of practising colour naming (particularly when 
continuing to practise word reading) cannot overturn the rapidity resulting from a 
life-time of reading words. 
According to the predictions made by the continuum of automaticity 
approach, interference should be manipulable through practice. Practice in one of 
the dimensions should result in its becoming more automatic than before practice. 
Furthermore, there is no reason why the slower dimension cannot interfere with its 
faster counterpart provided the slower dimension has reached a sufficient degree of 
automaticity (MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988). 
Another aspect of the Stroop task is facilitation. Just as incongruent words 
interfere with the task of colour-naming, so congruent words facilitate colour-
naming (Dalrymple-Alford & Budayr, 1966, cited by MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988). 
Facilitation effects are not as frequent as interference effects, the possible reasons 
for which will be outlined below. The relative speed and continuum of automaticity 
accounts of the Stroop effect make different predictions both about interference and 
facilitation effects. 
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According to the relative speed theory, the faster dimension aids the process 
of the slower dimension when their words are congruent. Thus, the relative speed 
view predicts facilitation wi l l only be obtained where there is interference. The 
continuum of automaticity view predicts that increased automaticity should result in 
a greater tendency for both interference and facilitation of the other dimension. As 
with the relative speed view, the continuum view predicts that facilitation can only 
occur when there is interference. It further argues, however, that a process may 
need to obtain a higher degree of automaticity in order for it to facilitate than for it to 
interfere. 
MacLeod and Dunbar (1988) put these predictions to the test by 
constructing compound stimuli which did not impinge on the reading process. 
They presented subjects with a number of different shapes and gave them each a 
name which was that of a colour. The subjects were then trained to name the 
shapes with the colour-names. They found that after a brief period of practice, 
incongruent colours interfered with shape-naming and congruent colours facilitated 
it. The shapes, on the other hand, irrespective of congruity, did not affect colour-
naming. Increased training resulted in symmetrical interference, but facilitation was 
seen only in shape-naming (i.e., from congruent colour-names). After yet further 
training (a total of twenty days), the asymmetry seen at the beginning was 
completely reversed so that the shapes interfered with colour-naming, but colour 
did not interfere with shape-naming. 
These findings run counter to the strong automaticity account since that 
claims asymmetry of interference is due simply to word reading being automatic 
and colour naming not being so. The strong automaticity view cannot explain why, 
if , as is claimed, colour-naming is not an automatic process, it is able to interfere 
with and facilitate shape-naming. 
Turning to the relative speed account, it would predict equal interference in 
the two tasks, which clearly was not the case since the original asymmetry was 
reversed. The relative speed argument regarding the standard Stroop test centres on 
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the notion that word-reading is faster than, and thereby interferes with (and 
facilitates), colour-naming. MacLeod and Dunbar (1988), however, have shown 
that, by controlling the amount of practice in a given task, the initially less-practised 
process can eventually, through practice, become fast enough to reverse the original 
asymmetry. Furthermore, MacLeod and Dunbar did not obtain any facilitation 
effects for colour-naming, which also argues against the relative speed account 
since that predicts facilitation effects should be equal to interference effects; that is 
to say, greater interference should lead to greater facilitation. 
These data are consistent with MacLeod and Dunbar's (1988) continuum of 
automaticity account. At the outset, colour-naming was more automatic than was 
shape-naming but this pattern was eventually reversed. This reversal is readily 
accommodated by the CofA account, since it assumes not just that some processes 
are 'more' automatic than are others, but that they may become more automatic than 
others; that is, they may move further up the automaticity scale. It is worth noting 
that this view incorporates the differential practice hypothesis referred to above as, 
indeed, does the relative speed view. The difference between the two positions is 
that while the relative speed view holds that differential practice effects are a 
function of the speed of processing (which, as we have seen, they cannot be), the 
continuum of automaticity account holds that they are a function of the automaticity 
of processing. Furthermore, it appears to indicate that with practice a seemingly 
'non-automatic' process can ultimately obtain a high degree of automaticity. 
The continuum of automaticity account also accommodates the fact that there 
were no facilitation effects for colour-naming. As referred to above, the CofA view 
predicts that facilitation can only occur when there is interference and that a process 
may need to obtain a higher degree of automaticity in order for it to facilitate than 
for it to interfere. Dunbar and MacLeod (1984) argue that this reasoning also helps 
to explain why facilitation effects are far less frequent than interference effects. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning a parallel distributed processing (PDP) 
model (Cohen, Dunbar & McClelland, 1990). Cohen etal. propose a PDP account 
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of the notions underpinning the CofA account Their PDP model used the type of 
framework developed by McClelland (1979), and Rumelhart, Hinton and 
McClelland (1986). Cohen et al. (1990) attempted to provide a model which could 
demonstrate increased automaticity with practice, and provide an account of the 
relationship between automaticity and selective attention. 
In Cohen etal.'s (1990) PDP model, the Stroop interference and speed of 
processing effects are a function of the strength of processing differences. Rather 
than postulating either speed or automaticity as fundamental in processing, Cohen et 
al. (1990) propose that strength is the basic factor. According to this account, 
automaticity is viewed as a function of each pathway's relative strength. Cohen et 
al. propose a unidirectional, bottom-up, system of interconnected modules, within 
which are basic processing units. Processing occurs via a spread of activation 
along connections between and within modules through pathways that have 
different strengths. Any given task may utilise a pathway that consists of any 
number of units within any number of modules. The strength of a pathway is 
contingent upon its group of connections and, in turn, processing speed and 
processing accuracy are contingent upon pathway selection. The asymmetry 
between facilitation and interference in Stroop is accounted for by arguing that the 
processing units are non-linear. 
Attentional bias in psychopathological disorders, using the 'emotional' Stroop 
paradigm 
Extending the basic Stroop paradigm, Klein (1964) showed that colour 
naming tasks are affected by the meaning of the words used. He found that degree 
of interference was a function of the degree of meaningfulness of the irrelevant 
word, with more meaningful words causing greater interference. While this effect 
was far stronger with colour-related words, Klein (1964) also found that 
interference could be obtained with non-colour words. It is this basic finding that 
underlies the research into the emotional Stroop. Indeed, Klein borrowed the term 
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attensive power from Titchener (Klein, 1964) to describe the capacity of a word to 
produce arousal. He proposed that attensive power is a function of a word's 
meaningfulness, and suggested that various types of words could be "assessed for 
their evocative power" (Klein, 1964, p.587), such as familiar and unfamiliar 
words, well-learned and poorly-learned words and, of particular interest here, 
affect-laden words. 
Since Klein's seminal paper, research adopting the use of affect-laden 
words in studying the Stroop effect has abounded, and the Stroop effect is now 
used to examine the processing of affective material in groups of individuals 
suffering from a variety of emotional and affective disorders, such as depression 
and anxiety. This paradigm is known as the emotional Stroop. 
As referred to above, it is well known that people suffering from 
psychopathological disorders show attentional bias towards material related to their 
concerns. In the 'emotional Stroop' paradigm, subjects are asked to name the 
colours in which words are printed whilst ignoring the meanings of the words 
themselves. It has been shown that individuals suffering from a variety of anxiety 
disorders take longer to colour-name affectively salient words than they do 
affectively non-salient or neutral words (e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; 
Williams et al., 1988). For example, Watts, McKenna, Sharrock and Trezise 
(1986) found that arachnaphobics take longer to colour-name words related to 
spiders than those either of the standard colour-word Stroop (e.g., the word red 
printed in the colour blue) or of a more generally threatening nature. The effect has 
also been found for people who had recently attempted suicide (Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986) and individuals high in trait anxiety (Richards & Millwood, 
1989). 
Such studies have been interpreted as indicating that anxiety states are 
associated with a processing bias towards threat-related material arising from the 
activation of danger schemata (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988). 
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Attentional bias in anxiety and depression 
As referred to earlier, there are a great number of studies that have used the 
emotional Stroop paradigm in the study of anxiety disorders. However, where it 
has been most widely used is in the attempt to understand the respective 
contributions of trait and state anxiety in attentional bias. 
Mathews and MacLeod (1985) found that anxious subjects were slower on 
colour-naming words related to physical threat and social threat, as well as control 
words, relative to control subjects. More importantly, the anxious subjects were 
especially slow on the threat-related words. In addition, anxious subjects who 
expressed worries about their health were slower to colour-name physical words 
related to their individual concerns (e.g., cancer, injury). This effect was not found 
for social threat-related words. Hence there was some indication that for the 
physical threat words, the effect was related to conscious cognitive content. In an 
attempt to ascertain whether the interference effects found were due to the fact that 
danger-related words were being encoded better by the anxious subjects, Mathews 
and MacLeod (1985) conducted a recognition memory task for words. They found 
no difference in recognition memory between anxious and control subjects, nor did 
they find any interaction with valence or stimulus type. So, while there was some 
evidence to suggest that the effect for physical threat words may have been due to 
conscious cognitive content, there was no evidence to suggest that anxious subjects 
were selectively encoding the content of threat-related words to the degree that this 
might facilitate recognition memory. 
Mathews and MacLeod (1985) argued that these findings support their 
hypothesis that generalised anxiety states are associated with a processing bias 
towards threat-related material arising from the activation of danger schemata. They 
conclude that the degree of interference is a function of the current level of anxiety 
but that the material that is selectively processed is determined by the individual 
content of danger schemata. While the fact that anxious subjects were slower to 
colour-name all words can be explained by current mood state, or state anxiety, this 
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cannot explain the differences within anxious subjects on physical as opposed to 
social threat words. 
MacLeod and Mathews (1988) noted that the majority of this type of 
research used healthy individuals as controls, who may differ in both state and trait 
emotion. They therefore set out to attempt to clarify the influence of trait and state 
anxiety respectively on the attentional response to threat. They tested a group of 
subjects with high trait anxiety and another group with low trait anxiety three 
months before an important examination (i.e., when state anxiety is low) and again 
just one week beforehand (i.e., when state anxiety is relatively high). The high trait 
group displayed an attentional shift towards material of a generally threatening 
nature on both occasions. The low trait group displayed no shift in attention at all. 
With regard to material specifically related to the examination, the high trait group 
again displayed attentional bias towards the threat-stimuli, but this time the nearer to 
the examination the greater the degree of attentional bias. The low trait group, 
however, showed the opposite pattern, with examination proximity being 
associated with increased avoidance of examination-related threatening material. 
These results suggest that attentional bias towards words of a generally 
threatening nature is associated with trait anxiety since the pattern of results for the 
generally threatening material was not affected by the increase in state anxiety 
caused by the nearing of the examination. The results further suggest that the 
attentional response to specific-threat stimuli (i.e., an examination), cannot be 
attributable solely to trait anxiety. This is indicated by the fact that although 
increased state anxiety led to increases in the attentional patterns of both high- and 
low-trait subjects, these increases were in opposite directions. It is important to 
note that these results were obtained despite the fact that increases in state anxiety 
from the first test session to the second increased equally for the two groups. The 
only difference, therefore, was the effect this increase had on the attentional patterns 
of the two groups. 
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These conclusions led MacLeod and Mathews (1988) to propose that neither 
trait nor state anxiety on their own could account for the attentional response to 
material relevant to current stress. Rather, they postulated the existence of an 
"interactive function" (p.666) involving both state and trait anxiety. Hence, the 
prediction of mood congruency effects may be possible only when trait and state 
emotions are considered as part of this interactive function. 
As with people suffering from anxiety, depressed individuals have been 
found to display attentional bias towards affectively salient material. Furthermore, 
they display enhanced recall of material of a negative affect (Williams et al, 1988). 
Depressed individuals have also been found to make abnormal attributions. In 
particular, they make attributions for negative events that are internal, global and 
stable (Brewin, 1988). 
There has been some debate, however, as to whether selective attention to 
threat is associated with depression, as it is with anxiety (see Williams et a/.'s, 
1988, review). Gotlib and McCann (1984) found that depressed students took 
longer to colour-name words of a depressed content than words of either neutral or 
manic content, relative to non-depressed subjects. They then attempted to ascertain 
whether task performance was contingent upon transient mood differences between 
depressed and non-depressed subjects or upon more stable information processing 
differences. Adopting a mood manipulation procedure, they found no effects for 
task performance and therefore concluded that performance on the emotional Stroop 
task could not be explained solely in terms of transient mood. That is to say, the 
fact that depressed subjects were slower on depressed words relative both to 
controls and to neutral or manic-related words, was more likely to be the result of 
differences in cognitive processing, or construct accessibility, than of differences in 
affect, or transient mood disturbances, between depressed and non-depressed 
subjects. They concluded that their results support Beck's (1967, 1976) cognitive 
model of depression and its postulated operation of negative schemata in 
depression. Important here is Gotlib and McCann's argument that interference 
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effects found in depressed subjects for negative material reflect stable cognitive 
biases or, to use their terminology, stable biases in construct accessibility. Gotlib 
later replicated these findings with clinically depressed subjects (Gotlib & Cane, 
1987). 
Support for Gotlib's position came from a study conducted by Williams and 
Nulty (1986). They obtained more striking results when group allocation was 
made on the basis of depression levels obtained one year previously than when 
allocation was made on the basis of current Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
scores. They therefore concurred that depressed subjects' slower performance on 
negative stimuli reflects stable cognitive biases as opposed to temporary mood 
states in depressed subjects. However, Williams and Nulty caution that the 
interference need not be the result of depression itself, but perhaps some other 
correlate, such as anxiety. They note that Mathews and MacLeod (1986), as 
referred to earlier, found that anxious subjects display significant interference from 
threat-related material and, in particular, that those with worries about health 
displayed greater interference with words related to physical threat (e.g., cancer, 
injury, mutilated) than for words related to social threat (e.g., pathetic, foolish, 
failure). Their anxious group differed from their control group not just on trait 
anxiety, but also on depression. Their partial correlations showed that the greatest 
proportion of the interference variance was due to state anxiety. Williams and 
Nulty (1986) argue that this, together with their findings, indicates that both 
stability and degree of disturbance may depend on an interaction between the type 
of emotional state (e.g., depression versus anxiety) and the type of words used in 
the Stroop. However, as Williams and Nulty note, this needs to be shown in an 
experiment rather than simply inferred from different experiments. 
Williams et al. (1988) conducted a review of the literature and concluded 
that attentional bias towards threat-related material is associated with anxiety, but 
not with depression. Needless to say, this contradicts Gotlib and McCann's (1984) 
findings. Hi l l and Knowles (1991) noted two factors about the Gotlib studies. 
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First, they did not assess anxiety. This is an important point since it has often been 
found that depression and anxiety may not only exist together, but may alter 
together; that is, they may also covary (Stravrakaki & Vargo, 1986, cited by Hill & 
Knowles, 1991). This means that Gotlib and McCann's findings might have been 
due to anxiety in their depressed subjects and not simply to depression. Second, 
Gotlib and McCann used adjectives that were descriptive of depressed or manic 
states. It is not clear that these words should be thought of as threatening. I f so, 
then since Williams et al.'s (1988) claim is that selective attention in anxious 
subjects is towards threat, Gotlib and McCann's findings might not be 
contradictory to Williams et a/.'s position that attentional bias to threat is not found 
in depression, only anxiety. It should be noted that the term 'threat', when applied 
to depressed words are those which are perceived as being threatening to self-
esteem (e.g., failure), rather than words which are descriptive of depressed mood 
(i.e., sad). 
Hill and Knowles (1991) used the following groups of words: Threatening 
nouns concerned with self esteem and related to depression, generally emotionally 
negative words, and generally emotionally positive words. The latter two groups 
of words were included to ensure that any resulting effect would be due to 
threatening content as opposed to emotionality. In case they found the same 
interference effect as Gotlib and McCann (1984) they took a measure of anxiety 
from both depressed and non-depressed individuals to check whether such an effect 
was due to anxiety as opposed to depression. 
Hil l and Knowles' results failed to confirm those of Gotlib and McCann; 
they found no evidence for a differentially larger Stroop effect in depressed subjects 
for the threat-related words. They argue that the reason for the different results 
stems from differences in the words used in the two studies. Specifically, Gotlib 
and McCann used words which could be viewed as being descriptive both of self 
and current mood state and it was this that caused the effect. I f the stimuli used are 
neither self-referent nor self-descriptive, including threat-related words, then a 
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differential effect wil l not be found. However, one should obtain slower times on 
all types of words owing to the depressed mood. 
Hil l and Knowles conclude that i f Gotlib and McCann's (1984) and Gotlib 
and Cane's (1987) findings are interpreted in terms of selective attention, then the 
fact that no effect was found for threat-related stimuli in their study concurs with 
Williams et al. 's (1988) proposal that selective attention to threat is associated with 
anxiety, but not depression. 
As we have seen, the interference effects displayed by people suffering 
from anxiety have been interpreted in a number of different, but conceptually 
similar ways. For example, Mathews and MacLeod (1985) argue that the effect is 
due to differences in danger schemata, while Gotlib and colleagues (Gotlib & 
McCann, 1984; Gotlib & Cane, 1987) view it in terms of emotional construct 
accessibility. Mathews (1990) notes that the underlying assumption behind such 
explanations is that the effects are specific to negative or threat-related words which 
coincide with the current content of individuals' concerns. However, Martin, 
Williams and Clark (1991) showed that anxious individuals showed an effect both 
for negative (threatening) and positive words compared both to neutral words and 
normal subjects. Hence, they argue that interference effects are a function of the 
emotionality of words used, and as such can be obtained with any words that are 
emotionally salient to the individual concerned, irrespective of valence. Martin et 
al. (1991) argue that previous studies have confounded emotionality and threat-
value, since the neutral words differed from the critical words on both factors. That 
is to say they have both lower emotionality and threat-value. 
Mathews and Klug (1993) noted that (at least) some of the words used by 
Martin et al. (1991) appear to describe states that were the direct opposite of the 
words used to describe anxiety states. There are two explanations possible here: 
First, it is possible that such positive words may have automatically primed their 
negative counterparts (Small & Robins, 1988). Second, the positive words are 
processed by anxious subjects to a degree that leads them to think of the words in 
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terms of a state in which they would like to be (e.g., carefree) but are not, or may 
never attain. In both cases, it is possible that anxious individuals actually perceive 
certain positive words as threatening. 
Mathews and Klug (1993) therefore tested people suffering from anxiety 
and normals using four sets of emotional words: Positive-related, negative-related, 
positive-unrelated and negative-unrelated. The results showed that neither valence 
nor general emotionality were important predictors of interference, but that stimuli 
related to the concerns of the anxious participants did predict interference, 
irrespective of whether those stimuli were of negative or positive valence. The 
results appear to support Martin et a/.'s (1991) claim that positive words can result 
in equivalent interference as do negative (threatening) words. Mathews and Klug 
argue that this suggests interference effects have rather more to do with the 
individual's emotional concerns than simply being due to threat. They suggest that 
the equivocal results using threatening and positive stimuli to date (e.g., Richards & 
Millwood, 1989; Martin et al., 1991) may be the result of a lack of attention to the 
semantic associations of the non-threatening words used. They suggest their 
results may indicate that where interference has been obtained using positive words, 
it may have been due to the perceived semantic connections with threat or concerns. 
In a recent review, Williams, Mathews and MacLeod (1996) concluded that 
relatedness to concerns is necessary, but probably not sufficient for emotional 
Stroop interference effects to arise. They go on to suggest that in clinical 
populations, schema-relevance and negativity of stimuli are the important factors in 
determining the extent to which bias will be demonstrated. 
Attentional bias in delusions 
It was noted above that depressed individuals show abnormalities in 
attributional style (Brewin, 1988) and this is paralleled in deluded individuals. For 
example, Kaney and Bentall (1989) found that deluded individuals tend to make 
attributions that are grossly external, global and stable for negative events, and 
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internal, global and stable for positive events, relative to normals. Such an 
attributional style may be indicative of abnormal basic information processing. 
Similarly, and also referred to earlier, it has been shown that depressed 
individuals display attentional bias towards material related to their concerns 
(Brewin, 1988), and that this has been shown many times with the emotional 
Stroop paradigm (e.g., Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). 
The parallels between depressed and deluded individuals were noted by 
Bentall and Kaney, who were the first to use the emotional Stroop paradigm with 
people suffering from delusions (Bentall & Kaney, 1989). They compared 
depressed individuals with people suffering from delusions of a paranoid content. 
They found that the latter showed a processing bias towards paranoid-related 
words. 
Bentall and Kaney's study was the first to adopt use of the emotional Stroop 
paradigm to reveal attentional bias in deluded individuals similar to that found in 
anxious and depressed individuals. Although the study examined people with 
persecutory delusions only, it shows that abnormalities in cognitive processing may 
play a major role in delusions. That is not to argue necessarily for a causal 
relationship, but rather one whereby an attentional bias towards material related to 
the delusion leads to preferential encoding of such material and so serves to support 
and maintain an already-formed delusion. In addition to this is the apparent 
relationship with depression in terms of attributional style. Both depressed and 
deluded individuals display abnormal attributional styles, with both making global 
and stable attributions for negative events. While people with persecutory 
delusions make external attributions for negative events, however, depressed 
individuals make internal attributions, thus indicating related, although not identical, 
forms of cognitive organisation. 
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Attentional bias in a case of the Cotard delusion 
Introduction 
Three factors noted above are particularly relevant for the purposes of 
investigating the Cotard delusion. The first is the suggestion by Mathews and Klug 
(1993) that interference effects may have more to do with individual concerns than 
with threat. Second, and in keeping with this, is the finding that people suffering 
from depression tend to show attentional bias towards material related to their 
concerns (Brewin, 1988). The third pertinent factor is the suggestion that 
attentional biases towards delusion-salient material serve to maintain an already-
formed delusional belief (Bentall & Kaney, 1989). It has already been noted that 
the Cotard delusion arises in the context of a depressive disorder. Furthermore, 
individuals suffering from the Cotard delusion appear to be preoccupied with 
thoughts of their own death. Given these factors, it seemed reasonable to expect 
that a person suffering from the Cotard delusion might demonstrate attentional bias 
towards words related to the theme of death. In order to test this, attentional bias 
was investigated in JK (described in detail in Chapter Three). 
Investigation 
A variant of the Stroop task was prepared involving words related to the 
Cotard delusion (which JK held), words related to the Capgras delusion (which JK 
had partially expressed), and words related to possible contributory moods of 
depression, suspiciousness and anxiety. In addition, by repeated testing of JK, it 
was possible to monitor how changes in her attentional biases related to changes in 
her delusional beliefs. 
Method 
Matched sets of 5 words were constructed. Words in the test sets related to 
themes of death, depression, duplicates, suspiciousness, and anxiety. In addition, 
two sets of neutral control words were prepared. Words were matched as far as 
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possible across these sets for length (number of letters) and for frequency (Hofland 
& Johansson, 1986). The lists are given in Appendix 2. 
The rationale for inclusion of each of these sets of words was as follows: 
i) Death-related words: The 5 death-related words were used because JK 
had experienced the delusion of being dead (the Cotard delusion). 
These words were chosen to represent the generic theme of death, rather 
than being words used by JK herself. This was in order to match the 
death-related words with the other word lists, which were also drawn 
up without regard to whether JK had used such words to describe her 
delusions. 
ii) Depression-related words: A set of 5 words related to a general theme 
of depression was included, because of the relationship of depression to 
the Cotard delusion. 
iii) Words related to duplicates: A set of 5 words related to duplicates was 
included, in view of the hypothesised relationship between the Cotard 
and Capgras delusions. Also, as noted above, JK had partially 
expressed the Capgras delusion. 
iv) Suspiciousness-related words: A set of 5 words related to 
suspiciousness was used, because of the association of suspiciousness 
with the Capgras delusion. 
v) Anxiety-related words: A set of 5 words related to the general theme of 
anxiety was included, to investigate whether attentional biases involving 
generalised anxiety are contributory in delusions. 
vi) Neutral words A and B: Two sets of 5 neutral words were prepared, 
for comparison to the test sets of words on colour-naming times. 
Once provisional sets of words had been selected, they were presented to 10 
independent raters who were asked to allocate each word to one of these 6 
categories (i.e., to the five test groups or a neutral group). Words for which at least 
8 of the 10 raters agreed with my own assignment were retained, and others were 
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discarded and replaced until this criterion was met. The words shown in Appendix 
2 are the final agreed sets. 
The resulting sets of words were presented on white A4 cards. On each 
card, fifty words were printed in 12-point lower case Helvetica font, with each of 
these words appearing in one of five different colours of ink. For any card, all 
words came from one of the sets (i.e., each of the 5 words in a set was used 10 
times on the appropriate card for that set). Each card showed ten rows of five 
words coloured in blue, green, brown, grey or red. The words and colours were 
arranged in a pseudo-random order, with each of the 5 words in the set used 
appearing twice in each of the 5 colours. 
JK's task was to name the colour in which each of the 50 words on each 
card was printed, working from left to right and top to bottom. She was instructed 
to ignore the meanings of the words and to concentrate on naming the colours as 
quickly and accurately as possible. JK was also given a practice list before the 
actual test, consisting of a different set of neutral words, to ensure that she was able 
to name the colours accurately. The test and neutral lists were then presented in a 
pseudo-random order, ensuring that JK finished on a neutral list. The time taken to 
colour-name all the words on each card was measured with a stop-watch. 
JK was tested on three separate occasions over a period of two years. 
These were on the same occasions on which she completed the HAD scale (see 
Chapter Three). To recap briefly, on Test 1, JK was fully convinced that she was 
dead, and had high self-rated scores on the HAD scale for both depression and 
anxiety. By Test 2, she was not longer convinced that she was dead, but believed 
she may have been dead, and although her subjective depression level had dropped 
to within normal limits, her anxiety score was still raised. It was during this time 
that JK voiced beliefs that her mother and brother had changed in some way. 
Finally, by Test 3, JK's delusions had all resolved, and both depression and 
anxiety scores were normal. 
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For purposes of comparison, the same variant of the Stroop task was given 
to 10 healthy controls (6 female and 4 males) who were matched for approximate 
age (mean age=26.6, sd=3.06; range 20-30). Eight of the subjects were educated 
to 'O' level standard and two (males, aged 23 and 29) had no formal qualifications. 
Results 
The measure of interest was the time needed to name the colours of each set 
of words. Before considering these colour-naming times, however, it is important 
to look at error rates. Errors can involve either reading a word instead of naming its 
colour (task switching error) or naming the colour incorrectly (colour-naming 
error). Task switching errors were very rare; they never involved more than a 
single word, and were immediately self-corrected. JK did this twice, once on the 
anxiety word list, and once on her first test with the death-related words. One 
control subject also switched to reading a word on two occasions; one with the 
anxiety word list and one with neutral list A. The other type of error involves 
naming the colour incorrectly. These errors were somewhat more common and are 
presented in Table 4.1. The Table shows that JK's error rate was in keeping with 
the control mean for all lists, and confirms that her colour-naming times were not 
affected by trading speed against accuracy. It should be noted, however, that JK 
made 3 errors on the Neutral B list in Test 2. This additional neutral list had 
been presented for the first time to JK in Test 2. Although the list consisted of 
concrete nouns, it is possible that JK may have interpreted two of these (watch and 
telephone) as slighdy sinister during this test, since this was the time during which 
she voiced beliefs that her mother and brother had changed. It is important to note, 
however, that since these errors were made on a neutral list, any slowing in colour-
naming this list would go against the hypothesis, rather than in favour of it. It was 
therefore included in the subsequent analyses. 
105 
Chapter Four 
Table 4.1: Numbers of errors made by controls and by JK in colour-naming word 
lists. 
Controls JK 
Word List Mean SD Test I Test 2 Test 3 
1 Death 0.60 0.84 1 
Depression 0.30 0.48 1 
Duplicates 0.70 0.67 1 2 
Suspicion 0.50 0.71 1 
Anxiety 0.60 
0.70 
1.26 
0.95 
1 
Neutral A 1 
Neutral B 0.90 0.74 3 
Having established that the data are not contaminated by speed-accuracy 
trade-offs, colour-naming times were examined in two ways; first by comparing 
JK's performance to control subjects, and second by comparing her own naming 
times across test and neutral lists. 
First, then, the comparison to controls. Means and standard deviations for 
the naming times for each list by control subjects are shown in Table 4.2, together 
with the times taken by JK on each of her three testing sessions. As can been seen 
from Table 4.2, JK was slower than the controls for all lists. This slowing was 
clearly evident even with the neutral lists and therefore seemed to reflect a general 
Table 4.2: Mean times (in seconds) taken by controls and the times taken by JK to 
colour-name word lists. 
Con trois J K 
Word List Mean SD Testl Test 2 Test 3 
Death 
Depression 
35.60 4.17 79 60 60 
34.90 4.95 65 64 58 
Duplicates 32.40 5.34 75 72 65 
Suspicion 33.60 4.38 65 56 58 
Anxiety 
Neutral A 
33.30 3.27 55 55 57 
35.80 4.37 62 58 54 
Neutral B 33.80 4.87 - 62 64 
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rather than a specific effect of her illness. In fact, generalised slowing of colour-
naming times even for neutral lists is commonly observed in psychopathological 
studies using the emotional Stroop paradigm (Bentall & Kaney, 1989; Kinderman, 
1994). More important than JK's overall slowness, however, is that, as Table 4.2 
shows, her overall pattern of results across conditions was different. Whereas the 
controls showed little variation in their colour-naming times of each list (confirming 
that the lists were well matched), JK's performance was relatively unstable, with 
markedly long reaction times to some lists in some testing sessions. 
Viewing JK's performances in relation to the performance of the controls is 
not very informative - it simply tells us that her performance was slower and more 
variable than that of the controls. A more useful strategy seemed to be to undertake 
a comparison of JK's colour-naming times of the test lists in relation to her own 
times for the neutral lists. Hence, her colour-naming times for the test lists were 
assessed by comparing them with her colour-naming times for the neutral lists. 
This allowed examination of any effects over and above any general slowness or 
variability in JK's performance. 
In order to do this, an index of each test list's interference with colour-
naming in each test session was derived by using the mean and standard deviation 
of JK's responses to the neutral conditions as her own baseline; z-score differences 
were then calculated between the length of time JK took to colour-name words in 
the test conditions and that taken in the neutral conditions. These results are shown 
in Figure 4.1. That is to say, this Figure shows by how many standard deviations 
JK's colour-naming times for each of the test lists in each session were above or 
below her naming times for the neutral lists. Since the standard deviation of JK's 
colour-naming times for the neutral lists must be considered an estimate of the true 
value, t values were used to test whether JK's colour-naming times for each of the 
test lists were significantly longer than for the neutral lists. One-tailed probabilities 
were used because the object of interest was whether JK would be slower to 
colour-name critical lists than neutral lists. 
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As shown in Figure 4.1, in the first testing session, JK took longer to 
colour-name both the death-related word list [/=4.75 (df=4), p<0.01] and the 
duplicates word list [f=3.75 (df=4), p<0.01]. In the second testing session, her 
response times for the death-related and neutral words did not differ significantly, 
but she was still reliably slower for the words related to duplicates [t=3.00 (df=4), 
p<0.05]. By the third testing session, JK was no longer significantly slower for 
any of the test lists relative to her neutral baseline. At no time during the course of 
her illness was JK significantly slower to colour-name the lists of words related to 
more general themes of depression, suspiciousness or anxiety. 
Figure 4.1: z-score differences between JK's times to colour-name words in test 
and neutral lists. 
Death Depression Duplicates Suspicion Anxiety 
5.00 
4.50 
4.00 
3.50 
3.00 
2.50 Test 1 
P 2.00 • Test 2 
1.50 
• Test 3 N 1.00 
0.50 
0.00 
0.50 
1.00 
1.50 I 
p<0.01; *p<0.05 
Discussion 
The results show a clear and striking relation between JK's delusional 
beliefs and her colour-naming times for delusion-related words. When fully 
convinced she had died (in the first testing session), her time to colour-name death-
related words was significantly longer than her time to name the colours of neutral 
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words. When JK was no longer convinced she had died (in the second and third 
test sessions), her time to colour-name death-related words did not differ 
significantly from her time to name the colours of neutral words. Similarly, when 
JK had strange beliefs that members of her family were not who they seemed (in 
the first and second test sessions), her time to colour-name words relating to the 
theme of duplicates was longer than her time to name the colours of neutral words, 
and when her beliefs returned to normal (in the third test session) this difference 
also disappeared. 
These attentional biases were to some extent specific to the content of JK's 
delusions. In contrast to the striking interference from words that were directly 
related to her delusions, her slight slowing in the first testing session for words 
related to general themes of depression and suspiciousness did not reach statistical 
significance. Similarly, at no point was there any interference from words related 
to general themes related to anxiety. 
The fact that JK showed attentional biases toward words related to death 
and words related to duplicates appears to be consistent with the postulated 
relationship between the Cotard and Capgras delusions (Young et ai, 1992; Young 
et al., 1994), and the finding that these attentional biases receded in parallel with the 
delusions is consistent with findings that attentional biases are significantly reduced 
when people with anxiety disorders respond to treatment (Watts et al., 1986; 
Mattia, Heimberg & Hope, 1993). 
As noted above, this is not the first time that the Stroop paradigm has been 
used to examine content-specific attentional biases in delusions. Bentall and Kaney 
(1989) showed that people suffering from persecutory delusions showed attentional 
bias on the Stroop task toward words related to morbid suspiciousness (spy, 
persecute, and so on). They pointed out that such findings lend further support to 
previous studies showing that cognitive abnormalities are implicated in delusions 
(Kaney & Bentall, 1989; Huq, Garety & Hemsley, 1988). Bentall and Kaney 
(1989) interpreted their findings as indicating that the attentional bias toward 
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delusion-salient material shown by people suffering from delusions leads to 
preferential encoding of such material, which in turn serves to maintain an already-
formulated delusion. The results presented above appear to be consistent with this 
explanation. 
Replication of attentional bias in further cases of the 
Cotard delusion 
Introduction 
The results presented above relate to a single case of the Cotard delusion. 
Before any firm conclusions can be made, therefore, it is important to ensure that 
the results are not peculiar to JK, but extend to other cases of the Cotard delusion. 
To this end, two other individuals suffering from the Cotard delusion were tested. 
They are presented separately from JK because, unlike JK, they were tested only 
once each. The control data reported are those used in the JK study (see p. 102). 
Investigation 
J A and MB, described in Chapter Three, were tested using the same variant 
of the Stroop paradigm as was used with JK. As noted above, complete sets of 
data were successfully obtained once only for both JA and MB and so, unlike the 
JK study, the monitoring of potential changes in bias over time was not possible. 
No data are presented for RB, also described in Chapter Three, because he was not 
tested in view of his poor literacy skills. 
Method 
To enable direct comparison to the JK study, the same sets of 5 test words 
were presented to both MB and JA. Hence, these related to themes of death, 
depression, duplicates, suspiciousness and anxiety (see Appendix 3 for the words, 
and above for the rationale for the use of the words and rating procedure for 
classification of the words). 
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In the JK study, only two sets of neutral words were presented. In this 
replication, in order to obtain a stronger baseline measurement with which to 
compare the colour-naming times of the test-lists, each test-list was matched 
according to frequency of use (Hofland & Johansson, 1986) and approximate 
length with a set of neutral words. 
All neutral words were presented to 8 independent raters, together with the 
test words, in order to establish that the words I had chosen to be neutral were 
perceived as such by others. The test lists were included so that the raters were not 
simply presented with the choice of saying whether or not a given word was 
neutral. Raters had the opportunity of allocating the words to a category named 
'Other' if they felt a given word fitted neither the neutral nor test categories. Hence, 
the raters' task was to assign each word to one of seven categories (death-related, 
depression-related, duplicates-related, suspiciousness-related, anxiety-related, 
neutral, or other). All raters agreed with my assignment of the neutral words. 
These are shown in Appendix 3. 
The word lists were presented in the same manner as described above, i.e., 
in a pseudo-random order. This time, however, each test list had a matched neutral 
list. The test and neutral lists were therefore also presented in a pseudo-random 
order, again ensuring that both JA and MB finished on a neutral list 
Results 
As with the JK study, the measure of interest was the time taken to colour-
name each set of words. Again, however, a brief examination of error rates is 
warranted. In Table 4.3, the errors made by JA and MB are compared with those 
made by the same controls tested in the JK study. As can be seen from the Table, 
the errors made by both JA and MB are in keeping with those made by the controls. 
Hence, again, there does not appear to be any trade-off of speed against accuracy. 
The colour-naming times of JA and MB are presented in Table 4.4. As with 
JK's colour-naming times, it can be seen that their respective performances over 
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Table 4.3: Numbers of errors made by controls and by JA and MB in colour-
naming word lists. 
Con trols JA MB 
Word List Mean SD 
Death 0.60 0.84 1 
Depression 0.36 0.48 
Duplicates 0.70 0.67 
Suspicion 0.50 0.71 
Anxiety 0.60 1.26 2 1 
Neutral A 0.70 0.95 
Neutral B 0.90 0.74 1 
different lists were variable. These data were then examined by comparing their 
individual naming times across test and neutral lists, as was done with JK's colour-
naming times. That is to say, the mean and standard deviation of J A and MB's 
respective colour-naming times for the neutral lists were used to derive an 
interference index for both of them, z-scores were then calculated between the 
length of time each took to colour-name words on each of the test lists and their 
respective mean colour-naming times for the neutral lists. Although the matched 
neutral lists yield a firmer estimate of baseline performance, it should still be 
considered an estimate of the true value of the standard deviation. Therefore, t tests 
were still used to examine whether the times taken by each individual to colour-
name the test lists were significantly longer than for their respective neutral mean 
scores. 
Table 4.4: Times (in seconds) taken by JA and MB to colour-name word lists. 
Test List JA MB Neutral List JA MB 
Death-related 54 64 Death-related 49 46 
Depression 52 55 Depression 45 47 
Duplicates 41 47 Duplicates 48 53 
Suspiciousness 44 46 Suspiciousness $1 43 
Anxiety 49 63 Anxiety 44 48 
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The results for JA are shown in Figure 4.2 and for MB in Figure 4.3. As 
can be seen, JA took significantly longer to colour-name the death-related words 
[f=2.13 (df=4), p<0.05]. MB also was significantly slower to colour-name death-
related words [r=3.75 (df=4), p<0.01]. In addition, MB was reliably slower to 
colour-name words pertaining to generalised anxiety [t=3.75 (df=4), p<0.01]. 
This latter finding is in keeping with the fact that MB was suffering from 
generalised anxiety. Both individuals, particularly JA, appeared to be slower on 
words related to the general theme of depression, but neither of these results 
reached significance [f=2.13 (df=4), p>0.05]. Neither individual was slower to 
colour-name the words related to duplicates. Indeed, JA was significantly faster to 
colour-name these words, relative to her neutral baseline [*=2.13 (df=4), p<0.05], 
for which there is no obvious explanation. Finally, neither JA nor MB showed any 
slowing on words related to generalised suspiciousness. 
Discussion 
As with the results found for JK, there is a clear relationship between the 
delusional beliefs of both JA and MB and their respective colour-naming times for 
delusion-related words. Both individuals showed attentional bias towards their 
own delusional beliefs, but not towards words related to the Capgras delusion 
(i.e., the duplicates words). Unlike JK, however, neither JA nor MB ever voiced 
Capgras-type ideas about anyone, so one would not expect them to show attentional 
bias towards these words. In terms of the possible contribution of mood states in 
attentional biases in delusions, JA showed no bias towards related to the moods of 
suspiciousness or anxiety. Although she appeared to be slower to colour-name 
words relating to the general theme of depression, this was not significant MB, on 
the other hand, while showing no attentional bias towards word related to 
depression or suspiciousness, clearly showed it towards words pertaining to the 
general theme of anxiety. This is consistent with the fact that she was suffering 
from generalised anxiety. 
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Figure 4.2: z-score differences between JA's times to colour-name words in test 
and neutral lists. 
-2.00 
-3.00 
Death Depression Duplicates Suspicion Anxiety 
* 
2.00-
-1.00 
* p<0.05 
Figure 4.3: z-score differences between MB's times to colour-name words in test 
and neutral lists. 
5 0 0 Death Depression Duplicates Suspicion Anxiety 
4 . 0 0 - 1 
o.oo 
•1.00 
** 
3.00 
P 2.00 
** p<0.01 
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These results confirm that attentional bias in the Cotard delusion is not 
peculiar to JK, and are consistent with the notion that attentional biases in delusions 
serve to reinforce delusion beliefs. 
Discussion 
These findings of attentional biases in the Cotard delusion are consistent 
with the notion that attentional biases serve to reinforce and maintain delusional 
beliefs by constantly focusing the person's attention onto any relevant information. 
However, as shall be discussed below, an alternative explanation might be that 
attnetional biases in delusions are epiphenomenal. 
All three individuals showed interference effects only for words related to 
their delusional beliefs and, in the case of MB who was suffering from anxiety, for 
words related to generalised anxiety. By testing JK over time, it has been 
demonstrated that her attentional bias was only displayed during the time in which 
she suffered from her delusional beliefs. In other words, her attentional bias 
resolved in parallel with her delusional beliefs. This is in keeping with the 
suggestion made earlier that people appear to be preoccupied with their delusional 
beliefs. 
These findings raise the issue of specificity in attentional biases. Martin et 
al, (1991) have claimed that the principal cognitive impairment in anxiety disorders 
may be "the presence of a set of beliefs which leads individuals to perceive 
erroneously certain predominantly non-threatening stimuli as threatening" (Martin et 
al., 1991, p. 158). They argue that people suffering from anxiety disorders should 
thus show selective processing for stimuli that are salient to their specific beliefs, 
but not for stimuli that are representative of general threat It was noted above that 
it might be argued that attentional biases are epiphenomenal. If this were the case, it 
would appear to be inconsistent with Martin et al. 's point concerning beliefs and 
the perception of non-threatening material as threatening. Furthermore, it would 
appear to be inconsistent with the interpretation of many studies of attentional bias 
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in depression. For example, as noted earlier, Gotlib and McCann (1984) concluded 
that the fact that depressed patients were slower to colour-name depressed words 
was more likely to be attributable to differences in cognitive processing than 
differences in mood between depressed and non-depressed subjects. Furthermore, 
they note that this formulation is consistent with Beck's (1967,1976) cognitive 
model of depression, and the operation of negative schemata in depression. Given 
this, it seems to make little parsimonious sense to postulate a function (in terms of 
selective processing of salient material) for attentional bias in some forms of 
psychopathology, but argue that it is epiphenomenal to other forms. Hence, the 
fact the all three individuals showed selective processing in the current study has 
been taken as support for Bentall and Kaney's (1989) suggestion that attentional 
bias in delusions serves the function of maintaining delusional beliefs. 
A questions arises, however, as to whether attentional bias in delusions is a 
function of preoccupation with delusional belief or of anxiety induced by the words 
themselves. Hence, it might be argued that words related to death are viewed as 
threatening by people suffering from the Cotard delusion. Similarly, attentional 
bias towards words related to duplicates (as shown by JK) may be due to the fact 
that people suffering from the Capgras delusion view such words as threatening. 
An alternative argument, proposed by Mathews and Klug (1993) and noted earlier 
is that attentional biases are due to individuals' emotional concerns. This 
suggestion is not inconsistent with notion that attentional biases in delusions are a 
function of preoccupation, although a problem then arises as to the relationship 
between emotionality and preoccupation. 
The relationship between attentional bias and preoccupation is precisely that 
held to exist between attentional bias and anxiety. Hence, it is suggested that 
attentional bias is a function of anxiety, so that a state of anxiety leads an individual 
to focus their attention onto material which is salient to the content or theme of that 
anxiety. The explanation offered in this thesis is that it is not anxiety per se which 
leads to the focusing of attention onto salient material; rather, the act of being 
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preoccupied with the ones concerns and interests leads one to focus one's attention 
onto material which is salient with those concerns. 
In Chapter Five, the role of threat and anxiety is investigated by looking at 
attentional bias in a grandiose delusion, and in Chapter Seven, evidence from 
healthy subjects is presented which suggests that attentional bias may be a function 
of individual concerns rather than of threat or anxiety per se. Hence, whereas in the 
anxiety literature it is suggested that attentional bias is a function of anxiety, so that 
a state of anxiety leads an individual to focus their attention on material which is 
salient to the content or theme or their anxiety. 
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Chapter Five 
Attentional bias in a grandiose delusion 
Introduction 
In Chapter One, it was proposed that a useful method of conducting 
psychopathological research was to examine a specific phenomenon in detail and 
then investigate whether any resulting explanation can account for other types of 
phenomenon. In Chapter Four it was shown that attentional bias towards delusion-
salient material may be a mechanism for maintaining delusional beliefs. A question 
now arises as to whether attentional bias can be demonstrated in other types of 
delusional belief. In this Chapter, therefore, attentional bias towards delusion-
salient material is investigated in an individual (SD) who held the grandiose 
delusional belief that he was both a rock star and Russian chess grandmaster. The 
reason for investigating this particular gentleman was that while he held delusional 
beliefs, he was neither depressed nor anxious. His delusional system and mood 
state therefore stood in marked contrast to the negativistic delusions and depressed 
moods of the three cases investigated in Chapter Four. 
It was noted in Chapter Four that the attentional biases shown by the three 
individuals suffering from the Cotard delusion might be potentially interpreted in 
two ways. First, such biases may be due to anxiety and, second, they may be a 
function of preoccupation with delusional beliefs. I f attentional bias can be 
demonstrated in someone with a grandiose delusional belief, it may help to separate 
the possible contributions of attention to delusion-related material due to 
preoccupation with such material from biases due to anxiety over its contents. The 
rationale behind this is that one would not be expected to be particularly anxious 
about a grandiose belief, yet it could still be very preoccupying. 
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Investigation 
Case description 
SD (Baddeley, Thornton, Chua & McKenna, 1996) is a 31 year old man of 
above average intelligence and with a ten year history of schizophrenia. At the age 
of 23, after a two year period of lethargy and moodiness, SD began to believe that 
he was going to be tortured sexually and castrated. He was admitted to hospital 
three times over the following two years, but recovered after treatment. He then 
attended college for a time, but was unable to keep up with the course. Soon after 
leaving college, SD began again to suffer from delusions. He also displayed a 
number of negative features, including lack of volition. His recovery was slow, 
but eventually he improved sufficiently well to move into a hostel for people with 
psychiatric illnesses. He has remained there now for nearly four years. He now 
holds two concurrent delusional beliefs: he believes he is a guitar-playing rock star 
as well as a Russian chess grandmaster. 
SD does not play the guitar and, although he is good at chess, he is not of 
grandmaster class, and neither does he have any connections with Russia or speak 
the language. When confronted with these clear inconsistencies, SD says he 
believes that doctors have somehow removed his memories of his guitar and chess 
playing, possibly through hypnosis. Hence, he believes that although he does 
speak Russian, he has been hypnotised to forget that he can do so. SD further 
claims to have flashback-type memories of his life as a rock star chess player. In all 
other ways he appears normal and can talk about his symptoms in a coherent and 
seemingly logical fashion. 
Formal testing revealed superior verbal skills, and normal face-processing 
skills. SD scored 50/50 on the Warrington RMT for words, and 49/50 for faces. 
HAD scores confirmed that he was not suffering from anxiety (7/21), but that his 
depression score of 12/21 was slightly raised (10 being the cut-off score for 
clinically significant depression). SD showed no other signs of depression and had 
not reported feeling depressed. 
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Method 
To enable direct comparison to the study presented in Chapter Four, the 
same sets of 5 words were presented to SD as had been given to the three 
individuals suffering from the Cotard delusion. These related, therefore, to the 
themes of death, depression, duplicates, suspiciousness and anxiety. The ful l list 
of words used is shown in Appendix 4. The rationale for use of each of these sets 
of words, and the predictions made as to SD's performance on each of the sets was 
as follows: 
i) Death-related words: The same set of 5 death-related words was selected 
because if, as argued in Chapter Four, attentional bias in delusions is 
specific to the content of those delusions, someone who is not suffering 
from the Cotard delusion (or any form of nihilistic delusion) should not 
show attentional bias towards death-related words (unless, perhaps, one 
has recendy suffered a bereavement, which SD had not). 
ii) Depression-related words: Again, the same set of 5 words related to the 
general theme of depression was included to enable direct comparison 
with the 3 individuals suffering from the Cotard delusion, and to 
establish that attentional bias in delusions is not due to generalised 
depression. 
iii) Words related to duplicates: The same set of 5 words related to 
duplicates was included, as with the death-related words, in order to test 
the claim the attentional bias in delusions is specific to the delusional 
belief. SD should not, therefore, show attentional bias to words related 
to duplicates, because he did not voice any Capgras-type beliefs. 
iv) Suspiciousness-related words: The same set of 5 words was included 
to enable comparison with the 3 cases in Chapter Four. SD showed no 
signs of suspiciousness and it was therefore predicted that he would not 
show attentional bias towards words related to suspiciousness. 
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v) Anxiety-related words: A set of 5 words related to the general theme of 
anxiety was included, to investigate whether attentional bias toward 
generalised anxiety plays a contributory role in delusions. I f , as 
suggested in Chapter Four, it does not, then SD should not show 
attentional bias towards words related to generalised anxiety. 
The five test lists had all been rated for the previous study, as described in 
Chapter Four. As with the study of attentional bias in J A and MB, each test-list 
was matched according to approximate length (i.e., number of letters) and 
frequency of use (Hofland & Johansson, 1986), with a set of neutral words. 
Again, this was in order to obtain a stronger baseline measurement with which to 
compare the colour-naming times of the test-lists. Again, these neutral words had 
been rated independently for their neutrality for the study described in Chapter 
Four. 
In addition to these five test sets and their matched neutral lists, SD was 
presented with a set of five words pertaining to his delusional beliefs that he was 
both a rock star and a Russian chess grandmaster. These words were drawn up by 
agreement between SD's consultant psychiatrist and the author as being salient to 
SD's delusional beliefs. They were also matched with a set of neutral words, the 
neutrality of which was agreed by 7/7 independent raters using the same rating 
procedure as for the other neutral words (see Appendix 4 for word lists). 
As with the study detailed in Chapter Four, each word list was presented on 
a white A4 card and printed in 12-point lower case Helvetica font. Each word 
appeared in one of five different colours of ink (green, grey, blue, brown, red). 
Again, there was one card for each set of words (i.e., one card containing all the 
death-related words, one containing all the depression-related words, and so on) 
and each of the 5 words for a given set appeared 10 times on its respective card. 
The words and colours were presented in a pseudo-random order, with each of the 
5 words in the set appearing twice in each of the 5 colours. 
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SD was instructed to name the colour in which each of the 50 words on 
each card was printed. He named these from left to right and from top to bottom. 
He was asked to name the colours as quickly and accurately as possible and to 
ignore the meaning of the words. Before the start of the test, SD was given a 
practice list using a novel set of neutral words to ensure he was able to name the 
colours accurately and to enable him to become familiar the requirements of the 
task. The test and neutral lists were then presented in a pseudo-random order, 
ensuring that SD finished on a neutral list. A stop-watch was used to measure the 
times taken to colour-name all the words on each card, and errors were noted. 
Results 
As in the previous two studies of attentional bias in the Cotard delusion 
(Chapter Four), the principal interest was the length of time taken to colour-name 
each of the word-lists, and a second measure of interest was errors. SD made only 
two colour-naming errors (one on a neutral list the other on the death-related 
words), both of which he corrected immediately, and at no point did he switch to 
reading the word instead of naming the colour. Since errors were so low, and in 
keeping with those of the controls reported in Chapter Four, in the previous study, 
they shall not be examined further. 
It was established in Chapter Four that comparing the colour-naming times 
of people suffering from delusions with those of controls does not allow us to 
examine effects over and above any general slowing or variability in individuals' 
own performances across the different list. In this study, therefore, no such 
comparison was made and SD's colour-naming times for each of the word lists are 
simply presented in Table 5.1. As with the colour-naming times of the cases 
reported in Chapter Four, SD's colour-naming times were variable. 
SD's colour-naming times for the test lists were then examined in relation to 
his own colour-naming times for neutral lists. As explained in Chapter Four, this 
involved comparing SD's colour-naming times for the test lists to his colour-
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Table 5.1: Mean times (seconds) taken by SD to colour-name word lists. 
Test List SD Neutral List SD 
Grandeur 56 Grandeur 41 
Death-related 33 Death-related 36 
Depression 40 Depression 42 
Duplicates 34 Duplicates 30 
Suspiciousness 45 Suspiciousness 42 
Anxiety 41 Anxiety 44 
naming times for the neutral lists. The mean and standard deviation of SD's colour-
naming times for the neutral lists were taken in order to derive an interference index 
of his performance, z-score differences were then calculated between the time SD 
took to colour-name words on each of the test lists and his mean colour-naming 
times for the neutral lists. Hence, the number of standard deviations that his 
colour-naming times for each of the test lists were above of below his colour-
naming times for the neutral lists were calculated. As in Chapter Four, r-values 
were used to test whether the times taken by SD to colour-name each of the test lists 
were significantly longer than for his neutral mean score. 
The results for SD are shown in Figure 5.1. Parenthetically, it is interesting 
to note that SD is slow in relation to the control data reported in Chapter 4 (see 
p. 103). As can be seen from the Figure, SD was significantly slower to colour-
name words related to his delusions [f=2.78 (df=4), p<0.03]. He was not slower 
to colour-name either of the other two sets of delusion-related words (i.e., the 
death- and duplicates-related words), nor was he significantly faster on them. 
Finally, he was not significantly slower on words related to more general themes of 
depression, suspiciousness or anxiety. 
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Figure 5.1: z-score differences between SD's times to colour-name words in test 
and neutral lists. 
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2.80-
2.40 
R 1.20 
o 
g 0.80 
N 0 .40-
0.00 
-0.40 
- 0 . 8 0 -
-1.20 
p<0.025 
Discussion 
The results show a clear relationship between SD's delusional beliefs and 
his colour-naming time for delusion-related words. He showed attentional bias (as 
reflected in slowed response times) towards words related to his own delusional 
belief but not towards words related to delusional beliefs held by other people. 
Hence, SD showed attentional bias towards words related to his own grandiose 
delusions, but not towards those related to other people's delusions concerning 
death (i.e., to the Cotard delusion) or duplicates (i.e., to the Capgras delusion). 
In terms of the possible contribution of mood states in attentional biases in 
delusions, SD showed no bias towards words relating to depression, 
suspiciousness or generalised anxiety. These results are consistent with those of 
JK and JA (see Chapter Four). They contrast, however, with the results of MB, 
who was suffering from anxiety (and had a long history of anxiety disorder) and 
who did show attentional bias towards words related to generalised anxiety. 
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The specificity of attentional bias shown by SD towards his delusional 
beliefs is in keeping with the results presented in Chapter Four. Taken together 
with those results, these data strongly suggest that attentional biases are specific to 
the contents of delusional beliefs, and are consistent with Bentall and Kaney's 
(1989) hypothesis that such biases act as a reinforcement mechanism in maintaining 
delusional beliefs. 
The principal impetus for the present study was an attempt to separate the 
possible contributions in attentional bias of preoccupation with delusional beliefs 
and anxiety over the contents of words used. The fact that SD did not suffer from 
anxiety - either generalised or specific to his grandiose delusional beliefs - is 
inconsistent with an explanation of attentional biases in delusions in terms of 
anxiety. His results are, however, consistent with the notion that attentional biases 
in delusions are a function of preoccupation with delusional beliefs. In turn, such 
an explanation is in keeping with Mathews and Klug's (1993) claim that attentional 
biases are due to individuals' concerns. Furthermore, an explanation of attentional 
bias in terms of preoccupation with delusional beliefs is able to account not only for 
the findings presented in this chapter and in Chapter Four, but also those of 
previous studies of attentional biases in delusions (e.g., Bentall & Kaney, 1989; 
Kinderman, 1994). 
Underlying this line of reasoning is the idea that believing one is a rock star 
chess grandmaster is not as anxiety-provoking as, say, thinking that one is dead. 
However, it could still be argued that the attentional bias shown by SD toward his 
delusion-related stimuli might nevertheless be related indirectly to anxiety. Such an 
argument would be based on the suggestion that grandiose delusions represent 
attempts by people to enhance low self esteem (Roberts, 1992). Hence, words 
relating to grandiose delusions could at some level be perceived as threatening. 
It is also possible to argue in regard to grandiose delusions, as in anxiety 
disorders, for an emotionality hypothesis (Martin et ai, 1991) because the 
grandiose words may be viewed as provoking an emotional response in the 
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individual insofar as they represent a state of being to which the person wil l never 
aspire, and it is this emotionality that underlies the resulting attentional bias. 
However, the simpler preoccupation hypothesis is better able to account for the fact 
that people remain so convinced by their false beliefs. Of course, it has to be 
recognised that preoccupation and emotionality may be difficult constructs to 
disentangle, but the results here suggest that attentional biases do not arise from 
anxiety in any direct way. 
It is important to note that attentional bias is not in itself a pathological 
construct. It is a mechanism we all have - we attend to the sorts of things that are 
salient or of interest to us. What appears to happen in the case of people who are 
suffering from delusions is that their attentional bias becomes exaggerated; the bias 
itself serves to accumulate evidence that will reinforce a delusional belief, and this 
process spirals out of control. This strengthens the person's belief in the delusion, 
making it almost a self-fulfilling prophecy. Moreover, the constant accumulation of 
subjectively pertinent positive evidence following from biased attention will make it 
much more difficult for the individual to break free from this cycle. 
To summarise, the suggestion made here is that attentional bias is a 
function, not of anxiety and nor of threat or emotionality per se, but of 
preoccupation with delusional beliefs. To this end, Bentall and Kaney's (1989) 
hypothesis may be extended to argue that preoccupation with delusional beliefs 
results in the preferential encoding of delusion-salient material and this in turn 
serves to maintain such beliefs. This theory requires a more rigorous test, 
however, since a question of replicability still arises; thus far, attentional biases 
have been demonstrated in three people suffering from the Cotard delusion and in 
one person with grandiose delusions. A further test, is required to establish 
whether attentional biases wil l be found, not only in single investigations, but in a 
group study. 
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Chapter Six 
Attentional bias in schizophrenic delusions 
Introduction 
As noted in Chapter Five, i f attentional biases serve to maintain delusional 
beliefs, it should be possible to demonstrate this with other types of delusion. Such 
bias has been demonstrated thus far in three cases of the Cotard delusion and in an 
individual with a grandiose delusion. In addition, Bentall and Kaney (1989) 
demonstrated attentional bias in a group of people suffering from persecutory 
delusions. 
Two points of interest arise from these findings. First, will attentional bias 
be found in groups of people suffering from other types of delusions? A l l these 
delusions in which attentional bias has been found thus far have a common element; 
they are all relatively stable and focused. A second point of interest, therefore, is 
whether attentional biases will be demonstrable in a group of people suffering from 
delusions of more complex character; i.e., where each person not only has a 
different delusional belief from the other people, but may have several apparently 
unconnected delusions, and where the delusional beliefs need not be maintained 
consistently across time. One group of people in which these questions can be 
addressed is those suffering from acute phases of chronic schizophrenia. 
Investigation 
Method 
The subjects were 8 in- and out-patients suffering from an acute 
exacerbation of chronic schizophrenia, and diagnosed according to DSM-HI-R as 
suffering from chronic schizophrenia. As Table 6.1 shows, 2 people (SI and S3) 
showed no formal thought disorder and neither were they suffering from 
hallucinations; S2 was suffering from thought disorder; S4 suffered both from 
formal thought disorder and hallucinations; and S5-8 suffered from hallucinations 
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only. A l l patients were tested once during a 48-hour drug-free period prior to 
commencing a drug-trial. 
Table 6.1: Presence of thought disorder and/or hallucinations. 
Symptom SI S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 
Thought disorder V V 
Hallucination V V < V V 
A variant of the Stroop task was prepared which included the 2 mood-
related words lists shown previously (i.e., anxiety-related and depression-related 
words). In addition, lists of words related to each patient's own personal delusions 
were compiled. The fu l l lists of words used for each participant are shown in 
Appendix 5. The rationale for use of each of these sets of words was as follows: 
i) Personal delusion words: Each participant was presented with a tailor-
made test list, comprising 5 words that were pertinent to his or her own 
delusional beliefs. The words were those which had been used by the 
individual when discussing his or her delusions at initial interview. 
ii) Other delusion words: Each person was presented with a set of 5 words 
relating to another patient's delusions. Wherever possible, the list 
presented was simply the list prepared for the previously tested patient's 
delusional beliefs. Where this was not possible (owing usually to the 
fact that a word in the previously tested patient's list had some meaning 
for the present individual), they were given a list prepared for those 
initially included in the study, but who were either colour-blind or who 
could not complete the study or refused to do so on the day of testing. 
The reason for testing people using lists of words related to other 
people's delusional beliefs was to ascertain whether the specificity of 
attentional bias seen in Chapter Four would be demonstrated by people 
suffering from schizophrenic delusions. The first participant to take part 
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in the study was given the list of words related to duplicates, presented 
in the studies described in Chapters Four and Five. 
iii) Depression-related words: A set of 5 words related to the theme of 
depression was presented to investigate the possible role of depression 
in any resulting biases shown by people suffering from schizophrenia. 
The list had one change from that used in Chapters Four and Five; the 
word failure was replaced with the word miserable because the 
consultant psychiatrist and I felt that the word failure may hold rather 
specific connotations for many people suffering from schizophrenia and 
hence would not reflect properly the notion of generalised depression. 
iv) Anxiety-related words: Each person was presented with the same set of 
5 words related to the theme of anxiety as was used in the studies 
described in Chapters Four and Five. As with those studies, this was to 
ascertain whether generalised anxiety plays a role in attentional bias in 
delusions. 
The set of words related to anxiety had been rated for the previous studies 
and so was not rated again. Although there was one change to the depression-
related words, it was felt that few would argue the word miserable did not relate to 
depression and so the list was not rated again. Words for inclusion in each 
personal delusion list were drawn up with agreement by the responsible psychiatrist 
and the author as being salient to each patient's delusional beliefs. As in the studies 
of attentional biases described in the two preceding Chapters, each test list was 
matched according to approximate length (number of letters) and frequency of use 
(Holland & Johansson, 1986), with a set of neutral words. Again, this was in 
order to obtain a stronger baseline measurement with which to compare the times 
taken to colour-name the test-lists. In the previous studies, all neutral words were 
rated as such by independent raters. In the present study, this was not feasible for 
two reasons. The first was the time factor; patients had to be tested within 48 hours 
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of being admitted to the study and there was not time to gain the agreement of 10 
independent raters as to the neutrality of the words. Second, and more 
fundamentally, words deemed to be neutral by independent raters may not have 
been deemed neutral by the patients or by their psychiatrist. Thus, the neutral 
words were drawn up by the responsible psychiatrist and the author as being not 
just neutral to ourselves, but neutral to each person concerned. 
Finally, everyone was given the HAD scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) on 
the same day they performed the Stroop task. 
Results 
Errors 
As noted in the two preceding chapters, there are two types of error. The 
first involves naming a colour incorrectly (i.e., a colour-naming error), and the 
second involves reading the word instead of naming the colour in which it is printed 
(i.e., a task-switching error). The colour-naming errors are shown in Table 6.2a 
and the task-switching errors in Table 6.2b. The colour-naming errors were low, 
and in keeping with those made by the controls reported in Chapter Four (see 
Chapter Four, p. 17). 
Colour-naming times 
The means and standard deviations of colour-naming times for both test and 
neutral word lists are shown in Table 6.3, together with the mean differences in 
colour-naming times between each test list and its matched neutral list As the Table 
shows, the mean colour-naming time for words related to individuals' own 
personal delusions is far longer (25 seconds) than that for their matched neutral 
word lists. However, it can also be seen that the standard deviation for the 
personal delusion words is also far higher than that for its matched neutral lists; this 
was due to one individual (S2) taking 240 seconds to colour-name words related to 
his delusion. Turning to the words related to other people's delusional beliefs, the 
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mean colour-naming time for the test lists is some 572 seconds faster than for the 
matched neutral lists. The colour-naming times for both the depressed and 
anxiety test lists are rather longer than for their matched neutral lists. Although the 
standard deviation for the depressed neutral words is rather lower than for all other 
lists, the remaining standard deviations are more in keeping with those for the other 
word lists, save the personal delusion list. 
Table 6.2a: Colour-naming errors made by the schizophrenia group (n=8). 
Word lists 
Test Lists SI S2 
1 
S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 Mean Sd 
Personal o . i r 6.33 
Other 1 1 0.25 0.46 
Depressed 1 0.13 0.35 
Anxiety 1 1 0.25 0.46 
Neutral Lists 
Neutral Personal 
Neutral Other 1 0.13 0.35 
Neutral Depressed 1 1 0.25 0.46 
Neutral Anxiety 1 3 0.50 1.07 
Table 6.2b: Task-switching errors made by the schizophrenia group (n=8). 
Word lists 
Test Lists SI S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 Mean Sd 
Personal 1 0.25 0.7 i 
Other 1 0.13 0.35 
Depressed 3 0.38 1.06 
Anxiety 1 0.13 0.35 
Neutral Lists _ _ 
Neutral Personal - -
Neutral Other 1 0.13 0.35 
Neutral Depressed - -
Neutral Anxiety - -
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Table 6.3: Means and standard deviations for colour-naming times in test and 
neutral word lists. 
Word List 
Mean 
(sees) 
Sd 
Personal Delusion 
Neutral Personal 
Difference 
70.75 
45.75 
25.00 
69.50 
15.13 
Other Delusion 
Neutral Other 
Difference 
48.88" 
54.50 
-5.62 
14.81 
18.28 
Depression 
Neutral Depression 
Difference 
50.88 
43.75 
7.13 
15.34 
9.59 
Anxiety 
Neutral Anxiety 
Difference 
56.00 
50.25 
5.75 
18.51 
18.47 
A two-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures was 
calculated; in addition to revealing any main effect of list type (i.e., test or neutral 
list) or word list (i.e., personal delusion, other delusion, and so on), the ANOVA 
would reveal any significant interaction between the two factors. The ANOVA 
showed no main effect of list type [F(l,7)=2.34, p>0.05] or of word list 
[F(3,21)=.59, p>0.05], and neither was there an interaction between the two 
[F(3,21)=1.44, p>0.05]. 
It was noted above that the standard deviation for the naming times on the 
words related to personal delusions was extremely high, owing to S2 taking a 
particularly long time to colour-name his delusion-related list. One person taking a 
far longer time to colour-name words related to his delusion than that taken by other 
people take to colour-name theirs is not, of course, grounds for excluding him from 
the analyses. However, it is interesting to note that with S2 removed from the 
analyses, the ANOVA became significant for list type [F(l,6)=20.62, p<0.005], 
but not for word list [F(3,18)=1.03, p>0.05], and the interaction failed to reach 
significance [F(3,18)=2.98, p>0.05]. Planned r-tests with alpha correction to 
avoid inflated Type 1 error rates were calculated between test and neutral lists. For 
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each individual comparison, alpha was set at 0.005. None of the tests were 
significant (see Appendix 6 for the individual results). 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression (HAD) scores 
As noted above, everyone was given the HAD scale. Individual scores 
are shown in Table 6.4, together with the means and standard deviations. As the 
Table shows, the mean score for anxiety was 9.00, which is borderline (the cut-off 
score being 10), and the mean score for depression was 5.38, which is within 
normal limits. However, it is clear from the Table that subject 1 was significantly 
anxious, and that all the other subjects had a score of 6 or higher. With regard to 
the depression scores, again, one individual (S5) scored significantly higher than 
the others, and three had scores of six or more. The remaining four subjects had 
very low levels of depression. 
Table 6.4: HAD scores for the schizophrenia group. 
HAD Scale S I S2 S 3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 Mean Sd 
Anxiety 17 6 10 8 9 7 7 8 9.00 3.46 
Depression 8 7 2 2 16 1 1 6 5.38 5.13 
Correlational analyses of HAD scores and colour-naming interference indices 
Pearson's r correlations (see Appendix 7) revealed that neither anxiety nor 
depression correlated with the interference indices of any of the Stroop lists [r=.71 
(df=2), p>0.05]. 
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Discussion 
The two-factor ANOVA failed to reveal a significant effect of list type or 
word list, and nor did it show any interaction. With S2 excluded from the analyses 
(and the standard deviation correspondingly reduced), there was a significant effect 
of list type, but planned comparisons revealed there to be no significant differences 
between any of the test lists and their paired neutral lists. 
It is clear, therefore, that a group study examining Stroop interference in a 
group of people suffering from the same disorder (i.e., an acute exacerbation of 
chronic schizophrenia) but holding different delusional beliefs, failed to 
demonstrate consistent attentional bias. Although the colour-naming times for 
words related to personal delusions were longer than for matched neutrals on 
average (with the inclusion of S2), the individual times varied markedly; indeed the 
variation was greater than that observed when comparing naming times across word 
lists between the three cases of the Cotard delusion and the controls shown in 
Chapter Four. Some of the individuals suffering from schizophrenia did, therefore, 
show an interference effect for personal delusion words, but others equally clearly 
did not An interesting point to note in this regard is the different approach adopted 
by individuals during testing. Some of the participants became quite distressed 
when colour-naming words related to their own delusional beliefs, while others 
made comments, or even laughed. Some visibly slowed, and two stopped briefly 
when colour-naming words related to their own delusions; others, however, 
noticeably quickened. Interestingly, five of the group commented afterwards that, 
while they could see a pattern, or theme, to the words related to their own delusions 
and to those related to depression and anxiety, they were unable to find the theme in 
regard to the neutral words. 
A question arises concerning the heterogeneity of the group - and, indeed of 
schizophrenia in general. There has been much debate concerning the utility of the 
term schizophrenia, with some authors (e.g., Bentall et al, 1988a, 1988b; Bentall, 
1990) arguing against the entire concept that schizophrenia represents a distinct 
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disease. Liddle and his colleagues (Liddle, 1987; Liddle, Barnes, Morris & Haque, 
1989; Liddle & Barnes, 1990) have argued that although schizophrenia is clinically 
heterogeneous, three syndromes may be identified in chronic schizophrenia; 
psychomotor poverty, disorganisation and reality distortion. The disorganisation 
syndrome includes thought disorder, while reality distortion includes delusions and 
hallucinations. Two individuals in the present study suffered from thought 
disorder, while five suffered from hallucinations. Of course, all participants were 
suffering from delusions, but the fact that two of them were suffering from thought 
disorder underlies the fact that people classified as suffering from one syndrome 
(e.g., reality distortion) often display symptoms classifiable in terms of another 
syndrome (e.g., disorganisation). The heterogeneity of the schizophrenic group in 
the present study must therefore be acknowledged. 
As noted in Chapter Four, attentional biases using the Stroop paradigm have 
been found in groups of people suffering from anxiety (e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 
1986), depression (e.g., Williams et al., 1988), and phobias (e.g., Watts et ai, 
1986), as well as in individuals who had recently attempted suicide (Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986). Furthermore, Bentall and Kaney (1989) were the first to 
demonstrate attentional biases towards paranoid-related words in a group of people 
suffering from paranoid delusions. A l l groups in these studies were tightly-
defined. It seems plausible to conclude, therefore, that the reason attentional biases 
were not demonstrated in the present study was due to the heterogeneity of the 
schizophrenic group. 
Related to the question of heterogeneity is the issue of fixity of delusional 
belief. Bentall and Kaney's (1989) group all had fixed paranoid delusions with a 
definite theme, as did the individuals described in Chapters Four and Five. The 
delusional beliefs in the present schizophrenic group did not all have such strong 
themes and it is possible, therefore, that some of the delusions were not so fixed or 
fully-formed as those of the participants in Bentall and Kaney's study or those of 
the individuals described in Chapters Four and Five. This notion links back 
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directly to the work of Sass (1994; see Chapter One), who adopts the concept of the 
variability in fixity of delusional beliefs in arguing that Schreber, for example, 
recognised that his delusions were not objectively real but the product of his own 
consciousness. 
What is clear is that the Stroop paradigm can demonstrate attentional biases 
in single cases of relatively circumscribed delusional beliefs (e.g., the Cotard 
delusion, as shown in Chapter Four, and a grandiose delusion, as shown in 
Chapter Five), and in groups of people suffering from the same delusions (e.g., 
Bentall & Kaney, 1989). It appears to break down, however, when a paradigm is 
adopted whereby words related to specific delusional beliefs are presented to a 
group of people suffering from differing and quite likely multiple delusional beliefs, 
that may not be as fixed as those held by the individuals described in Chapters 
Three and Four, or those reported in Bentall and Kaney's (1989) study. 
It was noted in Chapter One that the level at which one undertakes research 
depends largely upon what it is one wants to achieve. To recap briefly, it was 
noted that one may be interested in understanding a tightly defined phenomenon, 
and then in examining the resulting hypotheses to see if they are able to account for 
other types of phenomenology. In this thesis, the Cotard delusion has been 
studied, and a variant of the Stroop paradigm adopted in order to understand the 
mechanism by which such people remain so convinced by an explanation of their 
experiences that seems so absurd to those around them; i.e., that they are dead. 
In terms of the locus of attentional bias, the results from the present study 
are not informative. In Chapter Seven, therefore, this question is addressed by 
examining attentional biases in healthy subjects, free from any form of 
psychopathology. 
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Chapter Seven 
Attentional bias in normals 
Introduction 
Attentional bias has been demonstrated in four people suffering from the 
Cotard delusion (Chapter Four), and in a single case of a grandiose delusion 
(Chapter Five). These findings were consistent with previous studies of attentional 
biases in patients suffering from a range of psychopathological disorders (e.g., 
Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Williams etal., 1988; Bentall & Kaney, 1989). In the 
preceding Chapter, however, attentional bias failed to be demonstrated significantly 
in a group of eight individuals suffering from schizophrenia, and it was suggested 
that the delusions held by schizophrenic patients were less fixed and therefore less 
preoccupying than those held by the individuals reported in Chapters Three to Five. 
It was suggested that lack of attentional bias may also indicate limitations of the 
Stroop paradigm adopted thus far when attempting to tap into mechanisms in 
broader groupings of patients and/or psychopathological disorders. 
It was suggested in Chapter Five that attentional biases may not be a 
function of anxiety per se, as suggested in previous studies of attentional biases in 
psychopathological disorders (e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; MacLeod & 
Mathews, 1988), but rather of preoccupation with delusional belief. It was further 
suggested that this preoccupation might act as a reinforcement mechanism for the 
delusional belief. In order to test this hypothesis, two factors need to be 
investigated. First, anxiety needs to be manipulated in the same study and second, 
anxiety caused by the content of the words used in the Stroop paradigm needs to be 
separated from preoccupation. Both of these factors are examined in the present 
Chapter, by studying attentional bias in the normal population. 
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Attentional bias in undergraduate students 
Introduction 
It was decided to test a group of second-year undergraduate students who 
were all living in university college accommodation because both factors noted 
above could be tested. That is to say, lists of words could be compiled which 
would have common meaning to all students and anxiety could be manipulated by 
presenting the Stroop task on two different occasions during the academic year; 
once during the Lent term, some 3 months prior to the end-of-year examinations 
and again during the end of the Summer term, within two weeks of examinations. 
These test sessions were timed on the basis that it was reasonable to expect students 
to have higher levels of anxiety immediately prior to, than 3 months before, 
examinations. 
Method 
The subjects were all second-year undergraduate students (5 male, 4 female) 
at Cambridge university, with a mean age of 21.78 (sd=1.86, range 20-26). No 
control group was used in this study as subjects acted as their own controls, the 
comparison being between two testing sessions; the first in the Lent term (between 
2 and 3 months before the end-of-year examinations) and the second toward the end 
of the Summer term (between 5 to 14 days before the examinations). 
Two sets of words, each paired with a set of neutral words matched for 
frequency of use (Hofland & Johansson, 1986) and approximate length were 
prepared specially for this study. In addition the same lists of words used in 
Chapter Six pertaining to generalised depression and generalised anxiety were 
presented, together with their matched neutral lists. The ful l lists of words used are 
shown in Appendix 8. The rationale for use of each of these sets of words was as 
follows: 
i) Exam-related words: A set of 5 words related to examinations was 
prepared, to ascertain whether students would take longer to colour-
138 
Chapter Seven 
name such words in the Summer term (within two weeks of the end-of-
year examinations, when anxiety levels might be expected to be 
relatively high) than they would during the Lent term (some 3 months 
before examinations, when anxiety levels might be expected to be 
lower). The list of words was rated by 2 Cambridge graduates and 4 
Cambridge post-graduate students. 
ii) College-related words: A set of 5 words related to Cambridge colleges 
was included, because Cambridge is a college-based university and the 
college (irrespective of which particular one) is an integral part of 
university life for Cambridge university students. The list of words was 
compiled following advice from the 6 post-graduate students who rated 
the examination-related words. 
iii) Depression-related words: The same set of 5 words related to the 
general theme of depression used in Chapter Six, rather than that used in 
Chapters Four and Five, was included to see whether naming-times of 
depression-related words correlate with self-reported levels of 
depression (as measured by the HAD scale). The reason for using the 
same list as that used in Chapter Six was that the word failure was 
included in the present study in the exam-related word list. Hence the 
word miserable was used instead of failure in the depression-related 
words. 
iv) Anxiety-related words: Again, the same set of 5 words related to the 
general theme of anxiety used in the previous studies was included. 
This time, testing took place on two occasions - once during the lent 
term (in which there are no examinations) and again in the summer term, 
two weeks before examinations. I f anxiety plays a critical role in 
attentional biases, students might be expected to take longer to colour-
name words related to anxiety on the second test session (which is very 
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close to the examinations) as one would expect anxiety levels to be 
raised immediately prior to examinations, relative to the lent term. 
The five test lists had all been rated for the previous study as described in 
Chapter Four. Each test-list was matched according to approximate length (e.g., 
number of letters) and frequency of use (Hofland & Johansson, 1986), with a set 
of neutral words. Both the depression- and anxiety-related words were rated for 
the previous studies and so were not rated again. A l l other words were rated by the 
6 Cambridge post-graduate students referred to above. 
As with the previous studies, each word list was presented on a white A4 
card and printed in 12-point lower case Helvetica font Each word appeared in one 
of five different colours of ink (green, grey, blue, brown, red). Again, there was 
one card for each set of words (i.e., one card containing all the death-related words, 
one containing all the depression-related words, and so on) and each of the 5 words 
for a given set appeared 10 times on its respective card. The words and colours 
were presented in a pseudo-random order, with each of the 5 words in the set 
appearing twice in each of the 5 colours. 
A l l subjects were instructed to name the colour in which each of the 50 
words on each card was printed, naming from left to right and from top to bottom. 
Subjects were asked to name the colours as quickly and accurately as possible and 
to ignore the meaning of the words. Before the start of the test, each subject was 
given a practice list using a novel set of neutral words to ensure they were able to 
name the colours accurately and to enable them to become familiar the requirements 
of the task. The test and neutral lists were then presented in a pseudo-random 
order, ensuring each neutral list was presented either immediately before or 
immediately after its matching test list. A stop-watch was used to measure the times 
taken to colour-name all the words on each card, and errors were noted. 
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Finally, all subjects completed the HAD scale at both testing sessions in 
order to obtain measurement of anxiety and depression for both Lent and Summer, 
and to enable measurement of any changes in mood between the two terms. 
Results 
Errors 
As in the studies described previously, subjects' errors are examined before 
presenting mean colour-naming times. Three subjects each made one task-
switching error (i.e., reading the word instead of naming the colour in which it 
was printed): S3 read the word rod on the neutral-depression word list in the 
Summer; S4 read the word nervous on the anxiety word list, also in the Summer 
term; and S9 read the word castle on the neutral-anxious word list in the Lent term. 
Interestingly, three students also made a type of error not made by subjects in the 
previous study, by stating the colour of the word twice. These were not colour-
naming errors as such; subjects repeated the beginning of a line after hesitating on 
the second word of that line. S3 made 3 such repetition errors on the neutral-
depressed list in the Summer term (the same list in which he made the task-
switching error); S5 made 1 repetition error on the neutral-college list in the 
Summer term; and, finally, S7 made 2 repetition errors on the neutral-student list in 
the Summer. 
Most students made some colour-naming errors in both the Lent term and 
the Summer term, as shown in Tables 7.1a and b. These were in keeping with 
those made by the control subjects reported in Chapter Four. Table 7.2 shows the 
means and standard deviations for the total number of errors for test and neutral 
lists made in the Lent and Summer terms. As can be seen, although error rates are 
low for both terms, the mean number of errors for the test lists in the Summer is 
nearly double that of the Lent term, and more than double for the neutral word lists. 
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Table 7.1a: Colour-naming errors made by students in the Lent term 
1 Word lists 
Test Lists SI S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 Mean Sd 
Exams 1 1 T ~ 0.44 0.73" 
College 2 1 0.33 0.7 i 
Depressed 1 1 
1 
_3_ 1 0.78 1.04 
Anxiety 1 1 0.56 0.73 
Neutral Lists 
Neutral Exams 1 1 0.22 0.44 
Neutral College 2 1 l 1 0.56 0.73 
Neutral Depression 0 0 
Neutral Anxiety 1 1 3 l "0.67 
Table 7.1b: Colour-naming errors made by students in the Summer term 
Word lists 
Test Lists SI S2 
1 
S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 Mean Sd 
Exams 2 1 2 0.67 0.87 
College 2 5 3 2 2 1.74 
Depressed 1 2 2 1 i 0.78 0.83 
Anxiety 1 1 l 1 0.63 0.53 
Neutral Lists 
Neutral Exams 1 1 i 0.33 0.40 
Neutral College 2 1 4 l 1 1.00 1.32 
Neutral Depression 2 4 2 l 1 1.11 1.36 
Neutral Anxiety 1 2 2 l 1 2 1 1.11 0.78 
Table 7.2: Mean colour-naming errors made by students in the Lent and Summer 
terms. 
Lent Summer 
Lists Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Test lists 0.53 0.19 0.91 0.32 
Neutral lists 0.36 0.43 0.89 0.43 
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A three-factor ANOVA with repeated measures revealed a significant effect 
of term [F(l,8)=6.67, p<0.05], but there was no significant effect of list type 
[F(l,8) =0.30, p>0.05], nor of word list [F(3,24)=1.26, p>0.05]. There were no 
interactions between term and word type [F(l,8)=0.73, p>0.05], term and word 
list [F(3,24)=1.18, p>0.05], and list type and word list [F(3,24)=1.29, p>0.05]. 
However, there was a significant interaction of term x list type x word list 
[F(3,24)=4.03, p<0.02]. 
Planned comparisons with alpha correction to avoid inflated Type 1 error 
rates were calculated. For each individual comparison, alpha was set at O.OOS. 
There were no significant differences between any of the test lists and their matched 
neutral lists in either Lent or Summer (see Appendix 9 for the planned 
comparisons). 
Colour-naming times 
The mean colour-naming times and standard deviations for all word lists 
for the Lent and Summer terms are shown in Table 7.3. As the Table shows, there 
was a mean difference of only 1 second between the time taken to colour-name 
words related to exams and to colour-name matched neutral words in the Lent term, 
which extended to over 2.5 seconds by the Summer term. In the Lent term, the 
mean colour-naming time for words related to college life was 4 seconds longer 
than that for the matched neutral words, although the standard deviation was also 
slighdy higher. This difference was maintained in the Summer term and this time 
standard deviation was similar. Colour-naming times for words related to 
generalised depression were similar to their matched neutral words, and there was 
no apparent difference between Lent and Summer terms. 
A three-factor ANOVA with repeated measures revealed no significant effect 
for term [F(l,8)=0.59, p>0.05], but did reveal a significant effect for list type 
[F(l,8)=8.89, p<0.02] and for word list [F(3,24)=3.34, p<0.05], together with an 
interaction between these two factors [F(3,24)=4.55, p<0.02]. There was no 
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Table 7.3: Mean colour-naming times (sees) of students in the Lent and Summer 
terms. 
Word List 
Lent Summer 
Mean sd Mean Sd 
Exams 
Neutral Exams 
Difference 
32.11 
3i .n 
1.00 
5.75 
5.64 
33.44 
30.78 
2.66 
7.25 
8.32 
College 
Neutral College 
Difference 
34.11 
30.44 
3.67 
7.36 
4.95 
33.67 
29.67 
4.00 
6.22 
6.40 
Depression 
Neutral Depression 
Difference 
34.44 
33.78 
0.66 
8.23 
8.60 
33.89 
33.U 
0.78 
7.82 
6.77 
Anxiety 
Neutral Anxiety 
Difference 
33.67 
33.22 
0.45 
6.52 
6.22 
30.67 
30.44 
0.23 
5.94 
6.17 
interaction of term x list type [F(l,8)=0.820, p>0.05] or of term x word list 
[F(3,24)=1.41, p>0.05] and nor was there a three-way interaction of term x list 
type x word list [F(3,24)=2.24, p>0.05]. 
Planned f-tests with alpha correction to avoid inflate Type 1 error rates were 
calculated. For each individual comparison, alpha was set at 0.005. There was no 
significant differences between any of the test lists and their matched neutral lists 
(see Appendix 10 for the results). The fact that the ANOVA revealed effects of 
word list and list type, but the planned comparisons revealed no sigificant effects 
may reflect the fact that students took slightly longer to colour-name all test lists 
than they did to colour-name the neutral lists. However, it is worth noting that the 
power to detect a true medium sized difference in the planned comparisons was 
only 17%. Given this, it is worth examining the mean differences from the planned 
comparisons, (see Appendix 10). The mean difference between the college word 
list and its matched neutral in Lent was 3.67 (sd 4.153). With an effect size of 1.1 
(i.e., the standard deviation) and an alpha of 0.005, the power to detect a true 
significant difference was 32.2%. Similarly, on the same lists in the Summer, 
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(mean 4.00; sd 3.61), the power to detect a true significant difference was 51.9%. 
Hence there is a 31.2% (Lent term) and 51.9% (Summer term) chance, 
respectively, that there were significant differences between the college and the 
neutral list. It was noted earlier that the largest apparent differences between test 
and neutral colour-naming times occured for the college rated words in both Lent 
(3.67) and Summer (4.00). Given this, it may be said that there was a non-
significant trend for students to take longer to colour-name the college list than its 
matched neutral. 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression (HAD) scores 
The students' HAD scores are shown in Table 7.4. The maximum possible 
scores on anxiety and depression are 21, and the published cut-offs are 10 for 
anxiety and 10 for depression; scores of 8-10 are considered to fall in a borderline 
range (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). In terms of anxiety, Ssl, 5 and 7 had borderline 
scores in the Lent term, rising to significant levels in the Summer; S2 had a 
relatively high score in Lent, also rising to a significant level in the Summer; S9 had 
Table 7.4: Student HAD scores. 
HAD Anxiety HAD Depression 
Subject Lent Summer Lent Summer 
SI 9 12 2 2 
S2 7 13 3 6 
S3 2 1 1 4 
S4 5 7 1 3 
S5 10 14 1 2 
S6 3 4 0 0 
S7 4 13 1 5 
S8 7 9 4 4 
S9 17 10 10 3 
Mean 7.11 9.22 2.56 3.22 
Sd 4.57 4.47 3.05 1.79 
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a significant anxiety level in the Lent, which dropped to a borderline level in the 
Summer; Ss 4 and 6 showed relatively low levels of anxiety in both terms; S8's 
scores hovered around the borderline mark for both terms; and, finally, S3 had 
very low anxiety scores in both terms. The student's measures of depression were 
all relatively low, save for S9 who was borderline depressed in the Lent term only. 
It can be seen from the Table that the mean score for anxiety is 2 points 
higher in the Summer, but this difference is not significant [f=1.41 (df=8), 
p>0.05]. There was no difference in the mean depression scores between the two 
terms [f=0.62 (df=8), p>0.05]. 
Correlational analyses of HAD .scores and colour-naming interference indices 
Two-tailed Pearson's r correlations (see Appendix 11) revealed that neither 
anxiety nor depression correlated with the interference indices of any of the Stroop 
lists. 
Discussion 
The intention of the present study was to manipulate anxiety in second-year 
undergraduate students, by administering the Stroop task some three months before 
end-of-year examinations and then again within two weeks of those examinations. 
The Stroop lists were specially designed in an attempt to separate anxiety (by 
inclusion of the exam- and anxiety-related word lists) from preoccupation (by 
inclusion of the list of words related to college life, which is integral to Cambridge 
undergraduates). 
The three-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect for list type and for 
word list, together with a significant interaction between the two. There were no 
significant effects for term. Planned comparisons failed to reveal a significant 
difference between any individual list and its matched neutral list It was suggested 
that the ANOVA may have simply reflected that the students took slightly longer to 
colour-name test lists than neutral lists for all conditions. However, it was also 
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noted that the power to detect the effect size of the college and neutral lists in both 
Lent and Summer was 32.3% and 51.9% respectively. Given the apparent 
differences between these lists in both terms, it was concluded that there was a non-
significant trend for students to take longer to colour-name words related to college 
life than the matched neutrals. However, it is also possible that the difference 
revealed in the ANOVA simply reflected the fact that students took slightly longer to 
colour-name all test lists than they did to colour-name the matched neutral lists. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the largest differences in colour-naming times were 
found with the college-related words. 
Turning to colour-naming errors, although these were low, the total number 
was significantly greater in Summer than in Lent. This may reflect the non-
significant trend toward increased levels of anxiety in the Summer term. 
The aim of manipulating anxiety by administering Stroop around three 
months before examinations and then again a fortnight before examinations does 
not appear to have been successful. Indeed, it is possible that including words 
related to examinations and college-life may have confounded anxiety and 
preoccupation. Although there was a trend toward increased anxiety levels 
immediately before the examinations, this was not significant. 
It is clear, however, that the students did not take significantly longer to 
colour-name any of the test lists in comparison to the neutral lists, as measured by 
the planned comparisons. The ANOVA may have reflected the general slowing in 
colour-namng times of neutral words. Alternatively, given the power of the 
planned comparisons to reveal significant differences, the ANOVA result may have 
reflected the trend toward longer colour-naming times for the college-related words. 
This would tend to support the suggestion that attentional biases may have more to 
do with preoccupation than anxiety per se, and underscore the fact that attentional 
bias is not a pathological construct. What is clear, however, is that these results 
contrast with those showing marked attentional bias in chapters Four and Five 
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I f people with low-trait anxiety tend to avert their attention from threat-
related stimuli (e.g., MacLeod & Mathews, 1988), this might explain why the 
students did not show attentional biases towards word related to examinations. It is 
perhaps unfortunate that measures of trait anxiety were not taken, since in 
consequence direct comparison to MacLeod and Mathews' (1988) study cannot be 
made. 
The fact that the students showed only a non-significant trend to take longer 
on college-related words, together with the possibility that the results may have 
been confounded by anxiety means no conclusions can be made regarding the 
preoccupation-anxiety issue in attentional bias. It was therefore decided to test 
people who share a common interest but who are not suffering from anxiety, and 
who are not about to undergo a stressful experience, such as an examination. 
Attentional bias in motor-cycle enthusiasts 
Introduction 
Motor-cycle enthusiasts were tested in order to ascertain whether people 
who share a keen interest in a particular hobby, and who were free from anxiety, 
would demonstrate attentional biases towards words related to that interest. I f so, it 
would represent support for the suggestion advanced on the basis of SD's results 
(Chapter Five) that the locus of attentional bias is not anxiety per se, but rather 
preoccupation. 
Method 
The subjects were 8 motor-cycle enthusiasts (6 male; 2 female) with a mean 
age of 27 (sd=3.30; range 21-31). These were matched with a group of control 
subjects according to sex and age (mean age=26.50, sd=4.75; range 19-32) who 
had no particular interest in bikes (which was confirmed at the end of the test 
session). A set of words consisting of the names of five motor-bikes, paired with 
a set of neutral words matched for approximate length was prepared specially for 
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this study. Since the names of motor bikes do not appear in Hofland and 
Johansson's (1986) tables of word frequencies, they were matched with neutral 
words of a relatively high frequency (since the names of bikes are of high 
frequency use for bikers), and these words were matched according to approximate 
length. In addition, the same lists of words used in the above study pertaining to 
generalised depression and generalised anxiety were presented, together with their 
matched neutral lists. The full lists of words used are shown in Appendix 12. The 
rationale for use of each of these sets of words was as follows: 
i) Bike-related words: A set of 5 words consisting of the models of motor-
bikes was prepared, to ascertain whether motor-bike enthusiasts 
(hereafter referred to as 'bikers') would take longer to colour-name 
words related to their interest than they would compared both to 
matched neutral words and to controls' colour-naming times of the bike-
related word list. 
ii) Depression-related words: The same set of 5 words related to the 
general theme of depression used in the above study was included to see 
whether naming-times of depression-related words correlate with self-
reported levels of depression (as measured by the HAD scale). 
iii) Anxiety-related words: The same set of 5 words related to the general 
theme of anxiety used in the previous studies was included, again this 
was to enable correlational analyses between the colour-naming-times of 
anxiety-related words and self-reported levels of a anxiety (as measured 
by the HAD scale). 
The anxiety and depression word-lists were both rated for the previous 
studies. The bike-related word list was shown to two bikers, along with the neutral 
words, and they showed 100% agreement as to the category of each word. The 
presentation of word lists and procedure for administering the test were exactly the 
same as detailed in the previous study. 
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Finally, all subjects completed the HAD scale, in order to obtain 
measurements of anxiety and depression, and to see whether either mood correlated 
with colour-naming times. 
Results 
Errors 
Only one control subject (S3) made a task-switching error, reading the word 
garden on the neutral bikes list, and there were no repetition errors, such as those 
made by the students in the previous study. The number of colour-naming errors 
made by the bikers and controls, shown in Tables 7.5a and 7.5b respectively, were 
Table 7.5a: Colour-naming errors made by bikers 
Word lists 
Test Lists SI S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 Viean Sd 
Bikes 1 2 2 2 1 2 1.25 0.89 
Depressed 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1.12 6.64 
Anxiety 1 1 1 1 2 3 1.12 0.94 
Neutral Lists 
Neutral Bikes 2 i 1 2 2 1.06 6.93 
Neutral Depression 1 1 l 1 1 1 l 2 1.12 6.35 
Neutral Anxiety 1 1 2 i 1 2 1.12 6.<54 
Table 7.5h: Colour-naming errors made by controls 
Word lists 
Test Lists SI S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 Mean Sd 
Bikes 2 1 2 1 1 1 1.66 6.7tf 
Depressed 1 2 1 3 0 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 1.3S 
1.12 
0.92 
064~ Anxiety 1 1 1 
Neutral Lists 
Neutral Bikes 2 2 1 1 1 TX8 6.74 
Neutral Depression 2 1 1 2 2 1 3 1.50 6.93 
Neutral Anxiety 1 2 2 1 2 1 1.12 0.83 
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similar, and in keeping with those made by the control subjects reported in Chapter 
Four and the students reported above. The means and standard deviations for the 
total number of errors both for test and neutral lists made by bikers and students is 
shown in Table 7.6. As the Table shows, the results are similar both for bikers and 
controls, and for test and neutral lists. 
Table 7.6: Mean colour-naming errors made by bikers and controls 
Bikers Controls 
Lists Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Test lists 1.17 
1.08 
0.67 1.17 0.31 
Neutral lists 0.50 1.33 0.53 
A three-way ANOVA confirmed thai there was no effect of group 
[F(l,7)=0.30, p>0.05], of list type [F(l,7)=0.52, p>0.05], or of word list 
[F(2,14)=0.64, p>0.05], and nor were there any interactions between these three 
factors: group x list type [F(l,7)=2.27, p>0.05], group x word list [F(2,14)=0.39, 
p>0.05], list type x word list [F(2,14)=0.04, p>0.05], and group x list type x 
word list [F(2,14)=0.37, p>0.05]. 
CQlQur-narnjng timSS 
The mean colour-naming times and standard deviations for all word lists 
for bikers and controls are shown in Table 7.7. The first thing to note is that the 
mean colour-naming time for bikers on the bike-related word list is longer than that 
for the neutral list, although the standard deviation is a little higher than for the 
neutral list. The time taken by bikers on the bike list is also longer than that taken 
by the controls. The controls took around 2 seconds longer to colour-name the 
anxiety word list than its matched neutral list, although, again, the standard 
deviation is rather higher for the anxiety list than for the neutral list. The colour-
naming times for all other lists for bikers and controls were similar. 
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Table 7.7: Mean colour-naming times (sees) of bikers and controls. 
Word List 
Bikers Control 
Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Bikes 
Neutral Bikes 
Difference 
37.25 
33.75 
3.50 
7.09 
6.20 
34.00 
34.75 
-0.75 
6.05 
5.50 
Depression 
Neutral Depression 
Difference 
33.25 
34.62 
-1.37 
6.54 
5.07 
33.00 
34.62. 
-1.62 
5.26 
7.80 
Anxiety 
Neutral Anxiety 
Difference 
33.75 
32,62 
1.13 
7.34 
5.04 
35.25 
33.38 
1.87 
6.71 
5.29 
A three-factor ANOVA failed to reveal any significant effect of group 
[F(l,7)=.00, p>0.05], of list type [F(l,7)=0.55, p>0.05], or of word list [F(2,14) 
=1.37, p>0.05]. It also showed there were no interactions between the three 
factors: group x list type [F(l,7)=2.28, p>0.05], group x word list [F(2,14)=1.58, 
p>0.05], list type x word list [F(2,14)=2.60, p>0.05], or group x list type x word 
list [F(2,14)=1.21, p>0.05]. 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression (HAD) scores 
HAD scores for bikers and controls are shown in Table 7.8. As noted 
above, the published cut-off scores are 10 for anxiety and 10 for depression, with 
scores of 8-10 being borderline (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). The anxiety scores for 
one biker (S8) and one control (S6) were borderline, and one biker (S8) had a 
borderline level of depression. All other scores for anxiety and depression were 
within normal limits. As can be seen from the Table, there were no differences 
between the bikers and controls for either anxiety 0=0.15 (df=7), p>0.05] or 
depression [r=0.52 (df=7), p>0.05]. 
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Correlational analyses of HAD scores and colour-naming interference indices 
Two-tailed Pearson's r correlations (see Appendix 13) revealed that neither 
anxiety nor depression correlated with the interference indices of any of the Stroop 
lists for the bikers. For the controls, however, HAD anxiety was negatively 
correlated with the interference index for depression-related words [r=-.76 (df=2), 
p<0.05]. There were no other significant correlations for the control data. 
Table 7.8: HAD scores for bikers and controls. 
Subject 
HAD Anxiety HAD Depression 
Bikers Controls Bikers Controls 
SI 6 1 4 2 
S2 4 5 3 6 
S3 2 2 7 4 
S4 0 2 2 0 
S5 1 3 3 2 
S6 2 9 0 5 
S7 3 2 1 3 
S8 8 0 10 2 
Mean 3.25 3.00 3.75 3.00 
Sd 2.66 2.83 3.28 1.93 
Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to ascertain whether attentional biases 
could be demonstrated in a group of subjects who share common interest but who 
do not suffer from any form of psychopathology, and who are not about to undergo 
a stressful event such as an examination. The mean colour-naming times (see Table 
7.7) indicated the largest difference to be for the bikers between the words related to 
bikes and its matched neutral. A three-way ANOVA, however, failed to reveal any 
significant effects. 
In the following study, a group of individuals with a high degree of 
commitment to a common interest, rowing, was selected in an attempt to ensure a 
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high degree of preoccupation in that interest, and in order to establish whether 
attentional biases can be demonstrated in the normal population. 
Attentional bias in rowers 
Introduction 
In order to establish whether people in the normal population show 
attentional biases towards stimuli related to their individual interests (i.e., not to 
their individual concerns and worries), a group of rowers was given a version of 
the Stroop test. Cambridge rowers were selected for study because they show a 
high degree of commitment to their sport (for example, by having to get up very 
early in the mornings for rowing practice; having to maintain certain body-weights; 
striving to make it to the next level of boat; striving for Cambridge 'blues', i.e., 
medals awarded to those rowing for the University, and so on). For comparison, a 
control group of University students who were non-rowers, matched for age and 
education, was also tested. 
Method 
The subjects were a group of 12 Cambridge rowers (9 male and 3 female) 
with a mean age of 22.58 (sd 3.50; range 19-28), and 12 non-rowing controls 
matched for sex and age (mean age=23.33, sd=3.92; range 19-29). 
A set of words, paired with a set of neutral words matched for frequency of 
use (Holland & Johansson, 1986) and approximate length, was prepared for the 
study. The full lists of words used are shown in Appendix 14. The rationale for 
use of each of these sets of words was as follows: 
i) Rowing-related words: A set of 5 words consisting of words related to 
rowing was presented, to ascertain whether rowers would take longer to 
colour-name words related to this interest than they would compared 
both to matched neutral words and to controls' colour-naming times of 
the rowing-related word list 
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ii) Depression-related words: The same set of 5 words related to the 
general theme of depression used in the above study was included to see 
whether naming-times of depression-related words correlate with self-
reported levels of depression (as measured by the HAD scale). 
iii) Anxiety-related words: The same set of 5 words related to the general 
theme of anxiety used in the previous studies was included, again this 
was to enable correlational analyses between the colour-naming-times of 
anxiety-related words and self-reported levels of a anxiety (as measured 
by the HAD scale). 
The anxiety and depression word-lists were both rated for the previous 
studies. The words for the rowing-related word lists were selected following 
consultation with two Cambridge post-graduate rowers. The presentation of word 
lists and procedure for administering the test were exactly the same as detailed in the 
previous studies. 
Finally, as with the previous studies, all subjects completed the HAD scale, 
in order to obtain measurements of anxiety and depression, and to see whether 
either mood correlated with colour-naming times. 
Results 
Errors 
One rower (S7) made 3 task-switching errors, reading the last 3 words on 
the neutral rower word list {dozen, review and bonus). There were no other task-
switching errors (for either group), and nor were there any repetition errors. 
Tables 7.9a and 7.9b show the number of colour-naming errors made by 
the rowers and controls, respectively. As the Tables show, error rates were similar 
in the 2 groups. Parenthetically, the numbers of errors made by both groups 
appear slightly lower than those made by groups in the previous studies. The 
means and standard deviations for the total number of errors both for test and 
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Table 7.9a: Colour-naming errors made by rowers 
Word lists 
Test Lists SI 
T ~ 
S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 SI 
0 
SI 
1 
SI 
2 
Mean Sd 
lowing 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1.00 6.85 
Depressed 1 2 1 1 1 6.56 6.67 
Anxiety 1 1 1 1 1 1 6.56 6.52 
Veutral Lists 
"teut Rowing i 1 2 1 1 1 6.38 6.67 
^eut 
Depression 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0.92 0.51 
Steut Anxiety 2 l 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1.68 6.79 
Table 7.9b: Colour-naming errors made by controls 
Word lists 
Test Lists SI S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 SI 
0 
SI 
1 
SI 
2 
Mean Sd 
lowing 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1.68 6.67 
Depressed 1 1 
1 
1 1 2 1 2 2 6.92 0.79 
Anxiety 1 1 1 1 1 2 6.75 6.62 
Veutral Lists 
^eut Rowing 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 6.83 6.83 
^eut 
Depression 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 
0.92 0.67 
^eut Anxiety 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 6.83 0.58 
Table 7.10: Mean colour-naming errors made by rowers and controls 
Rowers Controls 
Lists Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Test lists 0.67 0.35 0.92 0.43 
Neutral lists 0.86 6.34 6.86 6.39 
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neutral lists made by rowers and students are shown in Table 7.10. Again, the 
results are similar for test and neutral lists for both rowers and students. 
A three-factor ANOVA confirmed that there was no effect of group 
[F(l,ll)=0.69, p>0.05], of list type [F(l,ll)=0.71, p>0.05], or of word list 
[F(2,22)=0.13, p>0.05]. There was, however, a significant interaction between 
list type and word list [F(2,22)=4.09, p<0.05]. There were no other significant 
interactions: group x list type [F(l,ll)=1.60, p>0.05], group x word list 
[F(2,22)=0.29, p>0.05], and group x list type x word list [F(2,22)=0.86, 
p>0.05]. 
Planned comparison with alpha correction to avoid inflated Type 1 error 
rates were calculated. For each individual comparison, alpha was set at 0.005. 
There were no significant differences in the number of errors made within or 
between the two groups on any of the word lists (see Appendix 15 for the results). 
The interaction between list type and word list may reflect the fact that the rowers 
made more errors on the rowing words than on the matched neutrals, but less on 
the depression- and anxiety-related words than their respective matched neutrals, 
although, overall, they made more errors on the neutral lists. The controls also 
made more errors on the rowing-related words than their matched neutral lists, but 
made similar numbers of errors between depression- and anxiety-related words and 
their matched neutrals. However, it must be stressed, that the numbers of errors 
were low. 
Colour-naming times 
Table 7.11 shows the mean colour-naming times and standard deviations 
for rowers and controls for each word list. For the rowing-related word lists, the 
mean naming time for rowers is nearly 3 seconds longer than that for the matched 
neutral words, although so is the standard deviation. Similarly, the rowers are 
longer on the rowing-related words than are controls (although, again, the standard 
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deviation is longer for rowers than for the controls). The mean colour-naming 
times for controls are similar between the rowing and matched neutral words, as are 
the standard deviations. The colour-naming times for all other lists for rowers and 
controls were similar, although it is noteworthy that the rowers were slightly slower 
to colour-name all word lists than are the controls. 
Table 7.11 Mean colour-naming times (sees) of rowers and controls. 
Word List 
Rowers Control 
Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Rowing 
Neutral Rowing 
Difference 
34.17 
31.25 
2.92 
8\42 
5.58 
29.17 
29.67 
-0.50 
5.82 
Depression 
Neutral Depression 
Difference 
31.58 
31.67 
0.17 
7.02 
6.36 
30.33 
30.08 
0.25 
5.65 
6.08 
Anxiety 
Neutral Anxiety 
Difference 
31.58 
31.67 
-0.09 
6.19 
7.40 
29.67 
29.08 
0.59 
6.89 
5.21 
A three-factor ANOVA failed to reveal any significant effect of group 
[F(l,ll)=1.24, p>0.05], or list type [F(l,ll)=2.38, p>0.05], or of word list 
[F(2,22)=0.26, p>0.05]. Similarly, none of the interactions reached significance: 
group x list type [F(l,ll)=2.94, p>0.05], group x word list [F(2,22)=2.76, 
p>0.05], list type x word list [F(2,22)=0.74, p>0.05], and group x list type x 
word list [F(2,22)=2.85, p>0.05]. 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression (HAD) scores 
Table 7.12 shows the HAD scores for rowers and controls. None of the 
rowers were significantly anxious, but 2 of them (Ss 5 and 9) showed borderline 
levels of anxiety. In contrast, 3 of controls (Ss 1, 6 & 10) were significantly 
anxious, while another 3 (Ss 2,3 and 7) had borderline scores. The anxiety scores 
for the remaining 6 controls were within normal limits, f-tests showed that the 
controls were significandy more anxious than the rowers [f=3.21 (df=ll) , p<0.01] 
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Table 7.12: HAD scores for rowers and controls. 
Subject 
HAD Anxiety HAD Depression 
Rowers Controls Rowers Controls 
SI 5 13 4 5 
S2 3 8 1 2 
S3 3 9 0 4 
S4 5 6 2 1 
S5 8 7 5 0 
S6 5 14 1 4 
S7 3 9 2 1 
S8 6 6 5 0 
S9 8 7 0 1 
S10 4 11 0 6 
S l l 6 5 4 2 
S12 3 6 1 3 
Mean 4.92 8.42 2.08 1.93 
Sd 1.83 2.91 2.42 1.98 
but that there was no significant difference for depression [t=.35 (d f= l l ) , 
p>0.05]. 
Correlational analyses of HAD scores and colour-naming interference indices 
Two-tailed Pearson's r correlations (see Appendix 16) revealed than neither 
anxiety nor depression correlated with the interference indices of any of the Stroop 
lists for the rowers or for the controls. 
Discussion 
The present study was designed to establish whether attentional biases in 
normal subjects sharing a common interest but free from any form of 
psychopathology could be demonstrated. To this end, a group of highly committed 
rowers was tested, and a slightly increased sample was used than that for the biker 
study. The means appeared to indicate that rowers were slower to colour-name 
words related to rowing than the matched neutral but, again, a three-way ANOVA 
failed to reveal any significant effects. 
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It is possible that the results were confounded by the fact that the controls 
were significantly more anxious than the rowers; indeed, three of the controls were 
significantly anxious according to published norms (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). 
Even if this were the case, however, there is no reason to suggest that this would 
have the effect of masking any differences in the rower's colour-naming times 
between the rowing-related word list and its matched neutral. 
Discussion 
The rationale for testing attentional biases in normals was that if such biases 
could be demonstrated in people free from anxiety, but sharing a common interest, 
then the notion that biases are due to anxiety would become less tenable. In the 
student study, a three-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of list type and 
word list, together with an interaction between these two factors. There was no 
effect of term, and neither were there any interactions between term and the other 
two factors. Planned comparisons failed to reveal any significant differences 
between individual test lists and their matched neutral lists. The study with the 
motor-cycle enthusiasts was designed to establish the locus of attentional bias by 
removing the presence of anxiety. However, a three-way ANOVA showed that 
there were no significant effects. In the rower study group sizes were increased to 
twelve. Again, the ANOVA failed to reveal any significant effects. 
It is worth noting that in all three studies, the means for colour-naming 
interest-related lists (i.e., college, bikes and rowing, respectively) appeared larger 
than for their matched neutral lists, while other lists appeared similar. Taken 
together, it may be argued that there is a slight trend for normals to show bias 
towards words related to their interests. What is clear, however, is that they do not 
show significant attentional bias and therefore stand in contrast to the patients 
studies in chapters Four and Five. 
In Chapter Eight, the implications of this study for the findings detailed in 
Chapters Four to Six are discussed. 
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General Discussion 
The aim of this thesis was to understand more fully delusions, using the 
Cotard delusion as an initial model. In particular, I sought to find reasons why 
patients suffering from the Cotard delusion remain convinced that they are dead, 
despite what appears to everyone else as incontrovertible evidence to the contrary. 
A thorough examination of the symptoms noted in Cotard's original case reports, as 
well as seventeen case reports published subsequently in the English literature 
revealed marked differences not just between patients, but within individual patients 
during the course of their illnesses. These findings were consistent with the 
suggestion made in Chapter Two that the term 'syndrome' as applied to the Cotard 
delusion was at present unhelpful. So, too, were the analyses of symptoms shown 
by the four cases of the Cotard delusion presented in Chapter Three - at least in 
terms of the Cotard syndrome as it is currently regarded in the literature. It was 
suggested that, were people suffering from the Cotard delusion to be investigated 
using a similar method to that adopted in this thesis, they may show the same 
pattern of symptoms displayed by the individuals in the present study; depression, 
depersonalisation, derealisation, and face-recognition impairments. I f this were 
found to be the case, there would be good grounds for arguing for the existence of 
a syndrome based on the resulting co-occurence of symptoms. 
The subjective experiences reported in Chapter Three, particularly those of 
JK, highlighted the very real misery and fears experienced by patients suffering 
from the Cotard delusion. Anecdotally, the deep depression which the patients feel 
while they are suffering from the delusion really struck me. After I had finished 
testing RB on the last testing session, I walked to the lift foyer and pressed the 
button to call the lift. While I was waiting for the lift, RB came running out of the 
ward toward me, sporting a huge grin. " I can go home! I can go home!", he 
exclaimed. He reached out for my hand and shook it vigorously while profusely 
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expressing his gratitude (although I had no say in his being discharged). He ran 
back into the ward and, as I got into the lift, it struck me that it was the first time I 
had ever seen him smile. A similar incident happened with JK, who, when she 
believed she was dead, appeared to be the most traumatised of all the patients I saw. 
When I visited her after the delusion had remitted, she told me about meeting the 
young man at the day centre to which she had started to attend. Her face beamed 
while she was telling me about him, and I realised then that I had never seen her 
smile before. To this day, I have never seen either JA or MB smile. 
Most striking was the patients' continual struggle to make sense of what 
they were experiencing. This, and the analyses of the symptoms displayed by the 
four patients, provided support for the theory of Young and his colleagues (Young 
et al., 1992; Wright etal, 1993; Young, 1994) that the Cotard delusion arises out 
of an interaction between perceptually anomalous experiences (feelings of unreality, 
derealisation, depersonalisation and a lack of feeling of familiarity) and depression. 
It was noted, however, that while this theory was able to account for why patients 
initially form the belief that they were dead, it fell short of a complete theory in that 
it failed to provide a reason as to why patients remain convinced by their 
explanations. To this end, there appeared to be a potential parallel between 
delusions, or at least the Cotard delusion, and an aspect of anxiety disorders; 
namely, preoccupation with their concerns. A question then arose as to whether 
this preoccupation with delusional belief might be a contributory factor in 
maintaining that belief. With this in mind it was decided to adopt a variant of the 
emotional Stroop paradigm, which is a common means of investigating anxiety 
disorders, and which shows that people suffering from anxiety disorders 
demonstrate attentional biases towards stimuli related to their concerns. 
Attentional bias was first investigated in patient JK. It was found that 
comparing her colour-naming times with those of control subjects was not a useful 
strategy, because it merely showed that her colour-naming times were not only far 
slower than the controls', but also showed far greater variation across the different 
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test lists. It was therefore decided to use JK as her own control by comparing her 
colour-naming times to the test lists against the mean time taken by her to colour-
name neutral words; z-scores were therefore calculated, reflecting by how many 
standard deviations above or below the neutral colour-naming times were JK's 
responses to each of the test lists. These analyses showed that on the first testing 
session, when JK was fully convinced she was dead, she was significantly slower 
to colour-name words related to death than she was to colour-name neutral words. 
This effect disappeared for the second and third testing sessions, when she no 
longer believed that she was dead. JK also showed attentional biases towards 
words related to duplicates on test sessions one and two, during which times she 
believed that her mother and brother had changed in some way. As with her 
attentional bias towards death-related words, the bias toward words related to 
duplicates disappeared when she no longer held these beliefs (i.e., by the third 
testing session). Attentional biases were then investigated in patients JA and MB, 
both of whom were suffering from the Cotard delusion. Again, both patients were 
significantly slower to colour-name words related to death. MB also took 
significantly longer to colour-name words related to anxiety, which was consistent 
with the fact that she was suffering from generalised anxiety. 
As noted, the rationale for adopting a variant of the emotional Stroop 
paradigm was the potential parallel between anxiety disorders and delusions in 
terms of preoccupation with individual concerns. It was suggested that the locus of 
the attentional bias displayed by the patients suffering from the Cotard delusion was 
preoccupation with that delusional belief, rather than anxiety per se. However, 
although only one of the three patients suffered from anxiety, it was not possible to 
conclude that preoccupation, rather than anxiety, was the locus of these attentional 
biases. 
The decision to investigate attentional bias in a patient suffering from 
grandiose delusions was twofold. First, it was noted in Chapter One that the 
research approach to be adopted in this thesis was to attempt to identify a possible 
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mechanism underlying a specific delusional belief (in this case, the Cotard delusion) 
and, having identified such a mechanism, to broaden the analysis in order to 
establish whether the mechanism is able to account for other types of delusional 
belief. Replication of attentional bias in someone suffering from a different type of 
delusion would help to establish whether attentional bias acted as a reinforcing 
mechanism for the delusional belief. Second, and arising from this, if it could be 
demonstrated the attentional bias contributes to the maintenance of a grandiose 
delusional belief, it would support the hypothesis that the locus of attentional bias in 
delusions is preoccupation with that belief, rather than anxiety per se. The rationale 
behind this was based on the assumption that one would not obviously be anxious 
about a grandiose belief, but it could nevertheless be very preoccupying. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, SD did indeed show attentional bias towards 
words related to his delusional beliefs. 
Attentional biases had thus far been demonstrated in individual patients 
suffering from delusions that were focused, consistent and well-formed. It was 
therefore decided to ascertain whether biases could be demonstrated in a group 
study of patients suffering from more complex delusions, where each patient may 
have several seemingly unconnected delusional beliefs. To this end, a group of 
patients diagnosed as suffering from an acute phase of chronic schizophrenia was 
tested. A two-way analysis of variance revealed no main effect of list type, nor of 
word list, and nor was there an interaction between the two. It was noted that the 
standard deviation was extremely high, owing to S2 taking an extrememly long 
time to colour-name words related to his own delusional beliefs. With S2 removed 
from the analysis, the ANOVA became significant for list type, but not for word 
list, and there was still no interaction between the two. Planned comparisons 
revealed no significant differences between any of the test lists and their matched 
neutral lists. It was noted that there was great variability between patients, such that 
some individuals did show attentional biases toward words related to their own 
delusional beliefs, while others, equally clearly, did not. 
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It was proposed that the failure to demonstrate attentional biases towards 
patients' own delusions in a group of patients suffering from schizophrenia was 
due in part to the clinical heterogeneity of schizophrenia (see, e.g., Bentall et al., 
1988a, 1988b; Liddle, 1987; Liddle et al., 1989) and, related to this, that some of 
the delusional beliefs were not as fully-formed or fixed as those of the individuals 
reported in Chapters Four and Five, or of those reported in Bentall and Kaney's 
(1989) study. Whether either or both of these explanations are able to explain the 
results, it is clear that the delusional Stroop paradigm broke down when word lists 
were tailor-made for patients suffering from delusions in the context of 
schizophrenia. It may be possible for future studies to test only those patients who 
suffer from reality distortion, suggested by Liddle and his colleagues (see, e.g., 
Liddle, 1987; Liddle et al., 1989) to be one of three identifiable syndromes within 
schizophrenia and, within those, only those suffering from delusions and not 
hallucinations. 
Having failed to demonstrate consistent attentional biases in schizophrenic 
delusions, it was decided to adopt an alternative strategy in the attempt to establish 
whether preoccupation with delusional beliefs forms the locus of attentional bias. 
To this end, three groups of people who were free from psychopathological 
disorder were tested. In the first of these studies, two factors were investigated; 
anxiety and the shared experience of college life in Cambridge. An attempt was 
made to manipulate anxiety by testing second-year undergraduate students three 
months before and a week before their end-of-year examinations. A three-way 
ANOVA with repeated measures revealed significant effects of word type and word 
list, together with a significant interaction between these two, but no effect of term. 
Planned comparisons failed to reveal any significant differences between any of the 
test lists and their respective neutral lists. It was suggested that there were two 
possible interpretations here. First, the ANOVA may have reflected the fact that the 
students took slightly longer to colour-name all test lists than their respective 
neutral. Second, given the effect size of the college-related words and the level at 
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which alpha was set, the power of the test to reveal a significant difference was 
discussed, and the mean difference between college and neutral words for both Lent 
and Summer was noted. 
Having suggested that anxiety and interest may have been confounded in the 
students study, it was decided to investigate attentional biases in a group of people 
who shared a common interest, but who were not suffering from anxiety, and who 
were not about to undergo a stressful or anxiety-provoking event such as an 
examination. To this end, a group of motor-cycle enthusiasts was tested, together 
with a group of control subjects. Again, the means indicated a difference between 
the bikes and neutral lists, but a three-way ANOVA revealed no significant effects. 
A group of rowers was then tested. Yet again, the means indicated a difference 
between the rowing list and its matched neutral lists, and again a three-way 
ANOVA failed to reveal any significant effects. Taken together, the three studies 
with normals, appeared to show a trend towards longer colour-naming times for 
related to people's interests. However, none of the results reached significance. 
These latter three studies were originally conducted in order to establish the 
validity of the suggestion made earlier that the attentional biases shown by the three 
people suffering from the Cotard delusion and the individual with the grandiose 
delusions were due to preoccupation with their beliefs rather than with anxiety per 
se. That there were no significant results in the three studies (with the exception of 
the student ANOVA) means no firm conclusions can be made. Clearly the results 
cannot be said to support the preoccupation hypothesis, since they were not 
significant. However, there did appear to be a trend, in the sense that in all three 
studies the largest differences in colour-naming times were found in the interest-
related word lists. Hence, they cannot be said to argue against the preoccupation 
hypothesis - or, indeed, in favour of the anxiety hypothesis. 
Several factors might be considered in conducting future studies. An 
obvious factor is sample size. One can only speculate as to whether the apparent 
trend toward longer colour-naming times for interest-related words might have 
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reached significance given much-increased samples. A further manipulation 
concerns all studies reported. The Stroop was presented on A4 cards, which raises 
the possibility that there is a 'build-up' effect of the all the words on a single list 
being semantically related, which may lead to artificially longer colour-naming 
times. Ideally, the Stroop task should have been conducted on a computer, which 
would have enable words to be presented singly. It was for reasons of practicality 
(namely lack of portable computer equipment) that patients were tested using cards. 
Patients suffering from the Cotard delusion can sometimes be treated very quickly 
(with ECT and/or lithium) and need to be tested as soon as possible (the first testing 
session usually took place within 48 hours of notification of the patient's delusion). 
Since the patients tested in Chapter Four were located in very different parts of the 
country, it was not feasible to arrange for the transportion of bulky computer 
equipment in the short time available. Future studies should test patients on colour-
screens, with words presented individually to enable measurement of single words. 
In addition, presentation of all words should be presented randomly, rather than 
semantically-related words appearing one after another. This would preclude the 
possibility of 'build-up', i.e., increased attentional bias over the course of a card 
consisting entirely of, say, death-related words. Second, it enables assessment of 
whether the effect found in patients were due to all words, or just one or two (e.g., 
death, but not undertaker). 
In future studies, in addition to presented the Stroop task, a visual search 
task could be administered in which the same words presented for the Stroop could 
be presented for reading only. The order in which subjects perform the tasks 
would need to be counterbalanced to ensure that the task presented first was not 
having a priming effect on the second. Another possible task might be an auditory 
shadowing task. This would help to establish that attentional bias is not context-
dependent (i.e., occurs only in Stroop). 
To return to the issue of investigating delusions, it was suggested in 
Chapter Four that attentional biases in delusions serve to reinforce those delusional 
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beliefs by constantly focusing the attention of patients onto any information that 
they perceive as being relevant to their beliefs. This fits in with the suggestion that 
the Cotard delusion (and also the Capgras delusion) is a reflection of patients' 
misinterpretations of perceptually abnormal experiences (e.g., Young etal, 1992; 
Wright et al, 1993). Support for this hypothesis was presented in the analyses of 
the four single cases of the Cotard delusion presented in Chapter Three. 
The subjective experiences of people suffering from the Cotard delusion, 
also reported in Chapter Three, provide a number of illustrations of the way in 
which misinterpretation of perceptual anomalies and attentional bias may interact to 
reinforce the belief that one is dead. Take, for example, RB's preoccupation with 
the clock. He looked at the clock continually and frequently pointed out that it 
should not be moving. Rather than accepting this as evidence that he must be alive, 
RB insisted that the clock should not be moving in time because he was dead. 
Equally striking was the interaction between MB's perceptually abnormal 
experiences and her belief that she was dead. She continually insisted that she had 
no emotions; she felt neither sadness nor happiness, and felt cut off from the world. 
Her feelings of depersonalisation and derealisation were taken by MB as evidence 
that she was dead; she could not possibly be alive if she had no feelings. If, as 
noted in Chapter One, Descartes' cogito ergo sum is taken to mean " I think and feel 
therefore I am", MB appeared to deny her existence because she no longer felt 
anything; she appeared to be saying " I do not feel, therefore I am not". 
JK also took her feelings of derealisation and depersonalisation as evidence 
that she was dead, and referred to them constantly. Furthermore, JK was for a time 
extremely preoccupied with the belief that she was responsible for world-wide 
disasters. She interpreted her delusional beliefs that she had predicted bad weather 
and catastrophes world-wide as evidence that she had been responsible for their 
occurrence. This, in turn, served to reinforce her extreme feelings of guilt. While 
it may be argued that such feelings and beliefs can be interpreted, in psychodynamic 
terms, as reflecting a death-wish (e.g., Enoch & Trethowan, 1979), such an 
168 
Chapter Eight 
explanation cannot account for why the beliefs themselves (i.e., predicting, and 
then believing oneself to be responsible for, catastrophes) first arise. 
Also of interest in terms of subjective experience and objective data, are 
JK's feelings of deja vu. Deja vu represents a type of perceptually anomalous 
experience in the same way as its suggested negative counterpart, depersonalisation 
(Myers & Grant, 1972). Support for the theory of Young and his colleagues (e.g., 
Young et al, 1992; Wright et al., 1993) that anomalous perceptual experiences, 
face memory impairment and depression interact, to lead to the particular belief that 
one is dead, was presented in Chapter Three. It was also noted that the Cotard 
delusion is associated with right hemisphere damage affecting the temporo-parietal 
regions, as well as bilateral frontal damage. 
It is interesting, therefore, that feelings of derealisation, depersonalisation 
and deja vu experiences are more common in some patients with temporal lobe 
epilepsy than they are in normals (Walsh, 1987). Walsh argues that with temporal 
lobe disturbances there is a "fresh interpretation of current experience" (pi86). In 
attempting to explain this phenomenon, Simpson (1969) argued that to make a 
decision regarding the familiarity of an object or situation, a comparison needs to be 
made between the current sensory input and the memory of one's past experience. 
Simpson suggested that when this comparison produces a coincidental familiarity 
response, the present sensory input will appear to the individual as familiar. This 
could happen even if the individual had had no similar experience in his life. This 
hypothesis is also able to account for the experience of jamais vu, in which case the 
comparison between stored memory and current sensory input produces an 
inappropriate lack of familiarity, when the individual had had the same experience 
before. 
To summarise, there is an established link between the temporal lobes and 
both inappropriate feelings of familiarity and inappropriate feelings of a lack of 
familiarity. It is noteworthy in this respect that Drake (1988) reported three cases of 
the Cotard delusion in the context of temporal lobe epilepsy. Noting Joseph's 
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(1986) case report of a patient with coexistent Cotard and Capgras delusions, Drake 
(1988) suggested that the two delusions represent "an ultimate manifestation of the 
unreality and depersonalisation characteristic of nondominant temporal lobe lesions" 
(p.39). 
Not only do such findings provide support for Young's (Young et al., 
1992; Wright et al., 1993) theory of the formation of the Cotard delusion, they also 
provide a direct link between his theory and patients' own subjective experiences, 
such as those reported in Chapter Three. Hence, all patients suffered from 
perceptually anomalous experiences, had impaired recognition memory for faces (as 
measured by the RMT), and suffered from depression. Central to such perceptually 
anomalous experiences are inappropriate feelings of unfamiliarity and, in the case of 
JK, inappropriate feelings of familiarity. 
That patients are preoccupied with their delusional beliefs has already been 
noted. Attentional biases are a reflection of this preoccupation that reinforce the 
interpretations individuals have placed on their perceptually anomalous experiences. 
This reinforcing mechanism operates by constantly focusing patients' attention on 
any information that they perceive as being relevant to, and interpret as consistent 
with, their delusional beliefs. 
To summarise, the depressed mood demonstrated in people suffering from 
the Cotard delusion leads them to seek an internal attribution for alterations in their 
perceptual experience. Having correctly interpreted this change in perceptual 
experience as a change in themselves, patients go on to infer that they are dead. 
They then seek out further information that, according to them, confirms this 
interpretation. Of course, it must be stressed that the seeking of confirmatory 
evidence is not in itself a pathological behaviour pattern; confirmation bias is widely 
prevalent in human reasoning (see, e.g., Wason, 1960). However, patients' 
preoccupation with searching for seemingly confirmatory evidence reinforces their 
initial interpretation, and they are then caught in a vicious cycle from which it is 
difficult to break free. Hence the success of treatments such as lithium and ECT 
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(electro-convulsive therapy) that relieve the depressed mood and, in turn, relieve the 
need to seek an internal attribution for the altered perception. 
The issues addressed in this thesis point to a number of areas that further 
research might address. First, a question arises as to whether perceptual anomalies 
pre-date the depressed mood and, if so, by how much. This would be difficult to 
ascertain, of course, since patients are referred for treatment after they have become 
depressed or even after they have formed the delusion. A longitudinal study of the 
Cotard delusion (such as that undertaken with patient JK) might, however, address 
the issue of how long such perceptual difficulties persist after the Cotard delusion 
has remitted. In terms of attentional biases in delusions, more research is needed to 
ascertain whether they may be demonstrated in other types of delusion and, if so, 
whether the argument that such biases act as a reinforcing mechanism for delusional 
beliefs is able to account for the maintenance of those delusions. Furthermore, it 
remains to be established whether attentional bias can be demonstrated in the normal 
population. If it can, it needs to be demonstrated whether there are any quantitative 
differences in attentional biases between normals and patients with 
psychopathological disorders. This could involve a simple measurement of how 
much longer it takes to colour-name test lists than neutral lists. 
Finally, I return to Cotard and his description of le delire de negation. As we 
have seen, Cotard's original conception of le delire de negation accords better with 
the cases described in Chapters Two and Three than does the commonly-held view 
of a Cotard syndrome. What is particularly striking is that many of the points made 
in the present thesis, and those made by Young and his colleagues (Young et al., 
1992, Wright et al. 1993, Young et al., 1994), were made by Cotard, either 
explicitly or implicitly. For example, Cotard (1884) referred to a loss of visual 
imagery in some of his patients - a deficit often associated with visual recognition 
deficits (e.g., Charcot & Bernard, 1883; Young & van de Wal, 1996). He believed 
this to be significant in the formation of the delusion. Hence, he suggested the 
delusion was the result of a misinterpretation of the altered perceputal experience and 
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that, given this, the delusions were not without logic. Cotard (1884) also noted that 
one of his patients (case 4) not only believed she was dead, but believed her 
daughter was the devil in disguise. She also failed to recognise her family, 
although, as Cotard implies, this may have been because she ceased to believe in 
their existence. Nevertheless, the linking of the two types of delusion is clear, and it 
becomes even more clear in what is best described as an early version of the 
attribution hypothesis: At the end of his (1882) report, Cotard tables an impressive 
list of contrasts and parallels between the delusion of negation and that of 
persecution. He concludes that in delusions of negation 'Le malade s'accuse lui-
meme', whereas in delusions of persecution 'Le malade s'en prend au monde 
exteneur'. It is incredible to think that, more than a century later, Cotard's insights 
are finally being recognised as fundamental to our understanding of such delusions. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Case reports analysed in Chapter Two. 
Case Number Re ference 
1 Campbell, Volow and Cavenar (1981). 
2 Drake (1988) (Case 1) 
3 " " (Case 2) 
4 " " (Case 3) 
5 Enoch and Trethowan (1979) (Case 1) 
6 " " " (Case 2) 
7 " " " (Case 3) 
8 " " " (Case 4) 
9 " " " (Case 5) 
10 Forstl and Beats (1992 (translation of Bonnet, 1788) 
11 Joseph and O'Leary (1986) 
12 Kearns (1987) 
13 Malone and Malone (1992) 
14 Sommer and Petrides (1992) 
15 Terao, Fujino, Egashira and Abe (1992) 
16 Wright, Young and Hellawell (1993) 
17 Young, Robertson, Hellawell, de Pauw and Pentland (1992) 
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APPENDIX 2 
Word lists used in JK's Stroop task (Chapter Four) 
1. Death-related words: coffin, died, funeral, grave, undertaker. 
Mean frequency = 32.60, SD = 43.33; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 2.30. 
2. Depression-related words: defeat, depressed, failure, hopeless, sad. 
Mean frequency = 35.80, SD = 31.40; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 2.30. 
3. Word related to duplicates: copy, double, duplicate, impostors, substitute. 
Mean frequency = 29.00, SD = 31.01; Mean length = 7.60, SD = 2.51. 
4. Suspiciousness-related words: deceit, follow, spy, stare, suspicious. 
Mean frequency = 29.20, SD = 45.81; Mean length = 5.40, SD = 2.79. 
5. Anxiety-related words: anxious, nervous, stress, tense, worried. 
Mean frequency = 39.00, SD = 17.79; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 0.89. 
6. Neutral words A: anchor, basement, details, magazine, sell. 
Mean frequency = 35.60, SD = 31.17; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 1.67. 
7. Neutral words B: jacket, jeans, telephone, walkman, watch. 
Mean frequency = 41.00, SD = 32.99; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 1.67. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Word lists used for MB & JA's Stroop task (Chapter Four) 
la. Death-related words: coffin, died, funeral, grave, undertaker. 
Mean frequency = 32.60, SD = 43.33; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 2.30. 
l b . Neutral-death words: amble, bud, foundation, gather, standard. 
Mean frequency = 32.60, SD = 42.49; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 2.70. 
2a. Depression-related words: defeat, depressed, failure, hopeless, sad. 
Mean frequency = 35.80, SD = 31.40; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 2.30. 
2b. Neutral-depression words: anchor, basement, details, magazine, sell. 
Mean frequency = 35.60, SD = 31.17; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 1.67. 
3a. Words related to duplicates: copy, double, duplicate, impostors, substitute. 
Mean frequency = 29.00, SD = 31.01; Mean length = 7.60, SD = 2.51. 
3b. Neutral-duplicates words: allow, component, henceforth, tray, waterfall. 
Mean frequency = 29.60, SD = 30.05; Mean length = 7.40, SD = 2.70. 
4a. Suspiciousness-related words: deceit, follow, spy, stare, suspicious. 
Mean frequency = 29.20, SD = 45.81; Mean length = 5.40, SD = 2.79. 
4b. Neutral-suspiciousness words: alignment, central, launch, paints, ply. 
Mean frequency = 29.40, SD = 49.07; Mean length = 6.20, SD = 2.17. 
5a. Anxiety-related words: anxious, nervous, stress, tense, worried. 
Mean frequency = 39.00, SD = 17.79; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 0.89. 
5b. Neutral -anxiety words: adult, castle, doorway, feather, library. 
Mean frequency = 38.20, SD = 19.70; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 0.89. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Word lists used for SD's Stroop task (Chapter Five) 
la. Death-related words: coffin, died, funeral, grave, undertaker. 
Mean frequency = 32.60, SD = 43.33; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 2.30. 
l b . Neutral-death words: amble, bud, foundation, gather, standard. 
Mean frequency = 32.60, SD = 42.49; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 2.70. 
2a. Depression-related words: defeat, depressed, failure, hopeless, sad. 
Mean frequency = 35.80, SD = 31.40; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 2.30. 
2b. Neutral-depression words: anchor, basement, details, magazine, sell. 
Mean frequency = 35.60, SD = 31.17; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 1.67. 
3a. Words related to duplicates: copy, double, duplicate, impostors, substitute. 
Mean frequency = 29.00, SD = 31.01; Mean length = 7.60, SD = 2.51. 
3b. Neutral-duplicates words: allow, component, henceforth, tray, waterfall. 
Mean frequency = 29.60, SD = 30.05; Mean length = 7.40, SD = 2.70. 
4a. Suspiciousness-related words: deceit, follow, spy, stare, suspicious. 
Mean frequency = 29.20, SD = 45.81; Mean length = 5.40, SD = 2.79. 
4b. Neutral-suspiciousness words: alignment, central, launch, paints, ply, . 
Mean frequency = 29.40, SD = 49.07; Mean length = 6.20, SD = 2.17. 
5a. Anxiety-related words: anxious, nervous, stress, tense, worried. 
Mean frequency = 39.00, SD = 17.79; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 0.89. 
5b. Neutral-anxiety words: adult, castle, doorway, feather, library. 
Mean frequency = 38.20, SD = 19.70; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 0.89. 
6a. Grandiose delusion words: chess, guitar, hypnosis, mother, russian. 
Mean frequency = 82.60, SD = 126.58; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 1.14 
6b. Neutral-grandiose words: chalet, decimal, fully, recipe, therefore. 
Mean frequency = 83.20, SD = 127.82; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 1.52. 
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APPENDIX 5 
Word lists used for the schizophrenia Stroop task (Chapter 
Six) 
Word lists presented to all patients 
la. Depression-related words: defeat, depressed, hopeless, miserable, sad. 
Mean frequency = 22.20, SD = 14.29; Mean length = 7.00, SD = 2.55. 
l b . Neutral-depression words: casually, introduce, paints, rod, similarly. 
Mean frequency = 22.20, SD = 14.29; Mean length = 7.00, SD = 2.55. 
2a. Anxiety-related words: anxious, nervous, stress, tense, worried. 
Mean frequency = 39.00, SD = 17.79; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 0.89. 
2b. Neutral-anxiety words: adult, castle, doorway, feather, library. 
Mean frequency = 38.20, SD = 19.70; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 0.89. 
Individual word lists 
51 . Personal delusion words: exercise, face, inflammation*, mirror, sun. 
Mean frequency = 139.75, SD = 179.73; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 3.58. 
Neutral-personal words: alphabetical, article, build, oven, upon. 
Mean frequency = 139.25, SD = 179.28; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 3.21. 
Other delusion words: compensation, fluid, milk, tuberculosis, whipround. 
Mean frequency = 32.50, SD = 46.75; Mean length = 8.40, SD = 3.78. 
Neutral-other words: handkerchief, localisation, pole, sideboard, trees. 
Mean frequency = 32.50, SD = 45.01; Mean length = 8.20, SD = 3.56. 
52. Personal delusion words: adopted, celt, conspiracy, jewish, sister. 
Mean frequency = 39.40, SD = 33.09; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 2.19. 
Neutral-personal words: auditorium, bean, joined, levels, setting. 
Mean frequency = 39.40, SD = 33.09; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 2.19. 
Other delusion words: exercise, face, inflammation, mirror, sun. 
Mean frequency = 139.75, SD = 179.73; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 3.58. 
Neutral-other words: alphabetical, article, build, oven, upon. 
Mean frequency = 139.25, SD = 179.28; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 3.21. 
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APPENDIX 5 (Contd.) 
Word lists used for the schizophrenia Stroop task (Contd.) 
Individual word lists <Contd.) 
53. Personal delusion words: benefit, bully, fraud, informer, victimise. 
Mean frequency = 15.40, SD = 25.58; Mean length = 6.80, SD = 1.79. 
Neutral-personal words: afterward, pasture, portable, solid, tally. 
Mean frequency = 15.40, SD = 25.58; Mean length = 6.80, SD = 1.79. 
Other delusion words: adopted, celt, conspiracy, jewish, sister. 
Mean frequency = 39.40, SD = 33.09; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 2.19. 
Neutral-other words: auditorium, bean, joined, levels, setting. 
Mean frequency = 39.40, SD = 33.09; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 2.19. 
54. Personal delusion words: death, eye, pictures, shoulder, thief. 
Mean frequency = 96.60, SD = 82.75; Mean length = 5.80, SD = 2.17. 
Neutral-personal words: afternoon, dale, equally, shown, wood. 
Mean frequency = 96.60, SD = 83.75; Mean length = 5.80, SD = 2.17. 
Other delusion words: bed, flashes, heart, man, sleep. 
Mean frequency = 304.00, SD = 436.52; Mean length = 4.60, SD = 1.67. 
Neutral-other words: ball, cab, paper, various, where,. 
Mean frequency = 300.60, SD = 416.86; Mean length = 4.80, SD = 1.48. 
55. Personal delusion words: abusive, follow, kim, swearing, telepathy. 
Mean frequency = 24.00, SD = 48.65; Mean length = 7.20, SD = 2.77. 
Neutral-personal words: diagonal, afterward, pebble, shrubbery, tea. 
Mean frequency = 24.00, SD = 48.65; Mean length = 7.20, SD = 2.77. 
Other delusion words: head, hollow, nerves, spiders, wood. 
Mean frequency = 101.20, SD = 172.79; Mean length = 5.40, SD = 1.34. 
Neutral-other words: breeze, cartoon, hill, peel, rather. 
Mean frequency = 101.00, SD = 170.10; Mean length = 5.40, SD = 1.34. 
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APPENDIX 5 (Contd.) 
Word lists used for the schizophrenia Stroop task (Contd.) 
Individual wrd lists (Contd,) 
56. Personal delusion words: affair, control, hem, implant, pull. 
Mean frequency = 56.00, SD = 81.80; Mean length = 5.40, SD = 1.82. 
Neutral-personal words: cake, hop, lettuce, market, precise. 
Mean frequency = 56.00, SD =82.29 ; Mean length = 5.40, SD = 1.82. 
Other delusion words: abusive, follow, kim, swearing, telepathy. 
Mean frequency = 24.00, SD = 48.65; Mean length = 7.20, SD = 2.77. 
Neutral-other words: diagonal, afterward, pebble, shrubbery, tea. 
Mean frequency = 24.00, SD = 48.65; Mean length = 7.20, SD = 2.77. 
57. Personal delusion words: birds, face, mirror, punishment, scabs*. 
Mean frequency = 132.25, SD = 185.13; Mean length = 6.00, SD = 2.35. 
Neutral-personal words: agriculture, avenue, broom, page, upon. 
Mean frequency = 132.50, SD = 184.18; Mean length = 6.20, SD = 2.77. 
Other delusion words: affair, control, hem, implant, pull. 
Mean frequency = 56.00, SD = 81.80; Mean length = 5.40, SD = 1.82. 
Neutral-other words: cake, hop, lettuce, market, precise. 
Mean frequency = 56.00, SD =82.29 ; Mean length = 5.40, SD = 1.82. 
58. Personal delusion words: devil, healing, heaven, pray, singing. 
Mean frequency = 22.20, SD = 11.86; Mean length = 5.80, SD = 1.30. 
Neutral-personal words: badge, cattle, circuit, fellows, nets. 
Mean frequency = 22.40, SD = 11.59; Mean length = 5.80, SD = 1.30. 
Other delusion words: birds, face, mirror, punishment, scabs*. 
Mean frequency = 132.25, SD = 185.13; Mean length = 6.00, SD = 2.35. 
Neutral-other words: agriculture, avenue, broom, page, upon. 
Mean frequency = 132.50, SD = 184.18; Mean length = 6.20, SD = 2.77. 
* denotes word did not appear in LOB Corpus. Word-matching approximated in 
such cases. 
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APPENDIX 6 
Planned comparisons between colour-naming times on test 
and neutral lists in the schizophrenia Stroop task (Chapter 
Six) 
1. Personal delusion x neutral: r=l .03 
2. Other delusion x neutral: f=2.66 
3. Depression x neutral: r=1.43 
4. Anxiety x neutral: f=2.75 
Critical value of t (df=6) with alpha set at 0.005 = 5.95 
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APPENDIX 7 
Correlations between HAD scores and the colour-naming 
interference indices for the schizophrenia Stroop task 
(Chapter Six) 
Word list 
H A D 
Anxiety 
H A D 
Depression 
Personal delusion -0.360 0.078 
Other personal 0.427 0.288 
Depression -0.324 -0.073 
Anxiety 0.072 0.322 
Critical value of r at the 5% level (df=2) =.7067 
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APPENDIX 8 
Word lists used for the student Stroop task (Chapter 
Seven) 
la. Exam-related words: exams, paper, question, results, revision. 
Mean frequency = 136.40, SD = 119.41; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 1.52. 
l b . Neutral-exam words: atlas, component, probably, story, street. 
Mean frequency = 137.60, SD = 118.96; Mean length = 6.60, SD = 1.82. 
2a. College-related words: bedder, college, fellow, pigeonhole, porters. 
Mean frequency = 68.33, SD = 70.95; Mean length = 7.20, SD = 1.64. 
2b. Neutral-college words: aggregated, centre, groves, indicate, ornate. 
Mean frequency = 68.33, SD = 69.96; Mean length = 7.40, SD = 1.67. 
3a. Depression-related words: defeat, depressed, hopeless, miserable, sad. 
Mean frequency = 22.20, SD = 14.29; Mean length = 7.00, SD = 2.55. 
3b. Neutral-depression words: casually, introduce, paints, rod, similarly. 
Mean frequency = 22.20, SD = 14.29; Mean length = 7.00, SD = 2.55. 
4a. Anxiety-related words: anxious, nervous, stress, tense, worried. 
Mean frequency = 39.00, SD = 17.79; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 0.89. 
4b. Neutral-anxiety words: adult, castle, doorway, feather, library. 
Mean frequency = 38.20, SD = 19.70; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 0.89. 
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APPENDIX 9 
Planned comparisons between errors on test and neutral lists 
in the student Stroop task (Chapter Seven) 
1. Lent test lists x Lent neutral lists: 1=1.17 
2. Summer test lists x Lent neutral lists: f=0.00 
3. Lent test lists x Summer test lists: f=2.13 
4. Lent neural lists x Summer neutral lists: /=2.20 
5. Lent x Summer (all errors): /=2.74 
Critical value of t (df=8) with alpha set at 0.005 = 5.04 
194 
Appendices 
APPENDIX 10 
Planned comparisons between colour-naming on test and 
neutral lists in the student Stroop task (Chapter Seven) 
Lent t Mean Sd 
1. Exam x neutral: r=2.00 1.00 1.50 
2. College x neutral: f=2.65 3.67 4.15 
3. Depression x neutral: f=0.24 2.56 5.88 
4. Anxiety x neutral: f=0.51 0.44 2.60 
Summer 
1. Exam x neutral: f=1.57 2.67 5.10 
2. College x neutral: f=3.33 4.00 3.61 
3. Depression x neutral: f=0.56 0.78 4.15 
4. Anxiety x neutral: r=0.24 0.22 2.73 
Critical value of t (df=8) with alpha set at 0.005 = 5.04 
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APPENDIX 11 
Correlations between HAD scores and the colour-naming 
interference indices for the student Stroop task (Chapter 
Seven) 
HAD Anxiety HAD Depression 
Word List Lent Summer Lent Summer 
Exams .310 .027 .355 -.280 
College -.136 -.181 .409 .415 
Depression .022 -.114 .100 -.006 
Anxiety -.204 -.382 .399 .352 
Critical value of r at the 5% level (df=7) = .6664 
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APPENDIX 12 
Words used in the biker Stroop task (Chapter Seven) 
la. Bikes-related words: harley, honda, kawasaki, suzuki, yamaha. 
Mean frequency - Not applicable; Mean length = 6.20, SD = 1.10. 
l b . Neutral-bikes words: alphabet, editor, garden, ideally, pedal. 
Mean frequency - Not applicable; Mean length = 6.40, SD =1.14. 
2a. Depression-related words: defeat, depressed, hopeless, miserable, sad. 
Mean frequency = 22.20, SD = 14.29; Mean length = 7.00, SD = 2.55. 
2b. Neutral-depression words: casually, introduce, paints, rod, similarly. 
Mean frequency = 22.20, SD = 14.29; Mean length = 7.00, SD = 2.55. 
3a. Anxiety-related words: anxious, nervous, stress, tense, worried. 
Mean frequency = 39.00, SD = 17.79; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 0.89. 
3b. Neutral-anxiety words: adult, castle, doorway, feather, library. 
Mean frequency = 38.20, SD = 19.70; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 0.89. 
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APPENDIX 13 
Correlations between HAD scores and the colour •naming 
interference indices for the biker Stroop task (Chapter 
Seven) 
HAD Anxiety HAD Depression 
Word List Bikers Controls Bikers Controls 
Bikes -.462 .475 -.115 . 4 9 8 " 
Depression .345 -.758 .224 -.615 
Anxiety -.140 .149 .396 .393 
Critical value of r at the 5% level (df=6) = .7067 
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APPENDIX 14 
Word lists used in the rower Stroop task (Chapter Seven) 
la. Rowing-related words: blade, catch, finish, rating, stroke. 
Mean frequency = 26.20, SD = 17.11; Mean length = 5.60, SD = 0.55. 
l b . Neutral-rowing words: bonus, cereal, dozen, review, summit. 
Mean frequency = 26.20, SD = 17.31; Mean length = 5.60, SD = 0.55. 
2a. Depression-related words: defeat, depressed, hopeless, miserable, sad. 
Mean frequency = 22.20, SD = 14.29; Mean length = 7.00, SD = 2.55. 
2b. Neutral-depression words: casually, introduce, paints, rod, similarly. 
Mean frequency = 22.20, SD = 14.29; Mean length = 7.00, SD = 2.55. 
3a. Anxiety-related words: anxious, nervous, stress, tense, worried. 
Mean frequency = 39.00, SD = 17.79; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 0.89. 
3b. Neutral-anxiety words: adult, castle, doorway, feather, library. 
Mean frequency = 38.20, SD = 19.70; Mean length = 6.40, SD = 0.89. 
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APPENDIX 15 
Planned comparisons between errors on the test and 
neutral lists for the rower Stroop task (Chapter Seven) 
1. Rowers 
a) Rowing vs neutral rowing: t= 1.449 
b) Depression vs neutral depression: t= 1.820 
c) Anxiety vs neutral anxiety: f=2.244 
2. Controls 
a) Rowing vs neutral rowing: t-= 1.149 
b) Depression vs neutral depression: t =0.000 
c) Anxiety vs neutral anxiety: t =0.000 
Critical value of t (df=l 1) with alpha set at 0.005 = 4.43 
Planned comparisons between errors on the test and 
neutral lists for the rower Stroop task (Chapter Seven) 
Rowers versus controls 
a) Rowing: r=0.226 
b) Neutral rowing: t= 1.076 
c) Depression: t= 1.387 
d) Neutral depression: f=0.000 
e) Anxiety: t= 1.067 
f ) Neutral anxiety: f=0.833 
Critical value of t (df=22) with alpha set at 0.005 = 3.79 
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APPENDIX 16 
Correlations between HAD scores and the colour-naming 
interference indices for the rower Stroop task (Chapter 
Seven) 
HAD Anxiety HAD Depression 
Word List Rowers Controls Rowers Controls 
Rowers -.119 -.461 -.040 
Depression -.300 -.586 .429 -.489 
Anxiety .438 -.483 .274 -.554 
Critical value of r at the 5% level (df=9) = .6021 
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